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Communism and War

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Radicalism and Communism

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The Low Impact of Soviet Writing and Aid on Indian Thinking and Policy

Stephen Clarkson

IN the struggle that has been waged by the super powers for the " hearts and minds " of the third world, it has been assumed that the ideological combat was not just a rationalization of the great power conflict but also a direct appeal to the uncommitted nations for them to adopt socialist or capitalist models for their own development. Politicians justified aid programmes as the means to buttress recipient countries from the subversive dangers of capitalism or communism and academics devoted monographs to assess whether countries X, Y and Z were being drawn into the orbit of the imperialist bloc or socialist camp respectively. As this was the era of social science model-building in the Western academies and nation-building by the mostly intellectual new leaderships in the third world, it was not unreasonable to assume that ideas would have a formative impact on the political, economic and even social systems of these " emerging " societies. Indeed the events that captured the headlines and dominated the book catalogues on third world problems concerned radical changes in these new states, whether the erection of Castro's Marxism-Leninism or the downfall of Nkrumah's socialism. By inference the leaderships, including the elites in the civil service, the economy, the press and the universities, could be shifted from one development path to another as if they were sitting on some huge teeter-totter just needing an ideological impulse to push them up or down to heaven or hell.

Recent political science research has not addressed itself to assessing what impact super power theories and models have actually had. To take India, the most thoroughly studied of third world countries, as an example we have studies on Indian public opinion concerning the USA and USSR,[1] comparative research on Soviet and American aid to India,[2] studies on the Soviet ideological line for Indian communism,[3] sensitive analyses of the internal dynamics of Indian communism,[4] and anti-communist descriptions of the extent of Soviet propaganda distribution in

[1] *Monthly Public Opinion Survey*, Nos. 7, 8, 9 (1956).

[2] Wolfgang G. Friedmann, George Kalmanoff and Robert F. Meagher, *International Financial Aid* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 498 pp.

[3] John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India. A Study in the Postwar Evolution of International Communist Strategy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), 220 pp.

[4] Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Communism in Indian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 455 pp.

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India.[5] No work has been done on the influence of either the USSR or the USA on the thinking or policy-making of Indians.

Since it was felt that an analysis of Soviet development theory would be incomplete without an assessment of its impact, the final phase of my research was a hundred-interview field trip to investigate the influence of Soviet thinking on the third world elite of a specific country. Since there is no "typical" developing country and since it was hypothesized that evidence of Soviet influence would be difficult to identify, India was chosen as the site for the field work: the interviews were carried out during March and April 1972 just after the liberation of East Pakistan by the Indian army under the umbrella of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty and immediately following the March state elections in which Indira Gandhi's Congress Party had elicited a second sweeping mandate of public confidence. It was in fact a period of national confidence vis-à-vis the outside world and, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, a period when feelings towards the USSR were as friendly and unapprehensive as they have ever been. If the time for the research was biased towards favourable responses concerning the Soviet Union, so too was the selection of interviewees weighted in favour of knowledge of Soviet thinking, and its possible impact on the policy process within the Indian government.[6]

The object of the study was simply to determine what influence Soviet writing about India had on the country's intellectuals and policy-makers. Given the exacerbation of India's relations with the USA and the excel-

[5] Peter Sager, *Moscow's Hand in India. An Analysis of Soviet Propaganda* (Berne: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966), 224 pp.

[6] As the objective was to ascertain what influence Soviet political and economic thinking had on Indian thought and policy-making, the following persons were interviewed: 9 journalists, 17 economists, 10 international relations experts, 10 other political scientists, 6 historians, 15 senior civil servants at the secretary, joint secretary or adviser level, 4 in the government circle, 2 ministers and 2 ex-ministers, 4 other politicians, 20 entrepreneurs, 14 from the private sector and 6 general managers of public sector corporations. Half of the interviewees received by mail in advance a copy of a paper written by this author on the Soviet Model of Development for India. The others received a summary of this paper or had read it as printed in the widely circulated intellectual journal, *The Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay) of 22 March 1972. In addition to the 101 direct interviews the author had contact with 104 other Indian academics in groups devoted to discussing the Soviet model for India, 66 at three formal papers presented by the author (one in Jaipur and two in New Delhi) and 40 at four discussions held on the same subject (one in Allahabad and three in Delhi). These discussions were with groups who could be presumed to be among the most knowledgeable and interested in Soviet writings and the Indo-Soviet relationship. Since there is no clearly demarcated elite "population" of which a scientific sample could be made, the research strategy was to talk with all those Indians at the upper leadership levels with a possible serious interest in the Soviet view. As the expertise of the interviewees ranged from the Planning Commission to the Ministry of External Affairs, from India Oil to the State Trading Corporation, from the Delhi School of Economics to the School of International Studies, Nehru University, from the radical weekly *Frontier* to the moderate *Times of India*, no attempt was made to impose a standard interview schedule. With the general subject matter defined by the author's paper on the Soviet Model for India, the discussions ranged widely depending on the interests of the subject who was questioned on whatever aspect of the Soviet relationship was relevant to his own professional or ideological position.

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lence of recent Indo-Soviet relations; given the generally satisfactory aid relationship through which Russian credits had made it possible for India to establish a large number of state sector enterprises, and given the coincidence of views between Soviet Marxism-Leninism and the bulk of Indian intellectuals concerning the importance of national economic independence, the imperialism of American foreign policy, and the need for state control of the private sector; the expectation behind this research was that the Soviet intellectual and policy influence in India would turn out to be considerable. In fact the research revealed that neither in theory nor in practice have the Soviets had any noticeable impact on Indian elites' ways of thinking or acting in governmental affairs.

HOWEVER huge India may be as the second most populous nation on earth, its elites are small. The English-speaking elites that actually make government decisions and formulate educated opinion are concentrated in the capital, New Delhi, the commercial centres of Bombay and Calcutta and a handful of better university departments. Whatever truth there may be in the view that the " real " India is beyond the grasp of the English-speaking elite, it can be taken for granted that whatever influence foreign thought, in this case Soviet, has would be first discernible in these English-speaking national elites.

Journalists

Because the intellectual world is effectively so small, the role of the journalist as intellectual pace-setter is greatly increased. In what is a largely conformist intellectual milieu, ideas circulate rapidly. When attempting to feel the pulse of Indian thinking one is immediately referred by local intellectuals to the senior columnists and editorial writers of New Delhi's major newspapers. Interviews with these journalists revealed a set of attitudes that turned out to be widely held by all the academic interviewees: a blend of national self-confidence and remoteness from foreign thought.

The first indication of what turned out to be a general theme running through interviewees' minds on the irrelevance of foreign thinking was expressed directly by one senior journalist as a general disinterest in all foreign writings about India on the grounds that no outsiders could possibly comprehend the complexity of Indian social reality. Asked why his paper has never reprinted a Soviet article on its editorial page, an editor at the *Times of India* responded that, if they were to reprint foreign material it would come from the London *Times*, not the Moscow *New Times*. It was not from animosity towards the Soviet Union that the journalists interviewed expressed low interest in Soviet writing. Quite on the contrary, during the course of interviews it became clear that this reluctance concerning Soviet thought had nothing to do with attitudes towards the Soviet Union which were warm when they were not

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enthusiastic. That the Russians have proven themselves India's best friends in action was a point repeatedly made by these editorial writers who clearly had no fear of the Soviets nor any concern that dependence would lead to improper behaviour by the USSR. While this self-confidence contrasted markedly with the anxieties expressed by journalists such as Kuldip Nayar only a year or two before [7] it is even more striking that such politically pro-Soviet attitudes could coexist with ideologically anti-Marxist-Leninist views. Explaining why the India press carries virtually no Soviet material, most journalists evinced a great distrust for the political bias of Soviet scholars and what they consider the resulting low quality of their publications. One editor's explanation for not publishing Soviet material was that India has a democratic political system; by inference the Soviet Union's undemocratic thought was not welcome. Just as friendliness towards the Soviet Union did not prevent apprehension concerning Soviet writings, so too a distrust of Marxist-Leninist ideology did not prevent a much greater interest in Soviet national interests than in Soviet ideological formulations. The final straw breaking the credibility of Soviet writings for one Indian journalist was what he saw as a contradiction between the socialist agrarian theory they are preaching abroad (collectivization and cooperatives) and the actual capitalism they are practising at home (increased size of private plots and de-collectivization). If the Soviets are coming to the Indians for help in plant genetics it is understandable that this Indian writer specializing in agrarian problems could not take Soviet ideological claims seriously. It is not very surprising that Indian journalists generally agree in their self-confident perception of the Indo-Soviet relationship and their disregard of Soviet writing. The ideological distance between the *Patriot* on the centre left and the *Times of India* on the centre right is not very great: conformism and considerable deference towards the governmental line is a common characteristic of the partially controlled daily press in India. What is far more surprising is the consensus concerning Soviet writings that was revealed by interviews of Indian academics from the moderate centre to the far left of the ideological spectrum. While the amount of knowledge of and the level of interest in Soviet writings vary among different academics depending on their area of specialization, the attitudes of those Indian intellectuals who could *a priori* be expected to be most familiar with Soviet thinking can best be presented in three dimensions: little information, low credibility and poor personal contact.

Non-Marxist Intellectuals

The most striking aspect of the intellectual relationship between India and the Soviet Union is the extremely low level of information among

[7] Kuldip Nayar, *Between the Lines* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1969), p. 119: "Had New Delhi not been dependent on Moscow for arms, it . . . might have moved away from the Soviet Union as happened in the case of the USA when it started giving arms to Pakistan."

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Indian academics concerning Soviet development theory. When the author presented papers on the Soviet development model in university centres the general reaction was one of great interest in information which the listeners had never heard before. At Jaipur University, after speaking at a refresher course for political science lecturers from across North India, he was thanked for telling them something about which they all "knew very little." Even at such a respected establishment as the graduate School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, which specializes in foreign affairs and area studies, the level of knowledge about the Soviet Union in general and Soviet thinking in particular was also low. Only one lecturer gives courses on Soviet politics. While there is some interest in communist political theory, this is restricted to a knowledge of Marx learned through Western, anti-Marxist texts. In fact, notwithstanding the School's interest in area studies, the Soviet Union, Central Asia and East Europe included, the official curriculum for all courses given there only included nine Soviet books. Even adding two works by Trotsky, the Soviet-authored listings made up only 0·7 per cent of the recommended readings.[8] The lack of knowledge about Soviet writings on India did not reflect disinterest in Soviet relations with India. On the contrary discussion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, and of the new power balance in Asia resulting from the liberation of Bangladesh, all indicated a lively interest in Soviet performance and intentions. Economists are interested in the efficiency of Soviet aid projects compared with Western project performance. Liberal political scientists are interested in the kind of relations the Indian communist parties, particularly the reputedly pro-Soviet CPI, have with Moscow. But the question of whether the Soviet academic researchers have anything relevant to say about India is a non-starter to Indian intellectuals.

THIS ignorance of Soviet writing on India is not a product of disinterest in Indian problems; on the contrary Indian social science is characterized by an almost total preoccupation with Indian issues. Nor is it a question of language though it is true that facility with the Russian language is an extremely rare professional quality among Indian academics. Much is translated from Russian into English in other areas of knowledge. Soviet writings on India could be translated if the interest were there. The crux of the problem, however, was reiterated in interview after interview: Soviet scholarship suffers from an extraordinary credibility gap among Indians. What material Indian scholars have read is called by them "turgid," "monotonous," "unreadable." Worse than the style is the perceived poor quality of the writing which is dismissed time after time as "only propaganda" "jargon," or "rhetoric." The Soviet intellectual is considered not to be free to write what he con-

[8] *Syllabus on International Relations and Area Studies & Books Recommended (1970–71)* (School of International Studies: Jawaharlal Nehru University, 121 pp., mimeo.)

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siders the truth, undertaking research only to refute accusations made by the Chinese or "bourgeois ideologists." Where they are not being defensive the Soviets are considered to be "political" academics, so constrained by party directives that they could only present the official view on any particular topic. Underlying all these stereotypes of Soviet writing is the feeling that there is a double contradiction in Soviet social science work on developing countries. One contradiction is between the Soviet writings on the third world which are revolutionary in tone or conclusions and Soviet foreign policy towards third world countries which is accommodating if not supporting reactionary regimes. The other contradiction, between Marxist-Leninist theory which is hostile to bourgeois capitalist systems and actual Soviet analysis of India which is presented as a progressive country, further discredits the Soviet school among the more radical thinkers.

IT might be thought that this set of unambiguously scornful attitudes is bred of ignorance and could be corrected by better personal contact between Indian scholars and their Soviet colleagues. This is not the case. Contempt for Soviet writings may not be bred on familiarity, but it is certainly nourished by contact with the Soviet academic establishment. This contact takes two forms, meeting Soviet scholars visiting India and dealing with the Soviet Ministry of Education about research matters. When questioned about Soviet academics visiting India, Indian intellectuals have a number of responses, none favourable. The general view as summarized by one political scientist is that they "come as academics but talk like diplomats." Even those political economists whose better quality books are translated into English have disappointed their Indian interlocutors. Gordon-Polonskaya, author of an important study on Pakistan, gave a seminar at the School of International Studies and appeared "doctrinaire," unwilling to discuss questions in the seminar. More recently when Grigory Kotovsky was in New Delhi in March 1972 it was noticed that he diplomatically declined to answer a journalist's questions concerning current Indian problems on the grounds that this was "politics" and he was a scholar. This inhibition against frank and open discussions is compared with the more free-wheeling, self-confident behaviour of Western professors who, while their bias is equally identifiable, are found more stimulating because of their readiness to engage in intellectual battle.

A more specific, professional complaint comes from those Indians who have tried with little success to get facilities for research in the Soviet Union or who are frustrated by having the research projects of doctoral students wanting to do field work in the Soviet Union rejected by Soviet authorities.

Thus, whether the Soviet writings are dismissed for being determined more by ideology or foreign policy than by scientific considerations, whether the attitudes are based on direct knowledge of working

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conditions in the Soviet Union or whether the scepticism is based on a knowledge more of Soviet English-language propaganda than the best Soviet scholarship, the views of liberal intellectuals in India are strikingly similar to those of their Western colleagues, despite the unusually good relations of India with the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet attitudes of the Indian elite.

The Left Academics

It might be argued that these very anti-Marxist-Leninist attitudes are only to be expected from liberal academics brought up in the shadow of Oxford and Harvard. Their standards of scholarship are Western and the better of them identify themselves as part of the international social science community. It comes as somewhat more of a surprise to find that the large number of left-wing political scientists, historians and economists in India harbour identical views towards the Soviet school of analysis though for somewhat different reasons.

One encounters as little informed knowledge about Soviet writings among radical as among moderate scholars. Whether formally members of one of the communist parties, ex-communists or independent Marxists, these intellectuals are less fellow travellers than parallel travellers: they are working with similar hypotheses, using similar concepts but not particularly interested in what their Soviet counterparts have produced. Take the case of Aurobindo Ghose a doctoral student at the Delhi School of Economics: a radical, he is working on Indian monopoly capital.[9] When apprised of the Soviet work that has been going on for 15 years on the same subject he was interested enough to want bibliographical references to any relevant English translations but was not excited to the point of wanting to go to Moscow to find out what has been achieved by Soviet scholars. A more senior colleague, Krishna Bharadwaj is working on a political economy theory of development relating different modes of production in a global analysis without any direct knowledge of the large Soviet literature on this subject.[10] Even a well-known young radical economist like Nirmal Chandra working on the definition of rural classes in Bangladesh and who does refer in his writing to a Soviet book on this subject by Gankovsky and Gordon-Polanskaya has had no intellectual contact of any kind with these authors apart from reading and citing their book.[11]

Whether it is Paresh Chattopadhyay writing on state capitalism [12] or

[9] Aurobindo Ghose, "Monopoly in Indian Industry: An Approach," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VII, Nos. 5, 6 and 7 (February 1972), pp. 385–92.

[10] Krishna Bharadwaj, "Notes on Political Economy of Development: The Indian Case," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VII, Nos. 5, 6 and 7 (February 1972), pp. 317–28.

[11] N. K. Chandra, "The Class Character of the Pakistani State," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VII, Nos. 5, 6 and 7 (February 1972), pp. 275–92.

[12] Parish Chattopadhyay, "Aspects of the Growth of State Capitalism in India," in Government of Kerala, *Alternative Policies for the Fourth Five Year Plan* (Trivandrum: The Government Press, 1969), pp. 71–89.

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Ranjit Sau trying to formulate the laws of development of the Indian economy,[13] whether it is Ashwami Saith working on the peasant economy[14] or Stephen Ganguli analysing Indian capitalism,[15] the academics of the radical left appear intellectually impervious to Soviet writings.

An examination of the references in the radical literature confirms this low degree of intellectual communication with Soviet sources. In a symposium edited by Mathew Kurian, *Alternate Policies for the Fourth Five Year Plan*, in which a large number of Marxist writers offered a critique of Congress planning, only two of the book's 257 footnotes referred to Soviet works.[16]

AMONG Indian Marxist scholars this absence of Soviet intellectual output is less a result of ignorance than a series of individual rejections of Soviet work which has been seen at first hand to be inadequate. While liberal intellectuals ignore Soviet writing out of disinterest, Indian Marxists reject Soviet "hacks" with the emotion of a jilted lover. Whereas the younger academics at the doctoral level are completely ignorant of Soviet work, their more senior colleagues who have passed through the Communist Party in one or other of its former incarnations have come to a very similar, though more passionate scorn of Soviet scholarship than liberal intellectuals. Soviet intellectuals are not searching for the truth, they say; their work is politically controlled so it is futile to study what they write; they are dogmatic, sterilely using preformed analytical frameworks; their scholarship is poor using random footnotes to pretend it is serious.

This rejection of Soviet thought is not restricted to political economists. Marxist historians assume an attitude of amused tolerance in discussing Soviet historical work on India. While they appreciate and use some of the English translations of Soviet works on the Indian national movement since these do accept colonialism as a reality and do not try to explain it away as do Western historians, they show no real interest in Soviet historiography. For instance they did not think recent Soviet thinking on the relevance to India of the concept of "Asiatic mode of production" was useful enough to translate into English.

GIVEN the strength of these attitudes, it is no wonder that personal contact by radical intellectuals with Soviet scholars simply reinforces

[13] Ranjit K. Sau, "Indian Economic Growth: Constraints and Prospects," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VII, Nos. 5, 6 and 7 (February 1972), pp. 361–78.

[14] Ashwani Saith and Ajay Tankha, "Agrarian Transition of the Peasantry: A Study of a West Up Village," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VII, No. 14 (1 April 1972), pp. 707–23.

[15] S. Ganguli, "Public Sector and Private Sector: Dynamics of the System," in Government of Kerala, *Alternative Policies for the Fourth Five Year Plan* (Trivandrum: The Government Press, 1969), pp. 207–25.

[16] Government of Kerala, *Alternative Policies for the Fourth Five Year Plan* (Trivandrum: The Government Press, 1969).

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this rejection. Observation of the Soviet delegates at the large international seminar on "Imperialism, Independence and Social Transformation in the Developing Countries" simply reinforced these attitudes. The Soviet delegates were felt to be highly political in their participation, applauding Mrs Gandhi's path of state capitalist development for simple *raison d'état*. This hostility towards all things Soviet is considerably strengthened by the radical Marxists' perception of the Soviet Union's policy towards India as backing the Congress Party in order to annihilate the Marxist Communist Party (CPM), the one party that has been creatively applying Marxism in praxis in West Bengal and Kerala. Even those on the left who are not politically committed to partisan activity have been unimpressed by the quality of visiting Soviet scholars. At the Indian Statistical Institute in Calcutta, for instance, Soviet agronomists Rastyannikov and Maksimov are remembered as pleasant visitors but not to be taken as seriously as a foreign scholar like Daniel Thorner who has spent years in the field and so talks with great personal expertise and direct knowledge.

The Centre Left CPI: An Oasis of Influence?

Among the pro-Soviet communists in and around the CPI (Communist Party of India), one would think that there would at least be considerable Soviet influence. This, after all, is the wing of the communist movement that has kept open its lines of communication with Moscow. Having succeeded in gaining access to the Congress-run government by electoral alliances and informal cooption into the government, it shares the same view on state capitalism as does the official Soviet line. As the most atrophied of the three communist factions, could it not be expected to maintain its historical record of dependence on direction from Moscow? Once again expectations are belied by research. Interviews with CPI intellectuals indicated that Soviet scholarly influence is as weak among the faithful as it is among the unconverted and the heretics of Indian communism.

THE level of information among Indian communists about Soviet writings on India is not perceptibly higher than the little knowledge displayed by other intellectuals. None of the CPI's leading intellects reads Russian so the informational sources are as restricted for them as they are for others—and no Indian is intellectually satisfied by the crumbs that fall occasionally from the weekly *New Times* and monthly *International Affairs*. As for translations of other Soviet writings, the Party's organs are unable to handle such a task. The weekly paper *New Age* has no space for reprints because of its limited resources. In any case the low rate of literacy in English and the few intellectual resources in the Party makes it practically impossible to have a serious ideological and theoretical CPI publication. Even the monthly *Mainstream* known as a CPI-inspired magazine which can afford good design

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and long articles only devoted 3 per cent of its columns to re-printing Soviet articles in 1971. Even were more Soviet indology to be available in English it is doubtful how much impact it would have on CPI thinking. As Mohit Sen, the Party's leading theoretician, put it in an interview, Indian communists have been misled too many times by the errors of judgment and analysis made by Moscow observers such as Dyakov and Balabushevich for Soviet writing to enjoy the authority it did in the decade 1945–55. Once analytically bitten, twice ideologically shy. What is more, he complained that Soviet indology is not relevant to the Party's day-to-day concerns since they are academic rather than political writings. More important according to Sen was the desire by the CPI to be intellectually independent of Moscow. Since the concepts and the methodology of Marxism-Leninism are universal, they feel no need for instruction in how to use the basic intellectual tools. These should better be applied by local communists to analysing the Indian scene than by foreigners working abroad, however superior their research resources might be.

THE unenthusiastic CPI attitudes towards Soviet indology are further explained by the CPI's general thinking concerning Soviet writings. Hiren Mukherji spoke with sadness of the "shoddy" scholarship which the Soviet writers still demonstrate. Even for the pro-Soviet Indian communists, Soviet indology suffers from a large credibility gap. It is characterized by analytical wish-fulfilment, oversimplification of political problems and imposing stereotypes on the Indian reality.

NOR do the pro-Soviet Indian communists get more inspiration from their personal contacts with visiting Soviet scholars than do other Indians. Lack of Soviet support, not excessive control, was their complaint. Hiren Mukherji complained of the Soviets' failure to answer the serious allegations made against the USSR by revisionist and Maoist critics. The Russians do nothing to offset their embarrassing image of a non-revolutionary power. Mohit Sen complains that letters written to Soviet scholars remain unanswered whereas letters to Western Marxists like Dobb or Sweazy receive a prompt reply. These complaints have been brought to the attention of the Soviet comrades. While Sen was careful to say that he was not charging the Soviets with intellectual colonialism, he clearly felt that his Soviet comrades were not much intellectual help to the CPI.

Objective data substantiate the CPI intellectuals' own reports that the Soviet influence on CPI thinking is equally low. Even though the propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union is thought by anti-communists to be colossal, such events as the World Book Fair held in New Delhi in March 1972 indicate that the Soviets' effort is not at all directed at communicating their political economy analysis of India to the Indians. True there was a large book display by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga in which the CPI People's Publishing House (PPH) shared the space. Of

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the Soviets' English translations available for purchase there was only one of any substance on Indian political economy. The rest were either propaganda brochures or reprints from Marx and Lenin. Even the Russian language books on display had no indology within their rank. It was as if the Soviets wanted to give the impression that they did no serious work on India in their own Academy of Sciences. This impression is not belied by the PPH catalogues. In its 1971–72 edition the PPH catalogue lists only 12 Soviet books out of 115; of these 12 only three are about India. In the catalogue " Soviet books in English 1972 " 21 out of 725 titles concern the third world and of these 15 are on India, while 58 others are reprints from Marx' and Lenin's writings. In a third catalogue, " New Books in English and Indian Languages from U.S.S.R." none of the 214 titles is about India and only three are concerned with third world problems.

Consistent with the lack of serious intellectual input from the Soviet Union into Indian radical thinking is the minimal contact that CPI thinkers have with Soviet academic sources. An analysis of the footnotes of the five most important recent books authored or edited by CPI intellectuals corroborate this psychological distance. Three books have no references at all to Soviet works. Two are collections of essays, *Das Kapital Centenary Volume*, a symposium edited by Mohit Sen and M. B. Rao (1968), and *Homage to Karl Marx*, a symposium edited by the former PCI Secretary-General, P. C. Joshi (1969). The third, the *Evolution of Agrarian Relations in India* by Bhowani Sen (1962) is particularly remarkable since the leading CPI expert on agrarian problems wrote a 295-page book on agrarian problems in India without making one reference to the translated work of Kotovsky not to mention other Soviet writings on the subject. Gautan Chattopadhyay's *Communism and Bengal's Freedom Movement* (1970) contains the largest number of Soviet footnotes of this group, though most of them are references to English versions of Soviet-controlled press like *Imprecor* and *New Times*. Four of the 242 notes in *Society and Revolution: Essays in Honour of Engels* (1970) refer to Soviet material. Of the 1,077 footnotes in the five PPH books under analysis only 18 were from Soviet sources. When CPI leaders talk of wanting to be intellectually independent the autonomy of their printed work justifies their claim to considerable intellectual isolation.

The Barriers to Communication

If intellectuals left, right and centre show the same pattern of little knowledge, low credibility and poor personal contact with Soviet intellectual sources, the prospects for increasing Soviet intellectual influence in India can hardly be considered rosy. Indeed the efforts made by the CPI to establish some intellectual autonomy beyond the Soviet apron strings represents a trend visible throughout the academic establishment to reject foreign models and standards in favour of local approaches.

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On India's intellectual left, for instance, an indigenous school of Marxist scholars is crystallizing. Although it is weakened by ideological and political cleavages, this collection of individuals is finding a corporate identity through occasional seminars held on specific issues and an intellectual forum in the *Economic and Political Weekly* of Bombay which keeps the left open to non-Marxists and communicates the new Marxist thinking to a wide public of government and political leaders. What makes this emerging Indian Marxist school congenitally unresponsive to Russian intellectual production is the perceived conservatism of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Whatever its state of intellectual disarray, radical Indian thinking is not fossilized and would greatly resent the establishment orientation of Soviet writing which, it is felt, uncritically accepts the virtues of state capitalism for India.

A second obstacle in the way of any Soviet impact is the fundamentally Western orientation of all Indian intellectuals, radicals very much included. Indeed if any new ideas are to fertilize the indigenous Marxist schools, it seems that they will have to come from the West. After the New Delhi seminar on Imperialism, Independence and Social Transformation in the Developing Countries it was Westerners Magdoff and Andre Gunnar Frank who were invited to tour the main campuses of the country—not the Soviet delegates. So long as this Western orientation survives it would seem that only *Time* magazine's endorsing a Soviet book with an enthusiastic article could make Soviet thought acceptable in India. Nor do other indications within the Indian university system point to any potential increase in interest in Soviet society or Soviet thinking. There are few lecturers in Soviet politics—one in Bombay and one at Nehru University—and so few courses on the Soviet system. While the USSR is included in the undergraduate courses on comparative politics, these institutional descriptions are at such a low level of sophistication that they cannot be counted on to raise the awareness of the new student generations passing through the colleges. Whatever the curriculum there will have to be a vast extension of English translations of Soviet political economy output on India for the Soviet school to make an intellectual mark at the undergraduate level. As it is, the handful of English translations of Soviet works are put on university library shelves, not on course reading lists. Since the Indian government has some influence in setting priorities for the translations of Soviet books the overwhelming preponderance of English-language Soviet books available in India are technical and scientific texts rather than works in political economy: only 72 of the 725 Soviet titles offered in English translations by the People's Publishing House in 1972 were on political economy while 318 were on scientific and technical topics. The declining level of students' competence in English at Indian graduate schools makes even the availability of Soviet texts in English a doubtful instrument for achieving a Soviet intellectual breakthrough. If authoritarian learning behaviour is perpetuated and if conformism rather than originality is encouraged among politics teachers, it would be optimistic to

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predict that any foreign schools of thought will become attractive by virtue of their distinctiveness. On the contrary the fact that they do not adhere to the ritualized formulae of mediocre academics will condemn Soviet thinking to more decades in the cold.

The low degree of interest in studying foreign systems in general and the Soviet Union in particular reflects both the current academic climate in India and educational priorities expressed by senior personnel in the Education Ministry. The possibility that Soviet aid to the Indian educational system could affect curriculum development seems remote. The Indian Institute of Technology constructed with Soviet aid in Bombay has the same curriculum as the other IITs established with other nations' aid and Soviet instructors have already been withdrawn.

Books are not the only way to convey Soviet thinking. Articles can equally well be translated. Their impact may be greater if they are published in non-Soviet journals. But an examination of the Indian press does not reveal it to be an effective communication channel for Soviet thinking. For the calendar year 1971 no Soviet articles appeared in the Indian daily press. The *Economic and Political Weekly* has never carried a Soviet article in translation. It is not surprising that *People's Democracy* and *Frontier*, which express viewpoints close to the CPM should not have reprinted any Soviet articles during this period. *New Age*, the organ of the CPI, only reprinted 800 words of Soviet texts or 0·05 per cent of its columns for the year, whereas *Mainstream*, the major carrier of Soviet articles, only published 39,500 words of Soviet material—just under 3 per cent of its year's total material. Direct Soviet distribution of news and commentary may get more words into the hands of Indians, but not into their minds. The number of interviewees who reported that they throw Soviet embassy news handouts unopened into their wastepaper baskets was a reminder that the credibility of Soviet writings must first be established by dissociating it from its official and propagandistic images in the Indian mind. Nor is foreign language training likely to make a radical change in the general situation. The number of Indians with a reading knowledge of Russian has increased to several thousand, but the professional separation of language competence from social science expertise reduces the likelihood that these language graduates will provide a channel for communicating Soviet social science to Indian thinking. No one has assessed the political impact of students returning from Moscow's Lumumba University, whose Indian recruits are chosen by such CPI-dominated organizations as the Indo-Soviet Friendship Society and Indo-Soviet Cultural Society. There is no evidence that these repatriated Marxist-Leninists would be as radical as graduates returning from American or British universities where they can mix with revolutionaries unrestrained by Soviet Victorian discipline. There is little likelihood that the increased cultural exchanges between India and the Soviet Union as envisaged by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty will alter this generally unreceptive atmosphere. Even the prospect of increasing numbers of Indian students spend-

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ing years in the Soviet Union does not imply that much intellectual cross-fertilization will take place. Samar Sen, editor of the radical monthly *Frontier*, reported that he had no contact with Soviet indologists during the five years he spent in Moscow. Although he was a translator of Soviet works into Bengali, he felt his command of the Russian language was inadequate to engage in serious economic or political discussion. Even if these barriers of language and distribution disappeared it would take a major revolution to break the cultural interpenetration of the Indian elite with the Anglo-Saxon world and to create a sufficient integration of the Indian with the Soviet worlds to bridge the historical gap that has kept these neighbouring peoples apart over the centuries.

This is not to say that no shift of values is possible in India. A de-Westernization of the Indian academy is already taking place. Still, this process is itself largely stimulated by the intellectual contribution of Western radicals whose critique of Western society and its social science is finding a response among the better Indian intellectuals.[17] The simple assumptions behind modernization and development theories are being challenged and even liberal economists brought up in Western schools are becoming aware of the narrowness of their intellectual horizons. Since the Soviet school remains dedicated to growth and industrialization it is unlikely to appeal to the new wave of thinking which talks the language of eco-systems and zero growth rates. Thus for reasons of history and circumstance, of ideology and prejudice, of communication and contact the influence of the large school of Soviet indology on Indian thinking is so low as to be negligible and shows no prospects of discernible increase.

It is one thing to influence another nation's thought patterns; it is another to have an impact on its policy processes. Having determined that the Soviet theoretical influence in India is low, one can still ask what has been the influence on India's governmental processes of this super-power neighbour that has given the country unique international support, has opened up precious new trading relations, has provided a model for economic planning, and, through its large-scale aid projects to the public sector, has enabled the country to establish new economic institutions. Even if India's intellectuals still revolve in an essentially Western milieu, it is surely possible that Indian praxis better reflects the country's position as a non-aligned country at a strategic crossroad between the socialist and capitalist worlds.

Low Soviet Impact on the Indian Political Process

To establish whether a foreign power has had a significant impact on the political processes and policies of another country is somewhat easier than to identify what impact it has had on the country's thinking. Behaviour can be discerned both on the part of the country under examination and of the foreign power. Movement of personnel between

[17] Rajni Kothari, " State-Building in the Third World: Alternative Strategies," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VII, Nos. 5, 6 and 7 (February 1972), pp. 233–44.

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one country and the other can be observed and their inter-action documented. Analytical problems arise nonetheless. How can one tell, for instance, whether India would have done what it did regardless of the Soviet Union? How can one decide whether observable impact by the Soviet Union on India is normal, more, or less than one would expect between neighbouring countries, one with super-power status and the other with major political and strategic interests in the Asian continent? Whether one looks at the Soviet impact on Indian practice in its *external* dimensions of foreign policy and trade relations or on the *internal* plane of the planning process and policy in the public sector the Soviet impact appears to be far less than would have been expected, given the extent, intensity and duration of the close economic, diplomatic and military links between these contiguous powers.

The External Soviet-Indian Relationship

In the simplest sense the Soviet Union has an obvious impact on Indian foreign policy. The reversal of Soviet world policy following Stalin's death, in particular its new open arm approach to independent third world countries, dramatically changed India's international position. Nehru's triumphal tour of the Soviet Union in 1955 and the Khrushchev-Bulganin return visit to India in the same year dramatized the USSR's adoption of Nehru's India as a progressive leader of the non-aligned world. India's new bilateral relationship was expressed economically by the signature of successive trade agreements which doubled and re-doubled Indo-Soviet trade.

Indians appreciate their Soviet trade relationship: the windfall benefits of markets that compete very little with other already saturated foreign markets. It gives Indian manufactured goods a sheltered trial area for development before attacking Western markets. It allows imports without expending foreign currency and provides alternative sources at competitive prices for imports of both equipment and needed raw materials. On reviewing this relationship over a 20-year period there is little evidence that it reoriented India's foreign policy towards the rest of the world to the extent that the Soviet policy change might have led the Kremlin to expect. While it is true that Nehru's non-alignment would have been lop-sided if the Soviet Union had refused to co-operate, it is also true that India had proven its independence of Western control and influence before the Moscow volte-face of 1954–55. India had already been critical of American expansionism in Korea during the days of high Stalinism and had shown its ability to keep its distance from Britain by rejecting Dominion status in favour of becoming a republic within the Commonwealth.

Evidence that the Soviet relationship has restrained Indian behaviour in international crises, most notably over Suez (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), is not seriously questioned.[18] The record also shows that, even if

[18] Kuldip Nayar, op. cit. p. 101.

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India's non-alignment has been pink, India has sided with the United States one out of every two times that it has sided with the Soviet Union against the USA in issues where the super-powers were in direct conflict at the United Nations.[19] Even so dramatic a new development as the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 is considered on balance by observers of the Indian scene to have had the effect more of freeing India to pursue its own external objectives—the liberation of Bangladesh under the umbrella of Soviet nuclear deterrence against China—than of inhibiting her foreign relations.

SINCE the Soviet Union was the first major centrally-planned economy with which India undertook large-scale economic relations, one could have expected that certain changes would be made in New Delhi's economic institutions to manage its new bilateral trade relationship. One could also have expected that the nature of trade negotiations between India and a socialist country would be different in kind from its economic relations with the private enterprises of the Western capitalist economies.

Opinion differs about whether the State Trading Corporation was established in 1956 exclusively, primarily or only partially to adapt Indian trade to the institutional characteristics of the centrally-planned economies. No one interviewed on this question denied that the Soviet trade relationship had a causal impact on establishing the STC. As a former manager of the STC put it, the Soviets gave a "fillip" to the direction that Indians wanted to take in any case. What is more surprising in this regard is the absence of Soviet collaboration with Indians in setting up the institutional mechanisms for Indo-Soviet commerce. According to an academic observer closely involved with the Institute for Foreign Trade over the past decade, the Indians had to learn by experience how to adjust to the Soviets' ways of work and trade. No Indian trainees were sent to the Soviet Union. No Soviet experts came to work with Indian civil servants. In fact it continues to be the Indian embassy in Moscow which provides the basic information on Soviet trade mechanisms for the benefit of Indian foreign trade personnel in New Delhi.

Soviet negotiators are reported by Indian officials to be tough bargainers who are not out to do India any favours but operate under the slogan that "business is business." This does not imply that the Soviet trade relationship is less valuable than has been claimed. What does undermine the hypothesis that the Soviet trade relationship decisively changed the nature of the Indian public sector is more recent Soviet behaviour which has turned from dealing through the Indian public sector commercial enterprises such as the State Trading Corporation to direct operations with Indian private firms. Soviet pressure brought to

[19] P. J. Eldridge, *The Politics of Foreign Aid to India* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 203–04.

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bear on the Indian government to *prevent* the nationalization of the New Delhi distributing agency that was handling Soviet imported tractors indicates that the Soviet relationship may now have a negative impact on the socialization of the Indian economy. Such evidence is strengthened by the frequently voiced (though insufficiently documented) allegation heard especially from economists and businessmen that the Soviet traders prefer to deal with the less respectable businessmen with some reputation for illicit operations. Even if the "ugly Soviet" image that is developing in the country bears little relation to the reality of Soviet performance in India, the reduced esteem for Soviet aid can nevertheless be expected to reduce the political impact that Indo-Soviet economic relations might otherwise have.

Internal Political Processes

The fact that the Indophilia of post-Stalinist Soviet policy had less impact on India's external policies and institutions than was anticipated does not preclude the possibility that the Soviet Union has had an important role as influence on Indian policy-makers both in their conceptualization of the state's role in planning and in the construction of the Indian public sector. After all, Pandit Nehru never hid his admiration for the socialist (as opposed to the repressive) features of the Soviet system. Before coming to power he often referred in his speeches and writings to the Soviet experience as a model for India: "So far as I am personally concerned," he said in a speech given in London on 4 February 1936, I very largely approve of the Russian system of government and I hope some such thing will extend to India." [20] After almost 10 years in power when the basic structure of the Indian political and economic system had been assembled, he told Frank Moraes that "the Soviet experiment didn't come in the way. On the contrary, it helped our thinking." [21]

Interviews with present-day planners and architects of Indian planning indicate that Nehru's 1930 image of Soviet industrialization and planning may have been the most important channel through which the Soviet model had its limited influence on policy formulation in independent India. Talking on the debates on the heavy industry approach taken by the famous second five-year plan (1956–61), former Finance Minister C. D. Deshmukh recalled that there was not much Soviet input in their policy thinking in the late 1940s. The pro-Soviet thinking of Pandit Nehru was vague and ill-defined. A commitment to a major role for the public sector in infrastructure and heavy industry development had already been made by the Tata-Birla plan produced for the Indian National Congress in 1944 by the big capitalist wing of the Party. The acceleration of industrial development through an interventionist state

[20] Jawaharlal Nehru, speech given in London (4 February 1936).
[21] Frank Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, p. 473.

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investment and planning activity was thus conventional wisdom for the new leadership of independent India.

This does not mean that Soviet experts did not participate in the background thinking for Indian planning. One Soviet economist, M. I. Rubinstein, was invited by P. C. Mahalanobis to join the group of renowned foreign economists that he had assembled at the Indian Statistical Institute of Calcutta to provide a brains trust in conceptualizing the planning system. Reports vary about Rubinstein's effectiveness in this assemblage of world expertise. Those who were favourably impressed by his contribution still rate it lower than that of Oscar Lange from Poland or Charles Bettelheim from France, both Marxists who were stronger in intellect and more respected in their policy advice. According to C. D. Deshmukh, Joan Robinson was the most influential foreign economist with her left-leaning sympathies but her theoretical rigour. The most generous assessment of Soviet policy influence came from P. C. Mahalanobis himself who went to Moscow as early as 1952 to consult Soviet planning experts. Such economists as Strumilin and Varga gave him strong advice—but in the direction of not going too far with forced industrialization. Recalling the Soviet scissors crisis of the late 1920s, they advised against too much nationalization, against too large a steel target for the second five-year plan and even supported Mahalanobis' inclination to support small-scale cottage industry at the same time as heavy industrialization was proceeding. Asked whether the second five-year plan would have been different without this Soviet participation, Mahalanobis replied that it was helpful to have their sympathy at a top level, "like airforce cover for the army." Thus, rather than pushing the Indians into radical action, Soviet influence on the Indian planning system was first to popularize the general idea of planning among Nehru's colleagues, second to restrain Indian policy planners from over-enthusiasm and third to provide both internal political support through their private conversations with Indian leaders and external ideological assistance through their public writings in the Soviet press.

This supportive participation in the Indian plan formulation was the high point of the Soviets' involvement in the Indian policy process. It is true that Rubinstein was followed by a number of Soviet statisticians who visited the ISI. Their contribution, however, was academic: they gave papers on Soviet statistics, but not advice on Indian practice.[22] Rubinstein thus remains the sole Soviet economist who had any personal involvement in the planning of Indian planning—a participation that must be contrasted with the Ford Foundation team of American economists that still have official status as members of the Planning Commission despite the officially cool relations between the US and India. It is, in fact, only with some difficulty that economists can be found in the Plan-

[22] *Planning and Statistics in Socialist Countries*, No. 19 in Indian Statistical Series (Calcutta, Asia Publishing House, 1963).

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ing Commission who are even interested in either what the Soviets write about India or what the relevance of the Soviet industrialization debate of the 1920s might be to India's industrialization problems. Whether it is a feeling that Indian planners are highly sophisticated economists themselves or that modern Soviet problems are quite different from those of India, even P. C. Mahalanobis expressed no desire for further Soviet intellectual participation since the formulation of the second five-year plan. Since the basic plan formulation was completed, he felt, the Soviets had more to contribute by capital assistance to specific public sector projects.

It is indeed obvious that the Soviet Union has had an impact on the Indian economic process through directing its aid effort primarily to large industrial projects in the public sector. The Bhilai steel mill, like the Aswan Dam, is an international symbol of Soviet aid. The question that concerns us here is whether these public sector aid projects themselves have had an impact on the Indian policy process. By helping the Indian government develop a publicly-owned oil industry which the Western oil cartel refused to permit India, Soviet aid has clearly affected the shape of the Indian economy in that industry as in other industries where it has helped construct public sector enterprises. By training Indian engineers to take over management of these enterprises it has also helped the Indian economy to sustain the operation of these projects and, in some cases, to expand their activity. These statements can, of course, be made of aid relationships by other countries with India, the major difference being that Soviet projects have related more to the public industrial sector than to infrastructure projects in the public sector. Apart from this important distinction there seems no tendency for these projects, whether taken individually or as a whole, to affect the Indian policy process in the public sector. Discussions with managers of public sector enterprises and with senior civil servants or politicians responsible for them indicated only a qualified enthusiasm for Soviet aid projects. Repeatedly the point was made that the Indians had gone to the Soviet Union for aid in building a particular public sector enterprise only when Western countries had turned down Indian requests. The price of getting Soviet support for a particular project was accepting less sophisticated and less up-to-date technology. The resulting lower efficiency constituted an economic sacrifice generally balanced by the positive contribution of the enterprise made to the economy. Many irritating examples of bad planning rankle in the Indian policy-makers' minds: the surgical instruments factory that has still not sold any of its products on the Indian market; the roof design of the Bokaro steel mill built in a tropical area yet constructed to withstand six feet of snow. The ideological euphoria with which Soviet writers discuss these projects contrasts sharply with Indian views on them. A striking example is the state farm at Suratgarh which, in Soviet writings, is seen as a model farm for collective farming but, in the view of its manager, Congressman Krishna, has

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no ideological significance beyond its practical purpose as an experimental farm producing the seed grains needed in Indian agriculture.

This evidence makes it necessary to qualify the conclusion by Eldridge, among other scholars, that because "the forms of Soviet aid to India have proved mutually convenient the political impact of Soviet aid on India has for this reason been out of all proportion to its amount."[23] It does not follow that because there is "a general bias of opinion at the senior administrative level in favour of the Soviet Union",[24] friendliness towards a neighbouring state has led to a proclivity to adopt its institutions and processes. On the contrary, there is no evidence at all of the policy spin-off from the excellent diplomatic and economic relations between the Soviet Union and India that will soon enter their third decade. Whether there has been a significant payoff in terms of Soviet influence among senior Indian policy advisers, civil servants, government leaders and businessmen still remains possible and worth investigation.

The Hearts and Minds of Indian Policy-makers

Outside the Ministry of External Affairs which devotes some resources to monitoring and responding to Soviet writings on India there was no evidence from our interviews with Indian policy-makers of any knowledge of Soviet thinking about India and even less interest in the relevance of Soviet practices for Indian problems. Interviews at Secretary or Joint Secretary level elicited views that were hostile to Marxism-Leninist jargon, critical of what was considered erroneous class analysis not corresponding to Indian reality or impatient with Soviet writings if they did not have concrete recommendations to make on specific policy issues. All civil servants and advisers interviewed were glad of the Soviet commercial and diplomatic relationship with India; none indicated any expectation that he would find any theoretical or practical help from Soviet indologists in dealing with his current policy issues.

This does not mean that there is no radical thinking in the Indian civil service. But prominent advisers known for their radical background have little intellectual contact with Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Non-Marxist radicals with a strong commitment to achieving an egalitarian society have even less contact with Soviet thinking. One such government adviser, Arun Ghosh, has developed a coherent argument for the more effective and aggressive use of the levers of state control by an extension of welfare and liberal economic theory to achieving socialism and reducing the role of the private sector. In working out his case he has responded pragmatically to the problem of the 1970s with no reference at all to Marxian theory or Soviet writing.[25] Lack of interest

[23] Eldridge, op. cit., p. 174. [24] Ibid., p. 180.

[25] S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, "A New Venture: A Holding Company for Iron and Steel," *Socialist India*, Vol. IV, No. 13 (19 February 1972), pp. 13–14.

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and expectations concerning Soviet thinking is not just a linguistic problem. Wolf Ladejinsky, a well known student of Indian agrarian problems whose mother tongue is Russian and who works for an international organization in New Delhi, had no knowledge of Soviet writings, no interest in finding out about them and no concern with what their recommendations might be. Underlying this dismissal of Soviet thinking among senior policy makers is the perception that ideology is far less important than *raison d'état* in determining whether the relations between the Soviet Union and India prosper. Allied to this lack of concern with Soviet writings is the sense of confidence, particularly noticeable in the Ministry of External Affairs, that, whenever problems arise between the two countries, they can be resolved by direct negotiations.

The complete divorce of government thinking from Soviet Marxism-Leninism was best expressel by Mohan Kumaramangalam, the Minister of Steel and a member of Indira Gandhi's inner Cabinet circle. Although a member of the Communist Party from 1935 to 1956, he does not read Soviet writings or have direct knowledge of Soviet thinking about Indian economics. While grappling with the problems of increasing the efficiency and productivity of both public and private sectors in the steel industry, by creating a new holding company [26] that could exert complete control over the whole process of production from mine to ingot, he had no inkling of what the Soviets might be thinking of such a new venture. Still expressing a strong interest in socialist goals, he was more concerned with raising the standard of living of the mass of Indians than expanding the state sector for the sake of ideological purity.

A sense of balance between form (ideology) and content (policy) characterizes Mrs Gandhi's handling of the overall Indo-Soviet relationship. Observed in the spring of 1972, the Indo-Soviet relationship seemed like a happy honeymoon being thoroughly enjoyed yet with careful attention paid to contraception. Interviewees including most businessmen were pro-Soviet since the USSR had just proved itself in the time of need during the Bangladesh liberation to be indeed a true friend of India. Despite real Indian gratitude for such consistent support, there was general sensitivity to the danger of dependence on the USSR. Interviewees were generally confident that Mrs Gandhi was never going to accept any serious dependency and that, should the Soviets abuse their influence, the whole relationship could be broken off overnight. This coexistence of great friendliness with an underlying distrust is one part of the double contradiction on which the dynamic of India's non-alignment is based. Although attitudes towards the USSR as an international power are warm and friendly, attitudes towards the Soviet system and ideology are hostile and suspicious.

The Indo-American relationship shows an equal but opposite contra-

[26] Arun Ghosh, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism. An Exercise in Value Theory and its Applicability to Indian Conditions," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VII, No. 9 (26 February 1972), pp. 511–16.

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diction. Attitudes towards the USA are almost universally hostile: the Americans who refused to build Bokaro and whose re-arming of the Pakistani Army forced India to divert scarce resources to its own military forces are seen at every step to be undermining India's position. This anti-Americanism seems as superficial as the pro-Soviet feelings. Whether it is *Time* Magazine, *Future Shock* or the latest Harvard University Press publication, the reading material of Indian leaders, moderate or radical, betrays a basic Westernization that is far too ingrained to be fundamentally damaged by the blunders of American foreign policy. Whether this double contradiction is a conscious policy or not can be debated. What seems an inescapable conclusion is the usefulness to those in power of this double dissonance. The superficial anti-Americanism which is managed carefully by press manipulation and the government's activation of trivial issues when combined with the superficial pro-Soviet views of the public makes an effective instrument for continually re-gilding the government's and the leader's progressive image; simultaneously ingrained anti-Soviet attitudes provide an insurance against any uncontrollable shift to the left on the Indian scene. At the same time the pro-Western attitudes of the Indian elite allow the leadership to maintain India in its various international economic, political, academic and scientific relationships, thus keeping India abreast of the latest developments in the world community. The low impact of Soviet writings and policy on Indian thinkers and policy-makers may also work to the advantage of the Soviet government which is more concerned about stability and influence in the sub-continent than ideological converts or policy disciples. While not flattering to Soviet ideologists, India's cool reaction to Marxist-Leninist ideas may be the best condition for a continuingly healthy long-term relationship of that country with the Soviet Union.

THE evidence appears conclusive that, if the influence of Marxist-Leninist thought is to grow in India, it will be less because of external stimulation, whether from Moscow or any other communist capital, than from the indigenous flowering of a local communist praxis of the type seen in Kerala or West Bengal.[27]

The impact of Soviet development writings on other countries of the third world cannot, of course, be deduced from the Indian case. Experience has already given one example in the person of Fidel Castro who was so attracted by Marxism-Leninism that he declared himself a communist and was admitted to the socialist camp. Others such as the UAR have followed the non-capitalist path which the Soviets advocate while invoking Allah rather than Lenin as doctrinal source. In some of the younger states the elite is much narrower than India's and so possibly more amenable to foreign-made analysis. In Latin American countries

[27] Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January–February 1972), pp. 1–17.

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that have enjoyed political, if not economic independence for generations, there are national intelligentsiae that consider themselves capable of working out the solutions to their own problems. In sum, while it is probable that the fortunes of Marxist-Leninist thought will wax and wane in different countries of the third world, it is unlikely that a critical variable will be the intellectual content of Soviet scholarly and semi-academic writings.

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Towards a Socialist Corporation: Soviet Industrial Reorganization of 1973

Leon Smolinski

"WHAT—*another* reorganization?" A student of Soviet economic history may be tempted to dismiss the reform of the ministerial system decreed in April 1973 as just another administrative shift which may affect the flows of paperwork but not the underlying economic reality. Memories are still fresh of the numerous mergers and split-ups of ministries under Stalin, of their demise under Khrushchev and resurrection by Kosygin. On the face of it, the present reform is even less far-reaching: the number of ministries remains unchanged and each of them continues to be in charge of a group of industry branches such as ferrous metallurgy.

And yet, the current reorganization may be viewed as potentially the most important of such measures in four decades. The preceding organizational and administrative reforms of Soviet industry, sweeping as they were, amounted in final analysis to mere permutations and rearrangements of a set of building blocks: industrial enterprises. They affected the addresses to which an enterprise would send reports and from which it would receive commands. But, while the winds of change were blowing above the enterprise level, they did not affect its set-up and legal status nor the traditional role of the toad beneath the harrow assigned to it in the Soviet planning system.

The enterprise was legally responsible for meeting the targets assigned to it by higher-up agencies. But a *glavk*,* a ministry, let alone a Gosplan bore no legal or financial responsibility for the consequences of their often ill-informed orders and unfeasible plans. Lenin's famous principle of the *khozraschet*, the economic accountability and financial responsibility stopped for all practical purposes at the level of a production unit: a factory, a mine. There was thus a sharp separation between the economic base, i.e. the sphere of production, and the administrative superstructure erected upon it: the former had the responsibilities, the latter the rights. It is true the 1965 Kosygin reforms were intended to shift some decision-making power down to the enterprise level but any substantial decentralization is considered by many Soviet economists difficult to implement as long as enterprises differ widely in size, efficiency, age and ability to use their newly acquired rights in the best interest of the national economy. Small-scale enterprises especially are held to lack the broad horizon, the entrepreneurial talent and adequate investment funds needed to avail themselves of the opportunities open to them by the Kosygin reforms. And, as of 1968, 56·4 per cent of Soviet

* A department of a ministry.

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industrial enterprises employed less than 200 wage-earners each while accounting for only 11·6 per cent of aggregate gross output and 7·9 per cent of profits.[1] And it is well known that if powerlessness corrupts, absolute powerlessness corrupts absolutely. A small-scale enterprise is no match for a ministry, a *glavk,* or, in fact, for any agency that may feel inclined to order it around.

This is then the dilemma. On the one hand, the great majority of Soviet industrial enterprises appear to be too small to avail themselves of even the rather limited degree of decentralization introduced in recent years. On the other, from the planners' viewpoint, the existing number of enterprises is far too large to allow optimal *central* planning. The complexity of central planning tends to increase exponentially with the number of enterprises. For example, N. I. Drogichinskii, head of the New Methods Department of the Gosplan and one of the principal architects of the April reform, estimates that a reduction in the number of enterprises by a factor of eight (i.e. from the present 50,000 to some 6,000) would reduce the complexity of the planners' task by a factor of 512 (or eight to the third power).[2] This calculation, based on admittedly simplified assumptions, illustrates nevertheless both the order of magnitudes involved and, given its source, central planners' preferences.

Thus, paradoxically enough, both centralizers and decentralizers favour a drastic reduction in the number of enterprises and an increase in their size. There is also a widespread agreement that enterprises belonging to the lower-size classes which for decades have been discriminated against in resource allocation policies, should be modernized, mechanized and made more efficient. This implies, i.a. narrow specialization. A factory too small to produce T.V. sets efficiently may become quite efficient if it specializes in the production of, say, transformers. And conversely, a big enterprise manufacturing T.V. sets may improve its productivity if it does not attempt to produce spare parts but buys them from specialized small-scale producers, while it itself becomes specialized in the assembly processes. Thus, as an industry branch develops, it undergoes a process of a vertical disintegration: processes previously all performed under one roof become delegated to separate factories and, eventually, separate industry branches, with the resulting economies of scale and specialization. As Lenin once observed, this natural process " makes into a separate industry branch not only the manufacturing of every product but even of every separate component of a product and . . . even every separate operation needed to prepare the product for consumption." [3]

Lenin's prediction has since been confirmed by the experience of advanced capitalist industries but far less so by that of the Soviet Union.

[1] Ts.S.U. SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu,* p. 180.
[2] N. E. Drogichinskii, *Organizatsia upravlenia promyshlennostiu i planirovania na sovremennom etape* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 19–24.
[3] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii,* Vol. III, p. 21.

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For example, while it costs 14 times less to purchase bolts from a specialized factory, Soviet machine-building plants prefer producing them in their own small, primitive shops,[4] so as to make sure that the supplies will be available on time and in correct assortment of types, sizes, etc., rather than be dependent on the notoriously unreliable outside sources of supply. Theoretically, central planners could do away with such wasteful autarkic practices by closing down the user factories' auxiliary shops and, simultaneously, by enormously increasing the detail of plans from the present highly aggregative level. They would then have to specify for each supplier of nuts and bolts not only the tonnage but also the types, sizes and delivery dates of each product. This would reduce the cost of production of the user enterprises which would then become more narrowly specialized but, as an economist points out, would greatly increase the cost of planning since "the number of interrelationships among enterprises will rise incalculably, coordinating such interrelationships will complicate the task of ministries and planning agencies."[5] The Soviet economist then suggests the solution: to specialize enterprises but then to *internalize* their interrelationships and the resulting transactions by merging enterprises into larger organizational units with centralized incentive funds derived from the performance of the association of enterprises as a whole. An iron ore mine merged with a steel works will no longer deliver ore with high moisture contents and rock admixtures, a bolt manufacturer merged with a dozen engineering works will produce the correct assortment of bolts for them since they all acquire a common interest now in the performance of the association as a whole. In brief, in the still prevailing seller's market, mergers are seen as providing at least a partial solution to the conflicts of interest that tend to arise between the buyers and sellers of intermediate goods. They also permit centralization of book-keeping, sales, purchases and other traditional economies of scale.

Central planners' and ministries' tasks become easier with the reduction in the number of enterprises and products to be included in the plans. At the same time, decentralization of decision-making becomes more feasible since an association is a more viable unit than an individual enterprise, with a broader horizon and a greater contervailing power towards superior agencies. This, as we shall see presently, may help to induce a change in the nature of the relationship between the planners and administrators who give orders and the producers who execute them.

THE institutional guidelines of the April reforms are somewhat obscured by the numerous exceptions for which they allow. I will, for reasons of space, largely abstain from discussion of these.

[4] Cf. B. I. Ganshtak, *Ocherki po ekonomike mashinostroitelnoi promyshlennosti SSSR* (Moscow, 1957), p. 196.

[5] V. A. Boldyrev, "Kontsentratsia proizvodstva i ob'edinenia," *Nauchnoe upravlenie obshchestvom*, vypusk 6 (Moscow, 1972), p. 165.

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The reform orders the demise, by 1976, of both the enterprise as the basic building block of the Soviet industrial system and of the *glavk*, a key administrative agency, initiated by Lenin himself on the day of the October revolution and serving as an intermediate link between the ministry and the enterprise. Within six months each ministry is to prepare a general scheme of its future organizational structure, choosing as a rule either a two- or a three-level management system, to be explained presently.[6]

The major institutional carrier of the reform which replaces the enterprise as *the* basic unit throughout Soviet industry is the so-called "production association" (*proizvodstvennoe ob'edinenie*) formed by merging a number of enterprises which manufacture related products and which are not too widely dispersed geographically. One of their number, usually the largest and most modern, is designated as the head enterprise which manages the affairs of the association as a whole. Other members, as a rule, lose their legal and economic identity and become mere branches of the head enterprise. Research institutes, design bureaux and construction enterprises may also be included as members in a production association. Previously these activities tended to be performed in virtual isolation and without adequate coordination while now "production, research, design and construction become organically fused into a unified, complex economic organism, an association."[7]

Production associations do not come as strangers upon the Soviet economic scene. Since 1962 as many as 1,100 of them have been formed, incorporating 4·5 thousand factories (or about 9 per cent of the total) and accounting for about 12 per cent of total industrial output. They have already acquired a considerable importance in some branches of industry (e.g. 42 per cent of the automobile industry's output, 26 per cent of light industry) and in some geographic areas (a quarter of the Ukraine's industrial production).[8] It is interesting to note that the early production associations represent one of the rare cases where a major institutional innovation was introduced as a local initiative (in the Lvov shoe industry) and where East European influences are clearly distinguishable.

The new decree allows a ministry to choose between two forms of organization. Under a two-level scheme, all enterprises are merged into production associations which then are subordinated directly to the ministry. Under a three-level scheme, an additional intermediate link is introduced between the primary unit and the ministry. This intermediate link is called an *industrial association* (*promyshlennoe ob'edinenie*) and

[6] For the full text of decrees, see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (1973), No. 14, pp. 3–4 and 11–14. Four-level management schemes are to be allowed in some consumer goods industries. Enterprises are to survive in some industries in which production associations cannot be formed.

[7] B. I. Gostev, *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (1973), No. 15, p. 3.

[8] N. E. Drogichinskii, *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (1973), No. 22, p. 7, and V. Scherbitskii, *Kommunist* (1973), No. 6, p. 25.

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includes *all* enterprises manufacturing a certain type of product (such as ball-bearings) in the country as a whole (an all-Union industrial association) or in a big Union republic (a republic industrial association). It has recently been revealed that only the three largest Soviet republics, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are entitled to form republic associations and that these will be largely limited to consumer goods such as garments and dairy products.[9]

In addition to production units proper an industrial association may (and usually does) include specialized research institutes, design and construction organizations serving a given industry branch. The purpose is to provide an integrated, unified guidance to the industry's development, from the pre-natal stage of research, through design of new factories, equipment and products to shaping primary units' activities and representing them in their dealings with the outside world: planners, suppliers and markets. Primary units may be either enterprises (this is one important exception where enterprises are allowed to survive) or production associations.

An all-Union industrial association is created by a Ministry USSR which also appoints its general manager. He is assisted by a Directors' Council composed of managers of the member units and intended to reconcile their interests with those of the association as a whole. The council's decisions are taken by a majority vote but may be overruled by the general manager. Aggregate targets, material supplies and bank loans are allocated to the association as a whole which then apportions (and, if necessary, reapportions) them among its members, in accordance with the norms it sets for their utilization. Its freedom of manoeuvre is further enhanced by the right to keep at its disposal centralized reserves of raw materials, fuel and equipment and to retain a certain portion of bank loans received and a reserve wage fund. An association also disposes of its own centralized funds accumulated by deductions from members' profits, namely: *an incentive fund*, out of which bonuses are awarded; *a development fund* for expansion of old and construction of new factories; a fund for financing research and *innovation*; and, finally, a special fund for promotion of exports. Transactions with suppliers and buyers as well as payments into the government budget may either be made by the association as a whole or, if so chosen, separately by each member.

THE reform makes clear that the ministerial system recreated in 1965 did not meet the expectations. The *glavks*, of which there are at present over one thousand, were to serve as the cutting edge of the system, to provide enterprises with operational direction and thus free the ministry's staff for the tasks of policy-making and long-range planning. In practice, the *glavk* has degenerated from a decision-maker into a

[9] Drogichinskii, ibid. The three-level scheme is to be adopted in those industry branches which consist of a large number of specialized enterprises (e.g. dairy products) or where production associations would not be economically justified.

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bureaucratic mail-box into which enterprises deposited reports which were then added up by the *glavk* and transmitted upwards to the ministry. " When faced with almost any problem, the *glavk* was simply passing the buck on to the higher level, to the functional administration of the ministry, instead of making a decision." [10]

Now that associations will take over the tasks which *glavks* failed to perform, the ministry, freed from the necessity of providing petty tutelage to enterprises, is to concentrate on its proper task: to study society's demand for its product, to plan the broad trends of technical progress and, in general, to choose the optimal long-term development paths of a given field. Of course, it was mainly in order to deal with these fundamental tasks that had been neglected under Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* system that the ministries were resurrected in the first place eight years ago. Yet, in fact, in these days just as in the Stalinist era, "an overwhelming majority of ministries' personnel is to be found in departments occupied with current operation and supervision " while " only small sections, consisting in all reality of only a few persons, are occupied with these fundamental problems." [11]

The second failure of the ministerial system has been ministries' growing despecialization. Ideally, the system presupposes that a ministry is responsible for all enterprises manufacturing a given group of products. In reality, as ministries were recreated in 1965, enterprises were assigned to them in a hurry so that establishments producing identical products often found themselves dispersed among several different ministries. Virtually no reassignments have taken place since.[12] Instead, further despecialization has taken place, i.a. due to the well-known " campaigns " when enterprises are ordered to produce a crash priority item, regardless of their ministerial subordination.[13] As a result of this and other causes, the actual product assortment turned out by a Soviet enterprise tends to correspond less and less to its ministerial slot. For example, only 41 per cent of Soviet computers, 32 per cent of plastic products and 67 per cent of forging presses are produced within the specialized ministries which are responsible for these industry branches. Conversely, forging presses are now produced by 20 different ministries and plastic products by as many as 72. Even the high priority defence industry has been made to produce non-defence goods such as lathes, tractors, optical goods, refrigerators, kitchen pots and toys which supposedly account for as much as 42 per cent of its

[10] Ia. Kulikov, Minister of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (1973), No. 9, p. 7.

[11] Cf. Premier Kosygin's original guidelines for reform in *Pravda*, 28 September 1965, and G. Popov, *Voprosy ekonomiki* (1971), No. 12, pp. 100–1.

[12] N. Oznobin, head of a Gosplan research institute, *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (1972), No. 47, p. 7.

[13] Thus, the Central Committee appealed in July 1970 to launch production of extra agricultural equipment. " Not a single factory, irrespective of its ministerial slot, should stay away from this great and noble task." Quoted by Iu. Subotskii, *Voprosy ekonomiki* (1972), No. 7, p. 16.

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total output.[14] *Se non è vero, è ben trovato.* . . . One wonders how any one ministry can under these conditions manage to meet the responsibility for shaping the broad developmental trends of an industry branch which has been parcelled out among dozens of ministries?

The third major deficiency of the ministerial system is the original sin of the Soviet economic system in general: lack of economic accountability on the part of agencies from the *glavk* level up to the Gosplan, and, closely related to it, lack of responsibility for erroneous commands. They can be viewed as part of a broader syndrome of the authoritarian style of economic leadership. It is in this strategic area that the April reforms are likely to have their most significant repercussions, as the *khozraschet* principle of economic accountability and self-financing is extended to the level of an association and, eventually of a ministry, and possibly of some central agencies as well.

It was traditionally held that *glavks* and ministries by their very nature " perform only administrative functions but are not engaged in production or in economic activities " and that, consequently, lacking resources of their own, they could not be held financially responsible for the outcome (however disastrous it might have been) of their decisions. A lawyer pointed out as early as 1965 that

> neither the leading administrative nor planning agencies bear any responsibility for erroneous decisions. In practice enterprises are held responsible for failure to meet targets even when this is due to culpable activities of the agencies of economic leadership.[15]

In 1967, V. S. Naidenov proposed that ministries should be put on the *khozraschet*, retain part of profit deductions contributed by enterprises and pay out of it compensation to those enterprises which suffered losses as the result of the ministry's mistakes.[16] Soon thereafter, the ministry of instrument-making became, by way of an experiment, self-financed so that, to quote the Minister himself, " for the first time in our economic practice a ministry guarantees payments into the budget regardless of the results of its economic activity." [17] According to Gosplan's N. I. Drogichinskii, that system will be eventually extended to all ministries. Analogously to associations, they will retain part of profits earned by subordinate units out of which the ministry will have to finance all planned outlays, including investment outlays, as well as compensate enterprises for losses suffered as the result of erroneous commands or unfeasible plans. Such payments will reduce the amount of bonuses received by the ministry's personnel.[18] A feedback is thus introduced from the economic base to the administrative superstructure governing it, from the outcome of the administrators' commands

[14] Ibid. pp. 15, 17.
[15] R. O. Khalfina, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (1965), No. 7, pp. 108–9.
[16] In *Kommunist Ukrainy* (1967), No. 3, p. 44.
[17] K. N. Rudnev (the minister), *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (1972), No. 32, p. 7.
[18] N. E. Drogichinskii, *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (1972), No. 41, p. 7.

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to their income. A ministry will thus be put in a position analogous to the newly created production associations which already " bear financial responsibility for every step they take," notes Aleksandr Birman, the well-known economist. " But what to do about compensating for losses caused by such budget-financed agencies as Gosplan or Gossnab . . ." whose decisions " determine to an enormous extent the results of enterprises' activity." [19] He then proposes that these agencies too should pay compensation to producers out of a special fund controlled by the Council of Ministers. He concludes that were such agencies to ask the government for funds whenever they had to pay such compensation, " This would make a major contribution to strengthening the economic rationality and mutual consistency of plans, orders, etc."

This seemingly Utopian proposal is related to the growing recognition that " leadership using purely administrative methods is no longer feasible. Psychological compatibility and harmony of interests in a collective are needed." [20] This observation by a former American professor is borne out by the findings of a recent survey conducted by the Kuznetsk Party organization. " In collectives with an authoritarian (non-democratic) style of leadership, one found three times more infractions of discipline, 2·5 times more dismissals, 1·5 times more failures to meet work norms and 1·7 times more work accidents." [21] From the level of a single factory to that of the economy as a whole, the traditional authoritarian, highly centralized style of leadership seems to be going out of style.

TO bring out the progressive character of associations an argument is used that they resemble a multiplant capitalist corporation which " has become the basic unit of production in all advanced industrial countries, thus reflecting the needs of the scientific revolution and of modern technology." [22] Some of the expected advantages and disadvantages of Soviet mergers are therefore familiar to any student of capitalist organization while others reflect the peculiarities of the Soviet system of resource allocation.

One such peculiarity is the dual character of the Soviet economy which consists of the modern sector of large-scale enterprises and the backward, less efficient, low priority sector of smaller establishments. Auxiliary shops of the large-scale enterprises may be counted, for that purpose, as part of the backward sector.

Mergers are intended to largely do away with the backward sector by combining a large, efficient head enterprise with a number of smaller establishments, thus, " extending all advantages of large-scale production to small factories " [23] each of which will become specialized in a narrow

[19] A. Birman, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 6 June 1973, p. 11.
[20] V. Tereshchenko, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 15 August 1973.
[21] Iu. Iushkov, *Ekonomika i organizatsia promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (1972), No. 5, p. 148.
[22] G. Popov, *Voprosy ekonomiki* (1971), No. 12, p. 103.
[23] *Izvestia*, 24 May 1973.

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range of products, inputs or operations which it can perform efficiently. This will be achieved, i.a. by reapportionment of equipment, cadres and supplies among member-enterprises so as to achieve their most effective utilization and by pooling members' inventories and reserves thus reducing the demand for them per unit of output.[24] Centralization of book keeping, sales, market research brings further savings and eases computerization.

Technical progress is facilitated by making research institutes part of associations rather than disinterested bystanders. In some Leningrad associations, for example, gestation delays of new products have been reduced by one-half or even by two-thirds.[25]

Associations are allowed to deal directly with foreign enterprises located in other socialist countries and to participate in planning exports. They have better patent services and more opportunity for acquiring latest foreign equipment.[26]

Last but not least, merging member factories' party cells into one strong organization results in " a strengthening of the Party's influence on concrete production decisions " (*Pravda*, April 20, 1973). In Byelorussia, prior to mergers each factory had a part-time party cell secretary who also worked on his factory job. Now each association has a full-time party committee for the association of a whole. This also facilitates supervision on the part of the regional committee.[27]

As regards the difficulties associated with reform, they may be viewed in part as growing pains and in part be attributed to some structural defects in the design of the socialist corporations, or to an improper sequencing of operations related to their creation.

So far, an association is a socialist corporation without corporate law. Legislation has lagged behind economic experimentation rather than paved the way for it and associations are still governed by the restrictive laws referring to enterprises.[28] The general director of an important computer association complains that, for all the ambitious tasks assigned to him, he is still subject to the same constraints as a manager of a small enterprise since " thus far associations continue to be assigned the same range of centrally planned targets and success indicators as do tiny enterprises " (*Sovetskaia Byelorussia*, 13 June, 1973).

But a new legislation is being prepared which will define the rights and duties of the socialist corporations. More serious is the fact that the new setup is unnecessarily complex. Aiming at flexibility, it achieves confusion and leads to a bewildering variety of institutional solutions. For example, although enterprises eventually are to become extinct, an industrial association may at present be composed of *both* enterprises *and* production associations. A ministry may administer some of its branches through a three-level and others through a two-level scheme.

[24] *Bakinskii rabochii*, 28 July 1970.
[25] Popov, op. cit. p. 101.
[26] Editorial in: *Kommunist* (1973), No. 11, p. 29.
[27] *Sovetskaia Byelorussia*, 12 Dec. 1970 and 28 July 1973.
[28] *Kommunist* (1973), No. 11, p. 30; and Laptev, *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (1973), No. 6, p. 92.

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In some specific branches of industry a four-level set-up is permitted. The degree to which various activities are centralized varies from one association to another depending on its free choice. How on earth can a unified system of information and control be devised under these conditions for the economy as a whole?

Monopolistic tendencies and abuses which are so characteristic of many capitalist corporations and which are already evident in some ministries' activities are likely to become even more pronounced in the the more narrowly specialized associations.[29]

The subordination of research institutes to associations will undoubtedly relate their work more closely to current production but their new bosses' preoccupation with the immediate tangible results, with the payoff, may lead to a neglect of basic research and of theoretical explorations. As researchers focus their attention on the practical problems of a socialist corporation, "no one will be left to work on general topics benefitting more than one industry branch. Some scientists expressed the fear that they may become 'dissolved' in production and that science may wither away." [30]

To come now to what I consider to be the main blind spot in the Soviet leadership's thinking about associations. The cutting edge of the new system is the head enterprise which manages the association's affairs while continuing to manage its own. This presupposes that there is unused managerial capacity at the level of large, modern factories which are scheduled to become head enterprises and that their executive personnel has time and energy to spare for these new exacting tasks. This assumption lacks substance.

In a 1965 survey of one hundred large industrial enterprises of the Sverdlovsk oblast their managers were found to work on an average 68 hours a week and chief engineers 58·6 hours.[31] Even more revealing are the results of a time budget study of executives of the large machine building factory in Kuznetsk, a typical candidate for the position of a head enterprise. Only 3·2 per cent worked less than 50 hours a week while three out of four executives worked from 60 to 80 hours a week, or twice as much as rank and file engineers. It was found that "a majority of executives . . . in their rush to meet deadlines find themselves in a state of a perpetual anxiety for the performance of the sector they have been put in charge of. . . . This affects harmfully both their effectiveness at work and their health." Furthermore, despite these extraordinarily long working hours, the executives in question were spending only 15 minutes a day on economic analysis and 25 minutes on long-range problems, defined as those with a time horizon in excess of one month. The factory's manager, out of a 15 hours' average working day, spends only 1·5 hours a week on economic and other "long-range problems." [32]

[29] Cf. *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 16 Jan. 1973, p. 2.
[30] Popov, op. cit. p. 103; *Pravda*, 30 Aug. 1973.
[31] V. Mazyrin, *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (1966) No. 2, p. 59.
[32] Iushkov, op. cit. pp. 143–7.

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Two implications are clear. Prospective organizers and leaders of the would-be associations are *already* more than fully employed. Nor do they give a high priority to economic analysis and long-range planning in which associations are supposed to engage.

It also remains an open question whether socialist corporations will substantially reduce the bureaucratic superstructure of Soviet industry's economic base. As *glavks* get disbanded, for example, experts employed in them were expected to quit their desks for production jobs. In reality, to judge by some reports, they simply play musical chairs. Experts freed by the closure of *glavks* in the Ukrainian iron and steel industry have been immediately moved up into the ministry so as to strengthen its apparatus.[33]

THIS brings us to an important point. Even the best designed reform may fail because of vested interests, ignorance or lack of motivation on the part of agents put in charge of its implementation. Let us therefore briefly review their attitudes.

To start with the ministry, the key agency which is to organize both production and industrial associations. The record is not encouraging. After their rebirth, in 1965, ministries promptly disbanded hundreds of production associations then in existence since by doing so they could effortlessly inflate their main success indicator, the volume of gross output.[34] For the same reason, now that enterprises are being merged, the ministry's performance "worsens" as their sales to one another are no longer counted in calculating the ministry's output. No wonder that *Pravda* reports on 15 August 1973 that "a number of ministries approach the task of creating associations in a timid manner without showing the necessary initiative and creative spirit. Here and there . . . the associations which have been successfully operating get disbanded. Others get reduced in size under the pretext of specialization." Even more serious is the very real possibility of interministerial feuds. The decree is emphatic that mergers should be dictated solely by economic rationale and not by the present administrative subordination of enterprises entering an association. And yet it also states that an association is created and then administered by an individual ministry. But then how to prevent attempts at power grabs? Each ministry, engaged in empire building, is reluctant to lose factories to another ministry even if they are needed for an association the latter is forming. Since national interest may be lost sight of in the criss-cross of departmental vested interests, it would appear to me that it is the Council of Ministers, rather than an individual ministry, that should be put in charge of organizing those associations which significantly affect the interests of more than one ministry.

As for the *glavks* which are being superseded by associations, their

[33] As reported by the minister himself, *Rabochaia gazeta*, 16 May 1973.
[34] N. E. Drogichinskii and V. G. Starodubovskii, editors, *Osnovy i praktika khoziaistvennoi reformy v SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), p. 93.

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indignant attitude towards these interlopers is understandable. And, before they are scheduled to disappear, by 1976, they will have many an opportunity to sabotage the associations, as they have been known to do in the past.

But how about the enterprises themselves? The head enterprise which gets merged with a host of less successful, smaller factories can expect their inferior performance, at least in the short run, to pull down success indicators for the association as a whole below its own performance level, with a subsequent decline in bonuses. Even more vexing is the fact that the head enterprise's management receives no extra compensation for the very considerable work required to organize the association and manage it.[35] For their part, managerial personnel and even wage-earners in the erstwhile small enterprises being reduced to the status of branches often resent losing their independence and suffering a loss of income and status. Considerable bitterness may result, as shown by the reports from Czechoslovakia which pioneered with production associations as early as 15 years ago. " Extremely ruthless methods were often required to break the resistance offered by the managerial personnel and workers of all those enterprises which had been demoted to the rank of mere branches." [36]

They may be joined in their resistance by local government organizations which suffer financial loss when factories located in their area become branches and stop paying taxes to their jurisdiction. Local party organizations have also been known to oppose appointments made in their factories by the distant head enterprise.[37]

A needlessly complicated organizational scheme, bureaucratic vested interests, psychological barriers, inadequate managerial incentives, all these are likely to impede the early progress of the socialist corporations but the long-run prognosis appears to be favourable. This new form of industrial organization will help bridge gaps existing in Soviet industry between the modern and the backward sectors; between production, administration and research; between the order-givers and order-takers. The April reforms are both an expression of the changing climate of opinion and may themselves contribute to the changing style of leadership in the Soviet economy. The traditional highly centralized, quasi-military style of economic decision-making seems to be going out of style. To paraphrase Lincoln, the dogmas of the stormy past are inadequate to the quiet present.

[35] Ibid. pp. 87, 107, and Boldyrev, op. cit. p. 177.
[36] B. Glinski, *Gospodarka planowa* (1963), No. 4, p. 27.
[37] Drogichinskii and Starodubovskii, op. cit. p. 107, and *Kommunist* (1973), No. 11, pp. 33–34.

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Opposition in the Ukraine: Seven Versus the Regime

Konstantyn Sawczuk

THE Ukraine is no longer silent. Fear, Moscow's recipe for the building of communism, which had paralyzed people for decades, unexpectedly lost its force. Stalin's heirs have discovered that terror has become less effective. Not only in the Ukraine, but also in other countries of the USSR, people have suddenly lost their fear. And with this has come a realization of human rights, thus presenting an unwanted problem for the Kremlin.

Valentyn Moroz, a Ukrainian intellectual, imprisoned by the KGB for daring to think and write contrary to the dictates of the regime, says in his essay " Report from the Beria Reservation ":

> A new generation has . . . entered Ukrainian life and set a completely new problem for the defenders of the Stalinist order. Order was maintained on the basis that the people *themselves* had renounced all rights and reconciled themselves to their absence. As a result everything could be promised, it being known in advance that nothing need be given. Now, a new generation had arrived and said: " The Constitution mentions freedom of speech and we want to take advantage of it! " This variation had not been foreseen. It has suddenly turned out that the dummy gun made for display can shoot. The gods have always hated Prometheuses who light up the darkness and show men that nothing is there except what their own fear has created and that the power of evil comes only from their own weakness.[1]

The struggle for rights, constitutional and otherwise, including the right of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to secede from the Soviet Union,[2] constitutes an important element of today's opposition in the Ukraine to the regime's abuses and to Russian chauvinism. Its intensity is well illustrated by the so-called Jurists' Case.

IN May 1961, at the time of Khrushchev's ascendancy in the Soviet hierarchy, seven members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were given harsh sentences by the Lviv Regional Court. The leading figure of the accused, Lev Lukianenko, was sentenced to death. In July of the same year, the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR reviewed the case

1 Michael Browne (ed.), *Ferment in the Ukraine.* Macmillan, 1971, Doc. 11, p. 143. Italics in the original.

2 Art. 14 of the Ukrainian Constitution states: " The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic reserves for itself the right of secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Art. 17 of the USSR Constitution guarantees the same right for all the Soviet Republics.

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on appeal and modified some of the sentences. Lukianenko's life was spared and he received fifteen years' imprisonment, and the terms of two other prisoners were reduced from 10 to 7 years. The rest of the sentences, ranging between 10 and 15 years, remained the same. Typical of Soviet judicial procedures, the trials were held in secret and became known only in 1966.[3] The reasons for the arrest, trial and conviction of Lukianenko, and his friends is to be found in the many charges levelled against them by the Soviet authorities in the Ukraine. An excerpt of the judgment asserts that five of the prisoners " committed treason against the Fatherland, the USSR, created the hostile UWPU organization, with the aim of struggle against the Soviet state system, the CPSU and its Marxist-Leninist theory, for severing the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR and the creation of a so-called 'Independent Ukraine.'"[4] These five were sentenced on the basis of Art. 56 (1) and Art. 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.[5] The other two, accused of similar although lesser charges,[6] received sentences according to Art. 62 and Art. 187 of the same Code.[7]

[3] See *Ukrainski iurysty pid sudom KGB* (the Ukrainian Jurists tried by the KGB), Munich, " Suchasnist," 1968; see also Michael Browne, *Ferment in the Ukraine*, pp. 29–93. The first book contains the documents pertaining to the case of the seven. The second book is a collection of documents which deal not only with the case in question, but also with other manifestations of the opposition movement in Ukraine. Since several members of the group under discussion were jurists, it acquired the name as the Jurists' Case.

[4] Michael Browne, *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Doc. 6, p. 57. The names of the five are: I. O. Kandyba, O. S. Libovych, V. S. Lutskiv, L. H. Lukianenko, S. M. Virun. The UWPU stands for the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union.

[5] Ibid. p. 58. The text of Art. 56 entitled " Treason to the Fatherland " is as follows: " Treason to the Fatherland is a deed intentionally committed by a citizen of the USSR to the detriment of state independence, territorial inviolability or the military strength of the USSR: defection to the side of the enemy, spying, disclosing state or military secrets to a foreign state, flight abroad or refusal to return from abroad to the USSR, aiding a foreign state in carrying out hostile activities against the USSR, as well as conspiracy with the aim of seizing power, is punishable by imprisonment for a term from ten to fifteen years, with confiscation of property and with exile for a term up to five years, or without it, or with a death penalty with confiscation of property. A citizen of the USSR, enlisted by foreign intelligence for carrying out hostile activities against the USSR, is not subject to criminal liability, if instead of executing the obtained criminal instructions, he did not perform any acts, but voluntarily informed the authorities about his connections with foreign intelligence." See *Kryminal'nyi kodeks Ukrains'koi RSR* (The Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR), Kyiv, 1968, p. 32. Art. 64 under the heading " Organizational activity directed towards the perpetration of especially dangerous state crimes as well as participation in an anti-Soviet organization " reads: " Organizational activity directed towards the preparation or the perpetration of especially dangerous state crimes, towards the creation of an organization whose aim is to perpetrate such crimes as well as participation in an anti-Soviet organization are punishable in accordance with Arts. 56–63 of this Code. See Ibid. p. 35. Art. 57 deals with " Spying," Art. 58 with " Acts of Terror," Art. 59 with " Acts of Terror directed against the Representative of Foreign State," Art. 60 with " Sabotage," Art. 61 with " Destruction," Art. 62 with " Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda " and Art. 63 with " Propaganda of War." Here punishment ranges from the death penalty to six months' imprisonment. See Ibid. pp. 32–35.

[6] Ibid. p. 57. It was stated in the judgment that the two " received texts of the UWPU programme, and knowing beforehand that they were of their essence anti-Soviet and directed against the Soviet state and the CPSU, read the programme and kept it to

[7] For footnote please see p. 38.

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Were the prisoners guilty of the charges? In a petition to P. Y. Shelest, then First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Ivan Kandyba, sentenced to 15 years, wrote that " a very formidable indictment was put against us, and in connection with it punishments of such severity were chosen for us. But this indictment is not consistent with the actual circumstances of our case, for our acts were such that there were no grounds whatsoever for classifying them not merely as treason, but as crimes of any sort." Kandyba told Shelest that the accused group had discussed *A Draft Programme of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union*, a pamphlet written by Lukianenko, but that it followed the Marxist-Leninist approach to past and present events. According to the petitioner, Lukianenko's pamphlet criticized the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for the 1933–34 famine years, and the severe political repressions in the 1930s in the Ukraine; oppression of the peasantry, whose position was no better than that of tsarist serfs in the past; weakening of the Ukraine's national, political and economic rights; lack of her sovereignty and of her right to enter into relations with foreign states.[8] The pamphlet concluded, according to Kandyba, that " the Ukraine lacked the opportunity for normal political, economic and cultural development, that in certain respects her position was much worse now than it had been under the tsarist regime, and that she was actually a colony of Moscow or, at best, had only cultural autonomy." To remedy this situation, Lukianenko proposed that the Ukraine should secede from the Soviet Union, a move consistent with Art. 14 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and Art. 17 of the Constitution of the USSR respectively.[9]

themselves as a means and instrument of committing a crime directed at treason against the Fatherland, the USSR, at severing the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR, and the creation of a so-called ' Independent Ukraine.' " The names of the two are: Y. Y. Borovnytsky and I. Z. Kipysh.

7 Originally, all seven were sentenced under Art. 56 (1) and Art. 64, but later the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR changed the legal classification as regards Borovnytsky and Kipysh from the said Articles to Art. 62 and Art. 187. See Michael Browne, *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Doc 4, p. 46, Doc. 6, p. 67, Doc. 7, p. 77. Art. 62 entitled " Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda " states: " Agitation or propaganda, carried out with the purpose of undermining or weakening Soviet authority or the perpetration of separate, especially dangerous state crimes, the spreading with the same purpose of slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet state and social order as well as the dissemination or preparation or safekeeping with the same purpose of literature of the same content is punishable by imprisonment for a term from six months to seven years and with exile for a term of up to five years, or without it, or exile for a term from two to five years. These same actions perpetrated by a person previously convicted for especially dangerous state crimes as well as perpetrated in war time are punishable by imprisonment for a term from three to ten years and with exile for a term of up to five years or without it." See *Kryminal'nyi kodeks Ukrains'koi RSR*, pp. 34–35. Art. 187 under the heading of " Misprision of Crime " deals with failure to inform the authorities about various crimes—committed or contemplated. Punishment is for a term of up to three years' imprisonment or for a term of up to one year of correctional labour. See Ibid. p. 79.

8 Art. 15-b of the Ukrainian Constitution states that " the Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, conclude agreements with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives."

9 Michael Browne, *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Doc. 6, pp. 58–60.

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So far Kandyba's petition could hardly have pleased Shelest, at that time a member of the Politburo of the CPSU, but more was to come. Again referring to the "Draft Programme," Kandyba argued that to achieve secession, it was necessary to create an organization which would carry out agitation and propaganda among the Ukrainians for that purpose, all of which was legal and "in accordance with the Constitution." In the event that the Ukrainian nation rejected secession, the organization provisionally called the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union would be dissolved. If, on the other hand, the Ukrainians chose independence, the political order must be Soviet and socialist respectively.[10]

After informing Shelest about the important parts of Lukianenko's pamphlet, Kandyba proceeded to explain why he thought that the charges of treason and various crimes against the Soviet state levelled against him and his friends were not justified. A jurist by profession, intimately acquainted with Soviet laws, he presented an impressive legal defence on behalf of the convicted seven. Kandyba wrote that on 6 November, 1960, several persons met to create an organization, which, had it been founded, would have been called the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union. However, at the meeting, "A Draft Programme of the UWPU" was rejected and a decision was made to write another draft programme in which there would be no discussion on the secession of the Ukraine from the USSR; only after the completion of the new and revised programmes would an organization be formed. But this never materialized. "There was thus no organization and no programme; nobody took any oath, or paid any membership fees; there was no suitably devised discipline; there was no nucleus of leadership; each of us considered himself free in all respects." Kandyba also asserted that such evidence was known to the investigative (the KGB) and judicial agencies, but that this did not change the outcome of the trial, since the evidence was suppressed. Had this not been so, the case against the seven would have been less damaging, "since there would then be no grounds for prosecuting us on criminal charges, and even if one or two of us had been prosecuted, such actions would never have been classified as treason, but, at worst, as anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."[11]

It appears that both the KGB and the courts—the official defenders of Soviet socialist legality—had acted illegally by suppressing important evidence and building their case against the seven as if the "Draft Programme" and the organization in question were already in operation. The Ukrainian jurist further tried to enlighten the communist leader on how inventive the Soviet court officials could be in interpreting the secession Articles of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR Constitutions. These officials, not daring to attack the right of secession per se, introduced the notion of "severing" the Ukraine from the Union, thus imbuing the whole matter with an intent to violence. This in turn helped the

[10] Ibid. p. 60.

[11] Ibid. p. 61. Kandyba says on the same page that "the question of the Ukraine's secession from the USSR was not to come into the new draft programme."

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court to formalize the treason charge as contained in Art. 56 (1) of the Ukrainian Criminal Code. The purpose of such an approach, Kandyba pointed out, became quite evident when the procurator's indictment speech endeavoured to prove that the accused had " conspired for the purpose of seizing power," again imputing treasonable activities to them under the said article. It is interesting to note that the procurator's statement did not appear in the judgment.

Following this, the Kremlin's man in the Ukraine was informed that in the 1964 book, *Practical Learned Commentary on the Criminal Code of RSFSR*, conspiracy to seize power receives some elucidation. The chapter entitled *Especially Dangerous Crimes Against the State* makes clear that " a conspiracy for the purpose of seizing power takes the form of agreement by two or more persons to overthrow Soviet rule and set up a different state and social system in the USSR." But, as Kandyba observed, all this cannot be applied to the accused, for the "UWPW Draft Programme " had envisaged secession in a peaceful and constitutional manner. [12] One must add, moreover, that the proposal of the Ukraine's secession from the Soviet Union was to be dropped in the new programme.

Kandyba's defence of the seven and his indictment of the Soviet investigation and juridical organs is fully corroborated by Lukianenko, also a jurist by profession. In an appeal to R. A. Rudenko, the Procurator-General of the USSR, Lukianenko stated that Soviet authorities had made three wrong assertions in the judgment concerning the UWPU organization and its programme: " (a) that an organization called UWPU already existed; (b) that an organization called UWPU had a programme; and (c) that members of the UWPU took political steps to implement this programme." Denying the validity of these assertions, the prisoner mentioned that in November 1960 at the meeting of the group, referred to by Kandyba, the draft programme was rejected and the name UWPU disappeared altogether. No new name was adopted at the meeting and Lukianenko thought of calling the assembled group a " Union for the Struggle for Democracy " since, in his own words, " such a name reflected more precisely the essence and aim of the organization being formed." Again, like Kandyba, he mentioned the abandonment of the main goal of the draft programme, namely, the Ukraine's secession by legal means.[13]

Rudenko, who served as the Chief Soviet prosecutor at the Nuremburg Trials, was made to understand by Lukianenko that the accused, contrary to the court judgment, had no intention of fighting the Soviet political and social system. He also said that neither he nor his colleagues meant to combat the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In any case, " A struggle against Marxist-

[12] Ibid. pp. 61–62. Browne gives the Russian title and page of " Practical Learned Commentary " on p. 62, fn. 1; it is " Nauchnoprakticheskiy kommentariy Ugolovnogo kodeksa RSFSR " (Moscow) 2nd ed., p. 156.

[13] Ibid. Doc. 2, p. 38.

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Leninist theory in the realm of ideas," continued the Ukrainian jurist, "does not constitute a crime of any kind at all." This is so because it "has not been proclaimed by law as the ideology compulsory for all citizens; it is in itself not law, which would involve legal penalties for the infringement of certain of its theses." All this, wrote Lukianenko, was not taken into account by the appropriate authorities, because they were not interested in ascertaining the truth of the matter, but in distorting it. The judgment of the court, therefore, could not be anything but wrong. Finally, the author of the rejected UWPU programme took Art. 56 as a whole and tried to convince the Procurator-General of the Soviet Union that the accused could not have committed treason, since no part of the article in question had been violated.[14]

In a statement to D. Korotchenko, then the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Lukianenko again raised the treason charge levelled against him and the others. He stated that:

> with all its lack of objectivity and its determination to sentence us, . . . the court was nevertheless unable to make the formulation of our guilt fit the content of the provision of Art. 56 UCC. It applied the punishment which it had decided upon, but being unable to charge us with a single treasonable act, left a most striking testimony to the incorrect legal classification of our actions—striking evidence of an arbitrary settling of accounts with dissenters.[15]

Another prisoner, Stepan Virun, who was sentenced to 11 years, wrote a letter to Oles' Honchar, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In it he pleaded to be released from "the remote swamps of Mordovia," a region in the European part of the Soviet Union occupied by concentration camps. Virun denied being a traitor, using the same arguments put forth by Lukianenko and Kandyba. Interestingly enough, he wrote that "A Draft Programme of the UWPU" was authored by Lukianenko and himself. Of even greater interest is the fact that in Virun's statement there is no mention of the decision to abandon the Ukraine's proposed secession from the USSR, which was perhaps an oversight on his part.[16]

IT will be instructive to review the charges of treason in the light of Soviet constitutional and criminal law and against the writings of Lukianenko, Kandyba and Virun. First, it is clear that the five people convicted of violating Art. 56 (1) and Art. 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, could have been charged with damaging the territorial inviolability of the USSR, and with "Organizational activity directed towards the preparation or perpetration of especially dangerous state crimes, the creation of an organization which has as its aim to perpetrate

[14] Ibid. pp. 39–41.
[15] Ibid. Doc. 7, p. 88. The statement to Korotchenko is dated May 1967. The appeal to Rudenko was probably written in 1964.
[16] Ibid. Doc. 4, pp. 46–53.

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such crimes as well as participation in an anti-Soviet organization." Secondly, since no organized attempt was made to commit crimes against the state or to agitate for the Ukraine's secession, Art. 64 has no relevance and should not have been cited. Thirdly, the charge that Lukianenko's group had aimed at "severing the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR" to create an "Independent Ukraine" should not have even been raised since the group had decided not to seek secession. Fourthly, if one is charged with treason for advocating secession because it would result in damage to the territorial inviolability of the USSR, then Art. 56 violates both Fundamental Laws or the Constitutions of the Union and the Ukraine, which should take precedence over criminal codes. However, the item of Art. 56 in question here is irrelevant because secession was not sought. Fifth, the struggle against the Communist Party of the USSR is neither a constitutional nor a criminal offence, for no pertinent articles to that effect are found in either Union or Ukrainian Constitutions or in the Ukrainian Criminal Code. Sixth, the same is true concerning the struggle against Marxism-Leninism. These last two charges, setting aside denial by the accused, attest only to the poverty of reasoning and ignorance of Soviet Laws by their official upholders. Seventh, Art. 62 which deals with agitation and propaganda directed against the Soviet system under which the two individuals were given maximum penalty (7 years), should not have been invoked for, as is evident from the rejection of secession as well as from the activities of the group, no part of Art. 62 could be imputed to them. Actually, Art. 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR seems to contradict Art. 105 of the Ukrainian Constitution which guarantees the freedom of speech because any criticism of the Soviet regime—and criticism there was in the case under consideration—could be considered as an Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. And finally, Art. 187 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code should not have been invoked either, since one cannot inform about the crimes which were neither committed nor even contemplated. It should perhaps be observed that Art. 187 does not deal with crimes covered by Art. 62, or, for that matter, by Art. 56 or Art. 64 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code. To sum up, the accused committed neither treason, nor crimes against the state, nor did they strike out for an "Independent Ukraine." The court's judgment was both illegal and obviously unjust.

WHY then were the accused punished so severely? The answer is clear. Members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were investigated, tried and convicted not for what they did but for what they possibly could have done or, even for what they dared to think of doing—mainly promoting the secession of the Ukraine from the Moscow-dominated Soviet Union. Even conceiving such a thought had to be punished, contrary to Art. 105 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and Art. 125 of the Union Constitution, which guarantee the freedom of speech. Or, perhaps, these articles guarantee only freedom of thoughtless speech?

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Whether Lukianenko's group rejected secession or not is unimportant. That these individuals had even thought about it *was* sufficient ground for prosecution and punishment. How terrifying the idea of the Ukraine's secession must have been for the Soviet authorities is demonstrated by the following statement. The KGB investigator Denisov told Lukianenko:

> Even if you had succeeded in organizing demonstrations in Kiev, L'vov and other large cities of the Ukraine, and even if those demonstrations had been joined by masses of people carrying banners, placards and slogans demanding the secession of the Ukraine from the Union, do you really think that the Government would not have used troops to crush the demonstrations? What are they stationed in the cities for? [17]

Virun, in his letter to Honchar wrote that, besides Denisov, there were other KGB investigators who spoke in a similar vein: "Even if a majority of the Ukrainian people expresses the wish to leave the USSR by taking advantage of its constitutional right to do so, the Soviet Government will not stop short of using armed force in order to keep the Ukraine in the USSR." [18] The KGB officers knew quite well that without the Ukrainian population, territory, resources and strategic position on the Black Sea and the Straits, Moscow's empire would not be what it is today.

THE problem of secession, which was the central question in the trial and conviction of the seven, presents a juridical puzzle of Soviet legality. While the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR states explicitly the right of this Republic to leave the Soviet Union, the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR leaves no doubt that the damage to the territorial inviolability of the USSR is regarded as an act of treason.[19] It would be very hard indeed not to damage the territorial inviolability of the Union, if a Soviet Republic, especially the Ukraine, would decide to part from the USSR. It seems, then, that what is granted by the Constitution is rescinded by the Criminal Code.[20] Lukianenko's appeal to Soviet authority, probably made in 1964, was answered by Maliarov, the Deputy Procurator-General who stated that the Lviv Regional Court had been correct in classifying Lukianenko's actions as treason, for they were detrimental to the territorial inviolability of the Union. "It appears from his interpretation," the imprisoned Ukrainian jurist commented "that when Art. 56 UCC refers to territorial inviolability, it does not mean the defence of the Union Republic's territory, but the inadmis-

17 Ibid. Doc. 7, p. 89.

18 Ibid. Doc. 4, p. 51.

19 See my article "The Ukraine: a Sovereign and Independent State? Juridical Approach," *European Studies Review*, I. No. 4 (October, 1971), pp. 383–84.

20 The Criminal Codes of other Soviet Republics contain the same clause. See *Ugolovnoe zakonodatel'stvo Soiuza SSR i soiuznykh Respublik* (Criminal Legislation of the Union Republics), Vol. I, Moscow, 1963.

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sibility of secession of the Union Republics from the USSR." [21] Well spoken indeed, but what else could this Article mean if the Ukrainian Criminal Code (and other Republics' Codes) talk of the territorial inviolability of the USSR and not of the Ukrainian SSR? This leads to the following conclusion concerning Lukianenko and his colleagues: while constitutionally, they would have committed no treason as regards secession, had they decided to seek it, they would have been guilty according to the Criminal Code. It is immaterial that constitutional law should and does take precedence over criminal law; one should not forget that Soviet reality and legality are not what one would call normal. Moroz still hopes that the Soviet Constitution, which is the Fundamental Law of the Land, "will some day become the law. . . ." [22] This is a simple, yet profound observation. It is also a pathetic one.

In order to have a convincing case against the accused group, the KGB investigators had persuaded Vasyl Lutskiv, one of the seven, to give false testimony against Lukianenko and others, including himself. He consented to do this because he was promised freedom. However, the KGB officials broke their word and Lutskiv got ten years' imprisonment. Several years later, in October 1965, the prisoner addressed a petition to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, for his release from the labour camp. He also asked the Central Committee for help to review the case of the group he had helped to convict. Lutskiv wrote in his petition that the KGB investigator Denisov had ordered him to admit his membership in the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union, which in fact did not exist. "Moreover," said Lutskiv, "I signed records fabricated by the same investigator with similar statements in writing to the effect that an organization existed, that the leader was Lukyanenko, that this organization was anti-Soviet, nationalist, and operated underground, although in reality I did not see anything like this." Lutskiv also signed papers written by Denisov in which, at the meeting on 6 November 1960, he had supposedly endeavoured to persuade Lukianenko, Virun and the rest to carry out an armed struggle against the regime and that this was agreed to by Lukianenko. Later, even in the labour camp, Lutskiv was to spy on Lukianenko, Virun and others, looking for some subversive activities on their part. "When I arrived in the camp, I did not see any subversive activities there, so I did not write any reports, although I had been directed to do so by the camp's KGB official, Capt. Litvin." [23] Lutskiv's petition to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine helped neither him nor the rest of the seven. According to Virun [24] and Kandyba,[25] Lutskiv was sent to a mental institution for writing these and similar petitions. Whether he is still there is not known.

21 Michael Browne, *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Doc. 7, p. 89.
22 Ibid. Doc. 11, p. 153.
23 Ibid. Doc. 3, pp. 43–45.
24 Ibid. Doc. 4, p. 51.
25 Ibid. Doc. 6, p. 64.

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ACCORDING to the accused, the KGB investigators and the Court officials had behaved with utter contempt with regard to the Ukrainian language, culture and history. Russian chauvinism was unconcealed. Kandyba complained to Shelest that, contrary to Art. 90 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and Art. 19 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code Procedure, the investigation was conducted in Russian.[26] He wrote:

> Procurator Starikov became so insolent that he brazenly boasted to Borovnytsky that he did not know Ukrainian; that Ukrainian did not deserve to be the state language; that the Ukrainian nation was not capable of having its own statehood; that because of this B. Khmel'nytsky had put the Ukraine under the Russian sceptre, and the Ukraine had become part of the USSR in 1922.[27]

In his letter to Korotchenko, Lukianenko said:

> Denisov and Sergadeyev and Starikov—these guardians of the sovereign Ukrainian Soviet state—have lived in the Ukraine for a long time, but they have not learnt our language. On the contrary, they treat it and our literature and culture with scorn and contempt, and everything they do bears witness to their chauvinism. And they displayed deadly hatred towards us.[28]

Virun spoke in similar terms about the manifestation of Russian chauvinism. He pointed out to Honchar that Moscow's officials in the Ukraine called the accused the "ferocious nationalists."[29] Ukrainian nationalism, of course, is one of the deadliest sins in the Russian vocabulary; the Kremlin hierarchy wages constant warfare against even the simplest indications of its existence.

The political prisoners mentioned in this paper are being kept in concentration camps in the Mordovian ASSR, which is part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. At the time of this writing, most of these prisoners should have been released, but their fate is unknown.

In June, 1969, a letter was addressed to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations Organization. It was signed by three political prisoners, two of whom, Kandyba and Lukianenko, were the principal figures in the political and legalistic drama. The third prisoner, M. Horyn' is not associated with the case of the seven. The three Ukrainians asked the "Honourable Commission" to protest the treatment by the Russian KGB of "the Ukrainian patriots and honest citizens."

[26] Art. 90 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR states that "legal proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language with a guarantee for persons, who do not know the language of the majority, to be fully acquainted with materials of the case through the interpreter and to have the right to speak in the court in their native language." The provisions of Art. 19 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code Procedure are similar to that of Art. 90 of the Constitution.

[27] Michael Browne, *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Doc. 6, p. 63.

[28] Ibid. Doc. 7, p. 83.

[29] Ibid. Doc. 4, p. 51.

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Calling the Human Rights Commission "the highest agency for the protection of human rights," they wrote:

> We have been arrested for demanding an improvement in the position of the Ukrainian worker and for defending the rights of the Ukrainian language, education and culture. Since these demands are constitutionally admissible, we continue to uphold them. Having been unable to break down our morale, the KGB agencies are trying to reduce us in a biological sense from intellectuals to vegetables.

The letter then described how the prisoners were being poisoned slowly by the chemicals added to their food. In the words of the Ukrainian intellectuals:

> The symptoms of poisoning are as follows: Ten to fifteen minutes after the consumption of food a slight pressure appears in the temples which afterwards turns into an intolerable headache. It is difficult to concentrate on anything, even on writing a letter home. When reading a paragraph one forgets by the end what was written at the beginning. In order to return to a normal condition one must fast for 24 hours. Thus, we alternate days of fasting with days of poisoned food.[30]

It is not known if the Human Rights Commission has ever reviewed this remarkable case and undertaken to protest such treatment of Ukrainian prisoners. Yet, one should bear in mind that the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR were the founding members of the United Nations Organization. In his Nobel Prize Lecture, which was never delivered, Alexander Solzhenitzyn, wrote this about the United Nations:

> Relying on the mercenary partiality of the majority, the UN jealously guards the freedom of some nations and neglects the freedom of others. As a result of an obedient vote, it declines to undertake the investigation of private appeals—the groans, screams and beseechings of humble individual plain people—not large enough a catch for such a great organization. The UN made no effort to make the Declaration of Human Rights, its best document in 25 years, into an obligatory condition of membership confronting the governments. Thus it betrayed those humble people into the will of the governments which they had not chosen.[31]

[30] Ibid. Doc. 31, p. 216.
[31] *The New York Times*, 25 August 1972, p. 2.

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Daniil Granin and the World of Soviet Science

Keith Armes

DANIIL GRANIN enjoys great popularity in the Soviet Union as a writer on scientific subjects. Amongst contemporary Soviet novelists he is notable for having concentrated his attention on the problem of scientific research and the nature of scientific creativity. Of particular interest is his preoccupation with the phenomenon of bureaucratic careerism and its effect on the Soviet administrative apparatus.

After publishing a short novel, *The Quarrel Across the Ocean* (*Spor cherez okean*) in 1950, Granin first attracted wide attention five years later with his major novel *The Seekers* (*Iskateli*). This success was followed in 1956 by the short story *One's Own Opinion* (*Sobstvennoe Mnenie*) published in the journal *Novy Mir*, which came to be frequently cited as one of the principal literary phenomena of the "thaw" period after the death of Stalin. Three years later Granin published a second full-length novel, *After the Wedding* (*Posle Svad'by*), in which he combined the subject of factory management and industrial technology with that of agriculture, dealing at length with Khrushchev's new policy for Soviet agriculture. In 1962 Granin then published a third major novel, *Into the Storm* (*Idu na grozu*), in which Granin presents his favourite theme of scientific research in relation to the changing political climate in the Soviet Union. After *Into the Storm* Granin published nothing further on scientific topics for some years, but used his experiences during a number of journeys abroad, notably to Cuba, the GDR, Australia and England as the basis for a series of travel accounts, *The Island of the Young* (*Ostrov Molodykh*), *An Unexpected Morning* (*Neozhidannoe Utro*), *The Moon Upsidedown* (*Mesyats Vverkh Nogami*), and *Notes for a Guidebook* (*Primechaniya k putevoditelyu*), the last of which includes a predominantly favourable description of a visit which Granin made to England as a member of a Soviet tourist group.

In 1970 Granin returned to the subject of Soviet science with his most recent work, a collection of short novels and stories, *Somebody Must* (*Kto-to Dolzhen*). The title-work has as its theme the complex psychological relationship between a successful research scientist and an inventor. The collection includes a science-fiction story, *Space for a Monument* (*Mesto dlya pamyatnika*) and an article on the early nineteenth-century Russian scientist Vasily Petrov in which Granin expresses his views on the nature of human creativity and the significance of pure science.

Daniil Aleksandrovich Granin, born in 1919, graduated as an

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electrical engineer in 1940 from the Electrical Engineering Department of the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute. After working for a short time in the electrical laboratory of the Kirov plant in Leningrad, Granin volunteered for the front immediately after the outbreak of war in June 1941 and served in the Soviet Army as a tank officer, rising at one point to command of a tank regiment at the age of 22. Towards the end of the war Granin was demobilized in order to head one of the regions of the electrical power network in Leningrad. Later he held a post as a research scientist and gave lecture courses to students in electrical engineering. It was only after the success of *The Seekers* that Granin decided to devote himself completely to writing. He has made his permanent home in Leningrad, and it forms the background for much of his work; his love for the city emerges clearly.

GRANIN'S first story, *The Quarrel Across the Ocean* (also published under the title of *Engineer Korsakov's Victory*), is of interest only in so far as the scientist hero, Nikolai Korsakov, is a prototype of the heroes of Granin's later novels *The Seekers* and *Into the Storm.* Korsakov is entrusted with the task of designing an electrical regulator for a revolutionary new machine and succeeds in developing a new type of regulator on a principle which he discovers. Korsakov displays great determination and self-sacrifice, refusing to follow the easier way of adapting an already existing regulator which had been designed by an American scientist. Had he done so, he would have been able to complete his candidate's thesis, but he will not "make a deal with his conscience for the sake of the glory of being a candidate of science." Although in the end the American scientist's device is adopted, Korsakov has discovered through his efforts both his own capabilities and the value of collective endeavour—themes which recur in Granin's later work. Similarly, the unprincipled scientist Professor Arsent'ev and the young careerist Agarkov foreshadow many negative characters in Granin's later novels. Much of the characterization, however, is naïve and schematic, while the extensive treatment of the Stalinist drive against "servility" towards the West (nizkopoklonstvo), notably with regard to Arsent'ev's pro-American proclivities, transparently reflects the influence of the Party's current ideological line.

IN the same year Granin published a short story, *The Second Variant* (*Variant vtoroy*: since reprinted in the collection *Somebody Must*), much superior to *The Quarrel Across the Ocean.* The hero Savitsky, who is on the point of submitting his candidate's thesis, discovers that a graduate student, Nikolaev, who had been killed in the war, had developed a far superior solution to the problem on which Savitsky was working. Like Korsakov, Savitsky rejects the "deal with his conscience" proposed by his supervisor—to conceal his discovery—and reveals Nikolaev's priority during the formal defence of his thesis, thus depriving himself of the coveted degree. However, Granin adds a facile

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happy ending in which the chairman of the degree committee tells Savitsky that his "noble action has proved better than any doctoral defence that he will be a real scientist."

IN his first full-length novel, *The Seekers*, Granin develops the theme of *The Quarrel Across the Ocean* on the background of a lengthy presentation of the world of Soviet scientific research at the end of the 1940s. The hero, Andrei Lobanov, who has recently obtained his candidate's degree in electrical engineering, gives up a promising career in a research institute in order to work on a cherished idea in an electrical laboratory in a remote town. Lobanov believes that he has discovered a revolutionary concept based on recent developments in radar which will make it possible to locate accurately the position of breaks in underground power cables. Apparently the idea for the novel was suggested to Granin by his experiences while working for the Leningrad power supply system: wartime bomb damage resulted in frequent breakdowns and there was a great need for a device which could establish the point at which the cable was cut.

At first Lobanov antagonizes his subordinates in the laboratory by his total dedication to work and lack of consideration for others, but gradually the "laboratory collective" becomes infected by Lobanov's exalted faith in the value of research work. Lobanov inspires the Komsomols in his laboratory by showing them "how much beauty there is in humdrum yet real laboratory work, how much imagination and willpower it demanded, what possibilities lay in it. In order to become a creator, one did not need at all to be an engineer. One could remain an ordinary laboratory assistant or a fitter and still feel oneself to be a soldier of the same army in which Faraday, Yablochkov and Krzyzanowki had fought." However, as a result of his inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise Lobanov loses the friendship of Viktor Potapenko, the head of the technical department of the power supply system, with whom he had earlier studied at the institute. Potapenko is the archetype of the unprincipled careerist who frequently recurs in Granin's work: in order to satisfy his ambition and secure promotion he consistently eliminates competent subordinates who threaten his position and surrounds himself with sycophants.

Potapenko blames familiar defects of the Soviet administrative system for his unwillingness to include in the laboratory work plan an automatic device designed by a gifted electrical engineer, Reingold—"Viktor saw the ministry's policy as the cause of many misfortunes. For nonfulfilment of the plan you become the object of murderous attacks, but as for automatic equipment and regulators—we never had them before, so we can do without them for a further year. Conservatism and reinsurance are caused by existing conditions." Telling Lobanov about abuses in the ministry, Potapenko asks "what possibilities he has to criticize the ministry? He, Viktor, is criticized at the power stations, at production conferences and at the Party committee. But he? Just let

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him try to speak out somewhere! I won't be able to settle a single question afterwards at the ministry."

Another figure whom Granin clearly sees as typical of the Stalinist administration is Dolgin, Potapenko's deputy, whose word is law in the Party Committee. Dolgin combines professional incompetence with a ruthless determination to eliminate anyone who dares oppose him. His method of using the slightest blemish in the record of an opponent as a means of discrediting him is illustrated by his treatment of Lobanov's protégé Reingold. Although Granin does not refer to Reingold's race in the novel, Reingold's fate is clearly intended to be seen in relation to Stalin's antisemitic policy. Dolgin uses the pretext of Reingold's remaining in occupied territory during the war to have him dismissed, despite Lobanov's protests that Dolgin's action is illegal and a violation of the Soviet Constitution.

In *The Seekers* Granin describes the atmosphere prevailing in the science departments of the universities during the Stalin period. Granin portrays a gallery of scientists who represent a range of varying philosophies of life and professional attitudes. At one end of the spectrum we have Lobanov's former supervisor, the demanding Professor Odintsov, who tells his pupil that "Honesty in science is as necessary as knowledge" and the brilliant theoretician Professor Grigor'ev, who is utterly selfless in his dedication to his field, while at the other we encounter the odious Professor Tonkov, who has given up scientific research in order to rest on his laurels as the founder of a school of electrical theory, and Tonkov's protégé Smorodin, who readily agrees to sabotage Lobanov's work at Tonkov's behest. Granin describes at length Tonkov's attitudes: "He made use of young scientists, they grew up under his supervision, they carried out his research, and he permitted them to become co-authors, it was better for them that way, at least their work was published without delay. He scarcely found the time to sit on his various commissions and committees. He derived satisfaction from the endless flow of telegrams, invitation cards and agendas. He liked to complain about his heavy workload." Tonkov fears that Lobanov will endanger his position as the greatest authority in the field, since Lobanov's "locator" competes with an inferior device which Tonkov himself had designed. Finally, driven to desperation, Tonkov commits the crimes of stealing Lobanov's design and falsifying test data in order to present Lobanov's device in a bad light, only to see his misdeeds exposed at the end of the novel.

The book concludes with a happy ending: Lobanov's device proves even more effective than expected and the hero emerges triumphant, although he still foresees the need to continue the struggle against the Smorodins who are still entrenched in Soviet science. Far more interesting than this dénouement is Granin's presentation of the Party meeting at which Potapenko's candidature for the Party Committee is rejected. Here Granin projects political developments after Stalin's death onto the

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political situation of the late 1940s in order to illustrate the new trend towards less authoritarianism in Soviet life. Dolgin had orchestrated the Party meeting with the aid of a prearranged list of candidates for the Party Committee and their proposers, while it turns out that the proposers scarcely know their candidates. At the meeting the Secretary of the Party Bureau of Lobanov's laboratory, Borisov, reveals Dolgin's methods by taking the list from the table and reading it out aloud. Borisov then points the lesson: "Dolgin has not only distorted the meaning of preparing a Party meeting, but violated the basis of our Party life—the principle of collective leadership." When Lobanov reflects later about the other meeting at which Tonkov's machinations had been exposed, he sees a "strong internal connection" between these events, all of which are clearly to be taken as evidence of the new political climate.

IN *One's Own Opinion* Granin develops a theme which had already been adumbrated in the characterization of Potapenko in *The Seekers*—the "deformation of personality" undergone by a Soviet administrator. The director of a research institute, Minaev, refuses to permit a young engineer to condemn in an article the design of a new motor produced by an Academician because of the complications for the institute and for Minaev's own position. This incident leads Minaev to go over his past and the way in which he had kept his opinions to himself at every successive step in order not to endanger his career. Minaev had always rationalized this attitude by telling himself that after his next promotion he would finally speak his mind: "It's not enough to have an opinion of your own, you have to have the corresponding position as well"—but even now as director of an institute he could not bring himself to oppose the Party instructor of the local city council, Loktev, a ruthless bureaucrat who wrecks the careers of everyone who dares attack him. Minaev is a case-history of the character development of an unprincipled Soviet official who has acquired an inbuilt capacity to speak and act so as never to incur the displeasure of his superiors. "He went along with obtuse ignoramuses. He voted in favour when his conscience demanded that he vote against. He spoke words in which he did not believe. He praised what he should have condemned. When things became completely unbearable, he kept silent. Silence is the most convenient way of lying." The story ends with Minaev's realization during his journey home in a sleeping car from a ministerial conference in Moscow that he has destroyed his own soul by becoming the slave of his own duplicity.

IN *After the Wedding* Granin focuses on the Party's new agricultural policies after the death of Stalin. The hero, Igor Malyutin, a young factory technician, accepts the summons of his Komsomol organization to help raise agricultural productivity by taking over the management of the repair workshop of a Machine Tractor Station. After a period of

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initial despair at the backwardness of the MTS, Malyutin greatly improves the organization of the work by employing factory production methods. The MTS workers eventually give Malyutin their wholehearted support, influenced by the discovery that someone had put iron filings in a can of milk left by Igor outside his house. With the aid of a somewhat schematic range of characters, Granin portrays at length the contrast between the dictatorial rule of the Stalinist administrators in the countryside and the "new men" and their progressive methods. The autocratic deputy head of the regional agricultural administration, Kislov, does all he can to thwart the Party's new policy of giving the collective farms some independence and is determined to stamp out any indiscipline on the part of his subordinates. Kislov is opposed by the highly cultured Chernyshov, who has a distinguished record as secretary of the Party Committee of a major organization and director of a large laboratory. Chernyshov openly criticizes Kislov, telling him that "Trust brings greater benefits than suspiciousness, although some leaders spend far more of their strength and abilities on distrust." The author shows us the way in which the battle between the old system and the new policies is being fought out in the mind of the Regional Committee Secretary, Zhikharyov, whose final decision to give Chernyshov his support is clearly intended to illustrate that Stalinist methods are doomed. "The fact that Kislov clung to the past constituted his impotence as opposed to Chernyshov. Looking at Kislov, Zhikharyov saw himself as he had been in the past. He was overcome by a feeling of pity and even terror because he until recently had been the same; but now Kislov appeared to him stupid and old-fashioned. He had understood nothing and learned nothing. He was clearly a hindrance. Zhikharyov thought with pain about the historical tragedy of this man, so honourable in his own way."

Granin vividly describes the straits to which agriculture had been reduced under Stalin. When a former kolkhoznik, Tikhon Chudrov, arrives in the city to work at Malyutin's old factory and Igor's roommates attack him for having fled from the land, he reproaches them bitterly for their material welfare—"Here you can get rolls and sugar in all the shops." Chudrov tells them that the peasants were unable to cope with the harvest so that the grain rotted in the fields; in winter cattle died of starvation. The peasants received only 100 grams of rye per workday and survived thanks solely to their private plots. When the young workers appear surprised that the peasants should have elected a drunkard as their chairman, Chudrov enlightens them "with pity"—"You don't know how they're appointed? Maybe here people are freely elected, but in our kolkhoz . . . the goat also went willingly, only it was on the end of a rope."

Through a tour of the local villages made by Igor's wife Tonya, Granin provides a graphic description of the agricultural situation in a backward region. There is no feed for the cows who are dying of

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hunger, although the roof of a cowshed had been torn down to provide them with straw. However, Tonya's tears over her experiences yield later to optimistic hopes which the peasants place in the new policies decreed during the decisive spring of 1954.

Surprisingly, we find a newly-elected kolkhoz chairman, Palchikov—the twenty-second to head the kolkhoz since its foundation—advocating the dissolution of the MTS and the distribution of their equipment to the kolkhozes some years before the abolition of the MTS by Khrushchev.

At the end of the novel Igor decides not to return to the plant but to stay in the village where he is most needed. Thus Igor, who had originally refused to accept the Komsomol assignment to the MTS and had also acted unethically in concealing from a colleague a design for automating a lathe which he had developed, comes to represent the new idealistic generation to whom the older generation of Communists can safely entrust their legacy. Igor inspires his factory comrades with his enthusiastic appraisal of future prospects for agriculture, telling them " One should not look for work, but for oneself in one's work." Success attends Igor also in his personal life, for his wife Tonya, who had been furious at his decision to return to the village, is at the end of the novel ready to rejoin him.

At Igor's factory the new political developments are illustrated in the conflict between the Stalinist chief engineer, Losev, and the reinstated director, Loginov, Igor's uncle, recently rehabilitated after being purged as an " enemy of the people " soon after the war. Here Granin presents the theme of the " returnee " in similar fashion to Ehrenburg in *The Thaw*—Loginov had never lost his faith in the Party or his determination to have his Party card restored to him. As soon as Loginov returns Losev realizes that his position is endangered and by the end of the novel he has lost all authority at the plant. Granin exposes Losev's methods in detail. In order to strengthen his position he systematically prevents the promotion of competent mechanics, favouring instead those who lack talent or have blemishes on their reputation, since such men will do anything they are told in order to keep their jobs. " One's strength lies in making use of others' weaknesses. What is important is not the knowledge of machinery, technology and so on, but relations with the management; just as you evaluate your subordinates, so the chief engineer and the director evaluate you, consequently don't push yourself forward until the right moment comes, don't try to make a show of your initiative or your erudition. Mediocrity is always agreeable to everybody." Clearly the scope for technical progress in Soviet industry was limited while important posts in management were frequently held by figures such as Losev. That such a situation was widespread is suggested by the extensive treatment accorded by Granin to Stalinist administrators of this type in *After the Wedding* as well as in his earlier fiction.

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WITH the novel *Into the Storm*, his most ambitious work to date, Granin returns to the world of Soviet scientific research. Here the author combines the theme of the triumph of the determined, altruistic individual over all difficulties with the theme of the deformation of the human personality under the influence of a careerist mentality. Moreover, Granin attempts in this novel, set in the late 1950s, to come to terms with the consequences of the "cult of personality"—in art as well as in the writer's own special field of scientific research. The novel is based upon the contrasting evolution of a brilliant young scientist, Oleg Tulin, who appears at the beginning as an immensely attractive "magician" with the world at his feet, only to deteriorate by the end of the book into a self-seeking weakling, and Tulin's friend, Sergei Krylov, who develops from a follower of Tulin into a recognized authority as a result of his singlehanded, major breakthrough in a new field of research. Tulin's research team is investigating the formation of storm-clouds and the origin of lightning. During a flight into a thunderstorm under Krylov's command a research aircraft crashes, causing the death of a member of the team, and as a result the commission of investigation orders that the research project be closed down. Tulin gives up after the disaster and abandons his research in the interests of his personal life, leaving Krylov to continue to battle on alone against great opposition until a top Party official—who appears unconvincingly as a *deus ex machina* at the end of the novel—agrees to give Krylov his support.

Krylov is clearly Granin's ideal of the scientist—a dedicated researcher who is determined to find the solution to all inexplicable phenomena. As a young student he had attempted to discover the nature of gravitational forces, reveal the contradictions of quantum mechanics and develop a universal theory of electrical fields—something which had eluded even Einstein. Through his characterization of Krylov, Granin attempts to demonstrate that a theoretical scientist is capable of achieving breakthroughs which may have important practical applications. Krylov lives only for his research and is indifferent to all considerations of career or material welfare. He expounds his beliefs in conversations with the less altruistic Tulin, in one of which he says, referring to a senior professor whom he greatly admires, "I know Danchenko is a true scientist. He will never go against his convictions. Like Galileo, he will go on repeating—'it turns all the same.' A true scientist cannot act otherwise. Whatever happens!" When Tulin gives up his research, telling Krylov that there is no sense in being good if good people perish, for one only makes it easier for scum to triumph, Krylov retorts that at least one makes no compromises. When his friend answers that all our life is a compromise, since we can never be completely honest and do what we want, Krylov continues: "I don't know what sense there is in being good. What is the sense of being a human being? Since you're alive, live like a human being, not like a caterpillar. I don't know, maybe one should be good for one's own sake, maybe for

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the sake of others. I don't refuse to fight, only I will fight honestly—if I act basely myself, then I'm no longer fighting against base people, but for my place amongst them." After Krylov's integrity and determination bring him success, the moral is spelled out by an older scientist, Professor Anikeev. Wondering how such a meek simpleton had been able to break down such a wall of opposition, Anikeev comes to the conclusion, " Yes, a man can do a lot if he has the truth (' pravda '), he can do the devil knows what."

Unfortunately Granin does not succeed in presenting Krylov's personality and career effectively, with the result that the author's moralistic conclusions about his positive hero lack all artistic conviction. The novel ends with a scene in which Krylov's optimism about the future of the world and belief in the forthcoming collapse of capitalism is contrasted with the desperation of an old French professor who believes that the invention of the nuclear bomb means that mankind is irrevocably doomed. Like Krylov's final triumph, this episode produces an unconvincing and tendentious impression.

The most interesting passages are those in which Granin deals with the effects of the " cult of personality " and the changed atmosphere during the Khrushchev period. Professor Anikeev, one of the top Soviet nuclear scientists, had shown incredible bravery in daring to oppose Beria when the latter headed the development of the Soviet atomic bomb. Infuriated by his " illiterate, sometimes fatal interference ", Anikeev had once insulted Beria and written to the Party Central Committee, asking it to remove Beria from control of the project. Anikeev had survived solely because of his prominence and irreplaceability: " In those times such a challenge amounted to suicide." At one point in the novel an engineer recollects the famous article by Stalin on linguistics and its consequences—" millions of people at every factory were compelled to spend months studying problems of linguistics, while the devil knows what was going on in the collective farms and there were queues for bread." When Krylov wants to go on with the project despite the risks, a member of the investigation commission, Professor Golitsyn, tells him that he has " cult positions." " Earlier," he tells Krylov, " you would have been compelled to continue work irrespective of all the victims. Ten people perished, a hundred, no-one was interested. . . ."

Golitsyn himself is seen by Granin as a member of the older generation who suffered permanent psychological damage under the Stalin dictatorship: " Fear had impregnated his brain." Golitsyn envies the younger generation of scientists such as Krylov who have grown up in a happier time and cannot understand the atmosphere of terror in which Golitsyn had had to work.

At the end of the novel Krylov refuses to accept the argument of his Party saviour, Bogdanovsky, that one will have to forget about personal factors when it comes to getting Krylov's group together again—" If we asked people every time, we'd still be living in caves." Krylov retorts

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that he is going to ask them—" that kind of progress is not for me." The conflict between the generations comes into the open again in the course of a discussion amongst Tulin's laboratory colleagues. One of the young men refuses to consider that the fact that no-one has been arrested for " wrecking " after the disaster represents a major reform: as he tells an older colleague, " That's just normal." After the careerist Agatov has reproached the younger researchers for having " had it too easy "—they had not known the war and had been spoiled by " democracy "—the young man goes on to ask, referring to the closing down of their research, " All right, 1937, but how could you permit that? "

Granin vividly describes the impact of the twentieth congress on the young scientists, who revel in the new political and artistic climate and put forward ideas for all kinds of reforms. Krylov, Tulin and their gifted friends see themselves as the possessors of the most important contemporary speciality and the nucleus of future Soviet society. " For them Babel's stories, which had just been reprinted, and Koltsov's sketches were a discovery; Tsvetaeva's poetry appeared and documents unknown under Stalin were published. Questions connected with the consequences of the cult excited them more than anything else, and they attempted ardently and selfassuredly to rebuild this imperfect world."

Krylov's brief affair with a colleague enables Granin to introduce her husband, Romanov, a painter who, like Pukhov in Ehrenburg's *Thaw*, has destroyed his talent by prostituting his art in conformity with the demands of " socialist realism." When Krylov reproaches Romanov for his soulless portraits of obtuse robots, Romanov justifies himself by citing the critical acclaim which he has won: " I work for the consumer." Eventually Romanov breaks down and confesses to Krylov that he realizes what he has done to himself, but is too terrified of criticism to change. Like Minaev in *One's Own Opinion,* he repeatedly tells himself that " some time " he will begin to paint for himself—but that moment never comes. Granin's condemnation of official art in the novel should be seen in conjunction with his remarks on art in the account of his stay in England, *Notes for a Guidebook*, where he explains that his earlier enthusiasm for abstract painting was partly the result of a feeling of protest aroused by official attempts to direct his artistic tastes. Granin speaks of his mixed feelings of pride and shame at seeing paintings by Goncharova and Larionov in the Tate Gallery and looks forward to the time when the work of Tatlin, Falk, Chagal and Kandinsky will be exhibited in the Soviet Union.

GRANIN'S recent short novel *Somebody Must* marks a great advance compared with the psychological schematicism which characterizes *Into the Storm.* The hero, Drobyshev, a successful young research scientist, is approached by an older man, Selyanin, who needs help in developing an invention against influential opposition. Impelled by the mutual attraction which he and Selyanin's much younger wife feel for each other, Drobyshev skilfully persuades the inventor to abandon his

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project, playing on his sense of responsibility towards his wife and son, and the need for a man to enjoy spiritual harmony and experience the fullness of life if his work is to be fruitful. "Life is more than work," he tells Selyanin, "it is immoral to work at the expense of life." Selyanin, however, seems to be a scientist possessed by an idea, a personality in the mould of Lobanov and Krylov. He appeals in anguish to Drobyshev's wife: "Let's assume I've invented some trifle, a nut for instance. No natural law, I'm no Einstein, but what if for me that nut is as if I were Einstein? You understand? Today they reject the nut, tomorrow it'll be genetics." Selyanin says that one cannot live without ideals, finally commenting bitterly, "I thought that somebody must."

Drobyshev's attitude towards Selyanin is complex and the success with which Granin conveys the "overdeterminedness" of their relationship marks a new development in his writing. Drobyshev not only wants to help Selyanin's wife but also sees his advice to Selyanin to give up his invention as a means of later blackmailing an unscrupulous scientific rival, Bragin, who is trying to get credit for Selyanin's invention by inducing Selyanin to name him co-author. Moreover, Drobyshev perceives in Selyanin a possible variant of his own life, the direction which his own career might have taken, had he not agreed some years before to permit his supervisor for the candidate's degree to steal his research results from him. Thus Drobyshev evidently makes use of his influence on Selyanin to justify to himself his own lack of principle in the past.

In the second part of the novel the tables are turned: it is now Drobyshev, who has staked his reputation on achieving a breakthrough in a new area of research, who approaches Selyanin for help in the production of special equipment which he needs. Selyanin is now a completely changed man—well-dressed, prosperous-looking, apparently content with his undemanding post of technologist at a remote plant. He refuses to help Drobyshev, telling him that he declines all unnecessary responsibilities—"I have stopped being the slave of my ideas." In the course of a brilliantly presented verbal duel between the two men on the deck of a river steamer, Drobyshev cannot decide whether or not Selyanin is sincere in echoing his own earlier self-serving arguments or to what extent his own influence has determined Selyanin's transformation.

For his part Drobyshev knows that his earlier encounter with Selyanin had decisively changed his life by inducing him to break with Bragin after the latter had consolidated his position thanks to Selyanin's invention. Drobyshev began research on his idea almost singlehanded and now after two years of dogged work he has nothing but failures to record. At the end of the novel, however, he emerges as an example of the type of dedicated scientist whose idealism is so frequently invoked by Granin. Although Drobyshev sees Selyanin as a "conqueror", he does not feel himself conquered or believe that he acted wrongly in deciding to stake everything on his one idea. Repeating Selyanin's earlier words, he tells Selyanin's wife "Somebody must." The novel

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concludes with Drobyshev's thoughts as he contemplates the difficulties which still lie ahead: "After all nobody seemed to be forcing him to do all this. Why not someone else, why should it be precisely he, Drobyshev, who is obliged to do it? Why the hell couldn't he abandon it, give up the idea, go back to his former quiet life? It would appear that there was nothing easier, it would appear that everything drove him to it, but he just couldn't.... What could it be that hindered him? What was the name of this incomprehensible feeling, where had it come from, and how was it that it had suddenly become the main thing in his life?"

OF all contemporary Soviet writers Granin perhaps comes closest to expressing the widespread enthusiasm for all aspects of science and technology in the Soviet Union, even if the results in terms of the standard of living and quality of life often appear so meagre. Even in Granin's work, however. the presentation of scientific research has an abstract quality—and this is particularly true of his last major novel *Into the Storm*—which detracts from the convincingness of the conflicts which he depicts. Nevertheless, Granin attempts to come to terms with the defects of the Soviet system and the consequences of the "cult" far more frankly than the great majority of Soviet writers. In describing the opposition which his idealistic young scientists encounter Granin vividly portrays the bureaucratic inertia, careerism and "shkurnichestvo (self-seeking egotism elevated to a philosophy of life) found in the Soviet administrative apparatus. As his latest work *Somebody Must* shows, Granin remains concerned by the threat posed by cynical careerists to Soviet science.

Granin's heroes all encounter powerful opposition in their attempts to pursue their research and achieve recognition in their chosen field. The realization of a scientific breakthrough, Granin suggests, requires almost superhuman will power and determination on the part of the scientist. We are left in doubt about the future of the young scientist who reaches the pinnacle of success: will he join the bureaucratic élite and begin himself to suppress initiative from below or will he be active in opening up the scientific apparatus to new men and new ideas? The majority of the elder scientists who are revered by the younger generation for their bravery and integrity, such as Danchenko and Anikeev in *Into the Storm* or Matievich in *Somebody Must*, are not in a position to determine scientific policy, since they do not hold key posts in the administrative hierarchy.

Granin is vitally concerned with the mentality of the careerist bureaucrat who evolves from a basically decent, if materialistic, person into a cynical and ruthless egotist who is determined to get ahead at any price. Such individuals are prepared to eliminate all who stand in their way and crush any display of independence from their subordinates. Although they may rationalize their attitudes by claiming that ultimate promotion to an influential post will enable them to right all past wrongs and benefit society far more than if they had remained mediocrities,

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their successive betrayals of their conscience have so warped their personality that they will always be ready to serve as the tools of unprincipled superiors. Here Granin's analysis of human motivation has relevance not only to Soviet society but to any hierarchically-structured human collective.

IF Granin's scientist-heroes are totally dedicated and selfless, it is because considerations of personal welfare and happiness are alien to them. Granin believes that in order to achieve moral greatness a scientist must be prepared to accept suffering and indifference. Expounding his view of the motivation of the true scientist in his article on Vasily Petrov, *Thoughts before a Non-existent Portrait*, he writes that "The drive for knowledge, simple curiosity is more powerful than all considerations of usefulness or of results." Granin quotes Pasternak's definition, "The aim of creation is self-bestowal" ("samootdacha") in order to defend the importance of pure science: "There is something more valuable than obtaining a result and even more important than seeking the truth—the process itself of creation, one's selfbestowal."

In Granin's view, the true scientist must reject all moral compromise; for him the ethical significance of science is manifest in the moral superiority of Giordano Bruno over Galileo. Referring to his ideal of a scientist, the unrecognized altruistic Petrov, he concludes that "Scientists like Petrov created the moral climate of science . . . they are necessary in the same way as a tuning-fork, since in them we find preserved the never-ageing measure of purity, disinterestedness and poetry."

However inspiring Granin's ideal of the scientist may be, his work leaves important questions unanswered. Granin fails to explore the relationship between the scientist and the political leaders, a vital problem for the modern world which has confronted prominent scientists in both the West and the Soviet Union. In his emphasis on the moral right of the scientist to fulfil his genius without reference to the demands of his society, Granin ignores the question of whether society has the right to make use of the scientist's results for its own ends.

Granin leaves us in doubt about the political role of the scientific élite. Characteristically, he attributes to inventors and scientists the dominant role in the evolution of humanity: "Humanity was formed not by emperors, priests or generals, but by those who created the axe, the wheel, the aeroplane, who found types of grain, watched the stars, invented iron, semiconductors and radio-waves." Yet while considering them to be responsible for human progress, Granin does not advocate that scientists be given a place in the political decision-making process or even that they be given control over the use made of their work.

The thesis that the truly great scientist must be prepared to remain indifferent to worldly considerations and uninvolved in policy-making contains great dangers for the future of humanity. One is inevitably disappointed to find such an idealistic view of the nature of scientific genius in the work of the most prominent Soviet scientific novelist.

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Waiting for Dinner

Norman Davies

STATE-MUNICIPAL Gastronomic Enterprise, No. 27. Category II. In other words, a restaurant. I was sitting at the corner table, waiting for dinner, and reading the menu. After some twenty minutes, the waiter walked across, briskly.

—Number Thirteen, I ordered, Pork chop (150 grammes), carrots, potatoes. 31 crowns.
—Sorry, sir, said the waiter, No pork chop.
—How's that? I asked.
—It's a meatless day, he replied.
—I thought Friday was the meatless day, I said.
—That's right, he agreed. Friday's the unofficial meatless day, for Catholics.
—But most of your people *are* Catholics, I said.
—That's right, he agreed. But under socialism, we have an official meatless day as well, on Wednesday.
—But today is Monday, I said.
—That's right, he agreed. It's just that today we don't have any meat.
—In that case, I said, I'll order Number Seven. Cod (125 grammes), cabbage, chips. 34 crowns.
—*Zaraz* (at once) . . . he said.

After some twenty minutes, the waiter walked across, briskly.

—Sorry, sir, he said. No cod.
—How's that? I asked.
—Fish is only delivered on Thursdays, he explained, so that the Catholics won't go hungry on Friday.
—In that case, I said, I shall order Number Sixteen. Plain Omelette (2 eggs). 22 crowns.
—*Zaraz* . . . he said.

After some twenty minutes, the waiter came across, briskly.

—Sorry, sir, he said, No omelette.
—How's that? I asked.
—No eggs, he replied.
—How's that? I replied, pointing to a lady opposite who was just finishing an omelette.
—Well, he explained, when there's no meat, and no fish, everyone orders eggs; so now there's no eggs.
—Look here, I said hungrily. I've been here for an hour without a bite. Give me anything you can find.
—Number Twenty-One? he suggested. Mushrooms-from-the-pan (200 grammes) and black bread (100 grammes). 25 crowns.
—Good, I said, and please bring the bill;
—*Zaraz* . . . he said.

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After some twenty minutes the waiter came across, briskly, bringing a plate of mushrooms and a bill for 55 crowns.

—How's *that*? I said, showing him the bill.
—Well, he explained, in the evening when the band is playing, prices are doubled.
—But, I said, the band is not playing. I've not yet heard a note from them. How's that?
—Well, he explained, it's the musicians' break.
—Really, I said. I've been here for nearly an hour and a half and they've not even tuned up.
—That's right, he agreed. But musicians are like everyone else. Under socialism, everyone has the right to eat before he works. The musicians are at that table over there, and they too are waiting for dinner.

At that point, a hand rose above the musicians' table, summoning the waiter with the flourish of an empty bottle. The waiter disappeared. It was the time for action. I knew that my treachery would not be noticed for twenty minutes at least. So, putting 25 crowns and no tip on the table, I left the State-Municipal Gastronomic Enterprise No. 27, briskly.

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A Multidimensional Approach to Contemporary Polish Stratification

Michalina Vaughan

Social Stratification in pre-war Poland

Since a high degree of correlation existed between birth, wealth and education, a unidimensional approach is considered adequate to describe the system of social stratification prevailing during the twenty years of independence. This interpretation, propagated by contemporary Polish sociologists, is centred on a dichotomous view of society—whereby the major division is between privileged and non-privileged and whereby privileges on the economic, the social and the cultural dimensions tend to be cumulative. As Rychliński wrote in 1939 (in an article which was published twenty years later): " In our social structure we are faced with a fairly clear demarcation line separating the few privileged categories from the masses deprived of most facilities and amenities. Such privileged groups are relatively least frequent among the strata economically deprived. Life chances are thus tilted towards the bourgeoisie, the professional intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie." [1] However this scheme is primarily designed to account for the evolution of urban stratification and does not emphasize the wide difference between urban and rural social hierarchies: a major failing since until 1939 approximately 60 per cent of the Polish population still derived a living from the land. Nor is it sufficiently explicit about the weakness of the industrial sector and its implications for the structure of both the bourgeoisie and the embryonic working class. Finally it fails to highlight the originality of the prestige enjoyed by the intelligentsia and the heterogeneity of its composition.

1. *The rural/urban dichotomy*

The extent to which pre-war Poland was a rural country is best illustrated by the census date of 1921 and 1931 on the socio-occupational structure of the population.

While this set of data does not demarcate landowning aristocracy from entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and does not show that 10 per cent of the peasant population were landless, it gives a sufficiently clear indication about the role of agriculture in the economy. Consequently it highlights the importance of rural stratification (with its major traditional

[1] S. Rychliński, " Zależność procesów demokratyzacji kultury od dynamiki społecznej," in *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, tome 13/1 (1959), p. 62.

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TABLE 1

Socio-occupational structure of the Polish population [2]

Active population & their dependants	% in 1921	% in 1931
Landowners & entrepreneurs	1·7	10·7
Artisans & small shopkeepers	11·6	
Farmers	53·4	51·8
Manual workers	27·0	28·6
Intellectual workers & professionals	4·7	5·6
No income	1·6	3·3

division between landowning aristocracy and peasantry and its additional differentiation between farmer and smallholder, smallholder and landless). Nor could these distinctions be construed as mere rural counterparts of the urban dichotomy between privileged and non-privileged, since criteria of differentiation in the countryside were more firmly related to the possession of land and less closely linked with a monetary economy.[3] Education represented an avenue of mobility out of rural society rather than of social promotion within it.

2. *The self-employed/wage-earners dichotomy*

Of the non-agricultural active population (approximately 2 million in 1938), nearly half belonged to the artisanal rather than the industrial sector of the economy.[4] Private ownership of small size workshops, perceived as a guarantee against unemployment, represented a brake on economic growth as well as on social polarization. Moreover while cottage industries and seasonal jobs were major sources of employment for manual labourers, only a minority of whom worked in modern large-scale factories, the constitution of a proletariat was historically delayed and geographically limited to such industrialized areas as Silesia. Furthermore, the ethnic heterogeneity of the urban population, the concentration of minorities in the artisanal, and particularly in the commercial sector, the comparatively slow rate of urbanization (only 11 towns counted more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1938) [5] and of economic growth, delayed the constitution of a Polish Third Estate. The economic vulnerability of the petty-bourgeoisie, which endowed it with a "proletaroid" fringe, meant that it relied on education and life-style rather than on income to differentiate itself from the manual classes

[2] W. Wesołowski and J. Koralewicz-Zębik, in J. Szczepański (ed.), *Przemysł i Społeczństwo* (PAN, 1969), p. 439.

[3] Cf. S. Czarnowski, "Dzieła" (Warsaw, 1956), Vol. 2, p. 183 f.

[4] Cf. W. Wesołowski, "Przemiany struktury klasowo-warstwowej w Polsce Ludowej," in *Nowe Drogi*, 8/231 (Aug. 1968), p. 230.

[5] Cf. D. Gałaj, "Problems of Research in Poland's regions under industrialisation," in *Empirical Sociology in Poland* (Warsaw, 1966), p. 53 f.

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with which it was genetically linked. In so doing, it endeavoured to maximize the prestige surrounding non-manual work—which was both the outcome and the guarantee of the special position enjoyed by the intelligentsia in Polish society.

3. *The manual/intellectual dichotomy*

No parallel for the prestige of the intelligentsia can be found in a Western society since no counterpart exists for a group exalted by reference to the non-manual character of its activities. "The intelligentsia as a social stratum is a local phenomenon, and an exceptional one, the product of the belated disintegration of the aristocratic estate and of its members passage into the ranks of the bourgeoisie in an environment lacking in the traditional embryos of urban strata." [6] As feudalism decayed and capitalism developed equally slowly in Poland, the constitution of the intelligentsia can be related to this economic retardation. Thus Chałasiński claims that "in its structure the Polish intelligentsia is linked with the underdevelopment of Polish civilization from the technico-economic point of view, with the fact that, as someone put it, Poland had no nineteenth century." [7] However its prestige is clearly not wholly reducible to descent from or similarity of life style with the aristocracy, and is also derived from the performance of a function—albeit self-imposed—in perpetuating the national culture, the use of the national language and the tradition of a national literature. This function of the intelligentsia is certainly derived from the fact that *politically* Poland had no nineteenth century. Hence, in analysing the social characteristics of this stratum, the lack of an institutional framework and the absence of dependence on the State—until its restoration in 1918—are equally significant as the aristocratic origins of many intellectuals.[8]

The intelligentsia was never characterized by the homogenous relation to means of production necessary to turn it into a class in the Marxian sense. After the First World War, its numerical growth and internal diversification, reflecting the development of white collar employment and the formation of a civil service, increased the heterogeneity of its income structure, of its educational background and of its occupational responsibilities. The distinction between "*intelligentsia stricto sensu*" and "intellectual workers," meaningful on all these dimensions, began to be reflected by differential prestige, but left unaltered the higher status of *non-manual* workers in relation to manual.[9] Thus by a halo effect the superiority attributed to creative intellectual work extended to non-manual tasks and, since these were poorly remunerated, incongruence

[6] S. Rychliński, op. cit. p. 17.
[7] J. Chałasiński, *Przeszłość i Przyszłość Inteligencji Polskeij* (Warsaw, 1958), p. 64.
[8] Cf. J. Szczepański, *Inteligencja i Społeczeństwo* (Warsaw, 1957), p. 18 f.
[9] Cf. A. Borucki, *Kariery Zawodowe i Postawy Społeczne Inteligencji w PRL* (Warsaw, 1967), p. 12.

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developed between income and prestige. Moreover it was only the upper section of the intelligentsia which participated in the exercise of power by controlling the State bureaucracy and by shaping public opinion, while the lower section was largely dependent on the State for employment, but had very little political influence. Thus it is only by a gross over-simplification that the intelligentsia as a whole could be ranked among the ruling elite.

DURING the inter-war period, as urbanization and industrialization proceeded (albeit slowly), a certain embourgeoisement may have characterized the life-styles of the aristocracy and the intelligentsia, as well as of privileged sections of the skilled working class. Correspondingly, the economic crisis and resulting unemployment may have 'proletarized' the least privileged members of the self-employed petty-bourgeoisie and of the peasantry. However it would be a gross exaggeration to detect a polarization into two conflicting classes. The multiplicity of small privately-owned urban enterprises and the structure of agrarian property made artificial any distinction based on the relationship to means of production. The major dichotomies (between town and country, and between manual and non-manual work) were not centred on this relationship and were rooted in history. In a society which was still predominantly agrarian and whose traditionalism was not challenged by rapid economic growth, the low prestige of manual and the high prestige of intellectual work coexisted with an emphasis on ascribed rather than achieved status. In so far as education served as a vehicle for social promotion, it was from among the ranks of intellectual workers and from the petty-bourgeoisie that the socially mobile were recruited. This mobility, inter- rather than intra-generational, hardly extended to the manual classes and was insufficiently widespread to undermine the association between educational and economic advantages on which the stability of the ruling elite was founded. In fact the various dimensions of social stratification were superimposed, if this elite is considered in isolation; status congruence is equally characteristic of the least as of the most privileged. It is the intermediary strata, particularly among the urban population, who showed the widest variations in terms of their position on the three dimensions of social stratification.

The post-war policy of planned social change

The avowed aims of the People's Republic at the end of the second world war were to abolish the privileges formerly enjoyed by the upper classes and to introduce the rule of the proletariat and of its ally, the peasantry. Hence the initial stage of this programme was by definition negative, since it consisted in undermining the former class structure rooted in property relationships. The second stage was positive and involved the planned transformation of the economic structure by industrialization, leading to major and politically desirable changes in the

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socio-occupational structure of the population. Since these changes were not synonymous with the eradication of all inequalities and did not produce a classless society, attempts had to be simultaneously made to justify all departures from the official postulate of egalitarianism either as ideologically acceptable or as temporarily unavoidable. It is in this third sphere that Polish sociologists have performed major feats of theoretical analysis.

1. *The undermining of the class structure*

The adoption of Marxism as the official doctrine of the Polish State meant the endorsement of the orthodox definition of social classes as rooted in relation to means of production. Hence the abolition of large-scale private property, both agrarian and industrial, was not only intended to eliminate unjustified social inequalities, but also to abolish the privileged classes, as the landed aristocracy and the capitalist bourgeoisie were termed. Yet neither the agrarian reform nor the nationalization policy abolished the institution of private property. The failure of collectivization in the countryside has meant that approximately 90 per cent of agricultural production is still derived from privately-owned, medium and mainly small size farms.[10] On the other hand, the urban private sector has been consistently narrowed down by a restrictive interpretation of the "small industry," by discriminatory taxation and controls, particularly those directed against private trading, and by the very content of economic development plans.[11] The urban private sector has survived however and has provided the substratum of the petty-bourgeoisie, officially denounced as a class, since it is still characterized by its property relationship. Although the same criterion applies to the peasantry, it is more often described as a "manual" class and its alliance with the proletariat is related to the nature of its work, while the underlying juridical difference is conveniently ignored or underplayed.

2. *The transformation of the socio-occupational structure*

The policy of industrialization and urbanization implemented under the three (1945–48) and the six-year plan (1949–55) was not only designed to modernize the country's economic production, but to further the development of a working class which, although officially hailed as the new ruling class, only existed in embryonic form in a predominantly agrarian economy at the end of the war. The success of this policy can be measured by the increase in the percentage of town-dwellers from 27·7 per cent of the total population in 1931 to 48·5 per cent in 1961 and by the fact that the number of factory workers doubled between 1931 and 1965. Apart from this numerical increase of the working class, a change in its composition ensued, since it was mainly the inflow of rural

[10] Cf. B. Gałęski, "Sociological Research on Social Changes in Polands' Rural Areas," in *Empirical Sociology in Poland*, op. cit. p. 79 f.
[11] Cf. J. Przybyła, *Reflections on the Third Sector* (Berne, 1958)

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migrants which filled the new factories. In ten years one million " new " workers thus entered industry from the countryside and the ratio recorded in the early sixties was approximately four new to one old worker.[12] In addition to rural migrants, an intermediate category of peasant-workers, numbering over 500,000 who commute to the factory but live on the land and continue to work their small holdings, constitutes a reserve of cheap unskilled labour.[13] The problems involved in imbuing the newly recruited proletariat with the appropriate degree of class consciousness, of political commitment and of technical skill may be considered as short-term, since they mainly refer to the first generation undergoing a drastic cultural and occupational change.

However industrialization has also produced a long-term problem, which is structural rather than conjunctural, namely the multiplication of non-manual occupations inseparable from the growth of the tertiary sector in a modern economy. The proportion of non-manual workers in the active population has thus doubled between 1931 and 1960.[14] This expanding social stratum is not reducible to the working class, since its aspirations are influenced by both the pre-war and the contemporary pattern of the intelligentsia and since the expectations of its members centre on individual mobility through promotion in a hierarchy.[15] It is therefore ununionized and deprived of political representation; hence an affinity with the petty-bourgeoisie—whose life-style it tends to imitate—rather than with the working class. Since the manual/intellectual dichotomy appears to be an unavoidable aspect of the present division of labour, the existence of this occupational category cannot be written off as a mere legacy of the pre-war past and its petty-embourgeoisement may well prove a lasting source of social inequality.

3. *The justification of existing inequalities*

By coining the expression " inegalitarian classlessness," Ossowski endeavoured to convey that the abolition of class divisions was not synonymous with the end of inequalities. As he put it, " the liquidation of levels in the social structure does not necessarily involve the destruction of the social ladder." [16] Therefore it is not only because private property survives and prolongs the existence of residual classes (petty-bourgeoisie and peasantry) that Polish society remains inegalitarian. The disappearance of remaining class distinctions, ideologically desirable, though politically unlikely (particularly in the countryside) would not imply the automatic advent of equality, since economic privileges, higher

[12] Cf. M. Jarosińska, *Adaptacja Młodzieży Wiejskiej do Klasy Robotniczej* (Warsaw, 1964), p. 21.
[13] Cf. R. Turski in A. Sarapata (ed.), *Socjologiczne Problemy Przedsiębiorstwa Przemysłowego* (Warsaw, 1965), p. 107 f.
[14] Cf. M. Ciechocińska, in A. Sarapata (ed.), *Socjologia Zawodów* (Warsaw, 1965), p. 100.
[15] Cf. J. Szczepański, " Inteligencja a Pracownicy Umysłowi," in *Przegląd Socjologiczny*, tome 13/2 (1959), p. 18.
[16] S. Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Class Consciousness* (London, 1963), p. 97.

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prestige ratings and greater shares in political power would remain the prerogative of some members or groups of society. This recognition that privileges need not be founded on class membership implies that objective differences between groups by reference to criteria other than their relationship to means of production provide the basis of stratification in a society in which the growing irrelevance of class distinctions does not preclude the existence of social hierarchies.

While some inequalities are either mere survivals of the past, or temporary necessities of the transition period, others represent functional imperatives of the contemporary division of labour and hence seem likely to prove durable, if not permanent. They are therefore easiest to justify ethically and ideologically; it is by reference to them that contemporary social stratification is interpreted. Hence the existence of residual classes and even the continuation of the town/country dichotomy can be viewed as mere enclaves in an economy whose planning is largely geared to their gradual elimination. Similarly the partial recognition by large sections of the population of a pre-war hierarchy in which non-manual workers have a higher prestige rating than manual is in direct contradiction with the official wages policy as well as with the political prerogatives granted to the working class. Consequently it may well be considered as doomed in the long run. A related assumption is that differences in life-styles and particularly in patterns of cultural consumption will be eventually eroded by the joint effects of a mass education policy and of a decline in income differentials between manual and non-manual workers.[17]

As distinguished from these unintended, " inherited " inequalities, others are accepted or even designed for the duration of the transitional phase towards a more egalitarian society. These are so-called " rectifiers " intended either to remedy socially damaging scarcities or to compensate for the effects of former under-privileges. The first category consists in economic incentives used to attract specialists who are insufficiently numerous in certain sectors of production or certain geographical areas. Income differentials are thus consciously used to obtain the appropriate skills needed, for instance, in new industries or new towns. This policy is by definition limited to the period of intensive industrialization and urbanization; it is the purpose of both economic and educational planning to remedy the shortages which it is intended to counteract in the short term. The other rectifiers consist in calculated departures from the basic principle of rewarding present performance, since they all take into account past disadvantages. Thus the unskilled are remunerated beyond the economic rate calculated in relation to their work, in order to at least partially apply the communist tenet " to each according to his needs " and thereby to narrow down the range of social inequali-

[17] Cf. L. Beskid, " Dochody robotników i pracowników umyslowych," in *Przegląd Statystyczny*, No. 3 (1963).

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ties.[18] The development of training programmes and the very logic of industrialism are meant to reduce the burden which this proletariat constitutes for the economy and particularly for the skilled section of the working class. In the educational sphere the privileges granted to university entrants of working class or peasant origin are similarly designed as rectifiers with a view to offsetting not only past social injustice, but also contemporary educational disadvantages resulting from a less cultured background. This privilege granted to the children of manual workers perpetuates a policy which was more pronounced during the first years of the People's Republic and which consisted of considering social origin as a sufficient qualification for posts of responsibility not only in the Party, but in nationalized industry and in local administration. The failure of the six-year plan accelerated the abandon of this recruitment criterion and its replacement, particularly in industrial management, by a "cult of professionalism."[19] Hence the concept of qualification or skill has increasingly become recognized as legitimizing the existing hierarchies of prestige and remuneration (though not necessarily the power structure), since the inequalities derived from differential knowledge are objectively conducive to the general good.

Contemporary social stratification

1. *The skilled/unskilled dichotomy*

In attempting to relate legitimate social inequalities to the criterion of qualification, Polish sociologists have emphasized that it cuts across the manual/intellectual dichotomy which constitutes a major potential divider, given the present organization of production. They have shown that the prestige enjoyed by various occupational categories coincides with the degree of skill or professional knowledge required from their members. Therefore "it could be argued that the complex of related values: 'education—knowledge—qualification' plays a very important part as basis of the esteem enjoyed by various occupations in our society, and possibly the most important part. It seems to play a bigger part than values such as 'power' and 'material rewards.'"[20] The change in the value system generally held is evidenced by the high rating given to skilled industrial workers and the lower prestige enjoyed by untrained clerical staff.[21] This contradicts the findings recorded in industrialized Western societies and could be construed as an internalization of some elements of the official socialist ideology. However the very low assessment of unskilled workers—both in agriculture and in industry—includ-

[18] Cf. J. Wiatr, "Uwarstwienie Społeczne a Tendencje Egalitarne," in *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, tome VI/2 (April–June 1962).

[19] Cf. H. Najduchowska in J. Szczepański (ed.), *Przemysł i Społeczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej* (PAN, 1969), p. 79 f.

[20] W. Wesołowski in A. Sarapata (ed.) *Socjologia Zawodów*, op. cit. p. 182.

[21] Cf. A. Sarapata, *Studia nad Uwarstwienien i Ruchliwością Społeczną w Polsce* (Warsaw, 1965), p. 117 f.

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ing those employed on building sites and presented by governmental propaganda as the symbol of the new regime, shows that the impact of socialist values is strictly limited by the influence of qualifications. Thus a demarcation line is drawn in the working class and in the *intelligentsia dato sensu*. The existence of an aristocracy of labour, in direct contradiction with the Marxist tenet of working class solidarity, is an indispensable corollary of the close connection between occupational level and prestige rating.

TABLE 2

Polish hierarchy of occupational prestige [22]

1. University professor
2. Doctor of medicine
3. School teacher
4. Mechanical engineer
5. Pilot
6. Lawyer
7. Agricultural engineer
8. Cabinet minister
9. Journalist
10. Skilled steel worker
11. Skilled turner
12. Priest
13. Nurse
14. Factory foreman
15. Accountant
16. Tailor (own workshop)
17. Locksmith
18. Head of administrative department
19. Farmer (own farm)
20. Career army officer
21. Shopkeeper (own shop)
22. Railway driver
23. Soldier in militia
24. Office worker
25. Secretary
26. Shop assistant
27. Unskilled building worker
28. Office cleaner
29. Unskilled manual worker.

As a result of departures from the principle "to each according to his work," the hierarchy of prestige does not coincide with that of remuneration. "Generally speaking, the scale of skills seems to be greater than the scale of incomes. Thus, a levelling out of income to a

[22] W. Wesołowski in A. Sarapata (ed.), *Socjologia Zawodów*, op. cit. p. 200.

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middle position results in certain decompositions of status characteristics." [23] The economic advantages enjoyed by tradesmen in the private sector are not reflected in their prestige rating, perhaps as a result of their condemnation by the official ideology, perhaps because this whole sector is seen as threatened by the government's economic policy. Conversely the prestige awarded to certain occupations and the qualifications they require are not fully taken into account in their remuneration, in order to reduce the range of salaries and thus to minimize social inequalities between the educated and the uneducated. Thus "the teacher enjoys a high prestige in our society, but he is considered as insufficiently remunerated. Similar comments are made about other occupations. The higher levels of education and qualification, as well as of responsibility assumed, do not correspond in the opinion of an important part of our society to adequately high levels in the hierarchies of remuneration and power. The dissociation of hierarchies results in a series of socially harmful phenomena. These include: the lack of aspirations, discontent, little identification with one's occupation, search for profit rather than for a job well done, poor morale, low productivity." [24]

2. *The rulers/ruled dichotomy*

The unequal distribution of decision-making responsibilities in an industrial society is an unavoidable consequence of the scale on which economic planning takes place. Thus the size of the various units—from productive enterprises to social and professional associations—implies a division between administrators, responsible for effective planning, coordination and control, and administered workers or participants. It is by reference to the social and economic responsibilities incumbent upon the State and the Party that the dichotomy between rulers and ruled is officially legitimated. The underlying analogy is between the State machinery as the nucleus of economic planning on the national scale and the productive enterprise, the political hierarchy being the counterpart of the managerial staff:

> The experience of socialist countries to date authorizes the assumption that organizational substructures of all kinds . . . will develop at the same time as an organizational structure for the whole of society. The existence of large organizational structures creates social hierarchies based on the criterion of the degree of power possessed: hierarchies which are different in the sub-systems and the general system of social organization. If by stratification is understood the ranking of social positions between which some values are unevenly distributed—it could be said that in the structures discussed positions exist among which the value called authority is unevenly distributed. Thus in so far as the existence of strata corresponds to a functional prerequisite, this is true of

[23] W. Wesolowski, "Strata and strata interest in socialist society," in C. S. Heller (ed.), *Structured Social Inequality* (New York, 1969), p. 476.
[24] A. Sarapata, *Socjologia Zawodów*, op. cit. p. 175.

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> stratification by reference to the criterion of power rather than to that of material advantages and prestige.[25]

The power dimension is then closely related to the exigencies of economic growth and the interpretation given to the rulers' tasks is closer to the " administration of things " than to the government of men. Hence the survival of State machinery under socialism is not doctrinally unacceptable. Yet the extent to which the power dimension remains unexplored is more reminiscent of the secrecy traditionally surrounding State policy than of the analytical approach to management problems common in Western industrial societies:

> A comprehensive study of power distribution in Poland still awaits its author. Owing to lack of reliable investigations, detailed data on its composition, internal stratification, prevailing type of career, sources and levels of recruitment, behavioural patterns, degree of inner cohesion and uniformity of attitudes etc. are not available.[26]

Inequalities of power during the first phase of the People's Republic were generally related to the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat. However, this ideological justification has become less and less realistic as the membership of the Party has been modified. The evolution of the " statistical Party member " away from " the statistical employee " of industrial enterprises has accentuated the advantages of the skilled over the unskilled. The rate of membership is currently three times higher among university graduates than among those who have only been educated at primary level.[27] Hence the very composition of the ruling Party has made it less representative of the manual classes. Moreover the nature of the work performed by the Party machinery means that its executives are intellectual—and not manual—workers. Accordingly the " second type " of party executive who emerged in the late fifties reflects an emphasis on professionalism similar to that prevailing at the time in the recruitment of managers in nationalized industry. The untrained working class militant increasingly gives way to the specialist whose economic or technical knowledge counts more than ideological involvement.

Thus it is increasingly by reference to the criterion of competence that the power structure ought to be justified. However, this would imply much wider information on both recruitment criteria and tasks performed. In practice scarcity of knowledge is detrimental both to the prestige ratings of rulers—as seen in Table 2—and to the view generally held on their economic rewards. It is impossible to assess whether the remuneration of the political personnel is exaggeratedly high unless the functions performed by them are documented. " In this conception what becomes important is not the level of remuneration of managerial

[25] W. Wesołowski, *Klasy, warstwy i władza* (Warsaw, 1966), p. 161.
[26] Z. Bauman, in J. Wiatr (ed.) *Studies in Polish Political Structure* (PAN, 1967), p. 27.
[27] Idem, p. 164.

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staff of various ranks (including the highest), but the comparison between this level and the complexity of the work corresponding to posts of leadership. No one has carried such comparisons until now." [28] By an apparent paradox the power dimension—likely to remain the most durable—is also the least known aspect of the contemporary system of stratification as well as the most controversial.

Status incongruence

The co-existence of inequalities rooted in the pre-war system of stratification with new ones either tolerated during the transition period or accepted as more durable features of an industrial society accounts for the complexity of the contemporary Polish social structure. The post-war policy of planned social change was not intended to create an egalitarian, unstratified society, but to promote a new ruling class recruited by reference to an ideologically acceptable criterion—since birth and wealth were no longer considered as legitimate grounds for differentiation. This new criterion was first sought in social origin (manual background), later in tested merit (educational qualifications) which was both more conducive to productivity and intrinsically less inegalitarian than origin. The dimensions of power, prestige and remuneration were intended to remain correlated. However, their correlation with qualifications and with each other remains far from perfect in contemporary Polish society.

The possession of qualifications is frequently unrelated to occupational prospects and generally fails to secure commensurate material rewards. "A careful selection of candidates to (higher educational) establishments has had no counterpart in selection for occupational posts, where connections have often been more important than origin, ideological identification, knowledge and aptitude possessed." [29] From secondary school leavers who are only offered manual jobs to workers who received advanced training at a Technikum and are given no opportunity to apply their newly acquired knowledge when they return to the factory, the wastage of graduates appears widespread. It is linked with governmental distrust of a group whose descent from the manual classes is no guarantee of solidarity with them and whose attempts to imitate the pre-war intelligentsia have mainly taken the form of attacks on political conformism and even on ideological orthodoxy (as at the end of the Stalinist period).

The scale of remuneration remains partly dissociated from the hierarchy of prestige, especially in the case of the intelligentsia. This fact, emphasized by Sarapata's studies, is linked with the egalitarian aspects of the official incomes policy and may be welcomed by a majority, though it is undoubtedly resented by the professionals concerned.

[28] W. Wesołowski, *Klasy, warstwy i władza*, op. cit. p. 218.
[29] J. Szczepański in Polska Akademia Nauk, "Wykształcenie a Pozycja Społeczna *Inteligencji*" *(Pt. I)*, *(Lodz, 1959)*, p. 493.

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According to a survey conducted by Nowak in 1961, demands for increased equality were much more widespread among skilled workers than among the intelligentsia, while three-quarters of informants isolated economic differences as the main source of animosity in Polish society.[30]

While criteria for admission into the political elite and the rewards received by its members remain to a large extent unexplored, the dissociation between power and prestige can be deduced from the low rating of politics as a career. This has been recorded in particular by Sarapata and Wesołowski[31] in their enquiry into the evaluation of occupations by Warsaw inhabitants. This disparagement of the political elite may be related to a certain resentment towards the State itself. " Groups with unequal earnings have less resentment towards each other and more towards the State as regulator of their income. . . . Paradoxically the socialist State . . . may appear more often as an ' antagonist ' to the people than a State which does not watch at all over their interests." [32] By an added paradox, this resentment is likely to be more pronounced among the unskilled manual workers than in other sections of society, since according to Nowak[33] they are both most desirous of and least optimistic about the reduction of social inequalities.

In spite of the ideological attempts made to isolate formal qualifications as the single dimension by reference to which contemporary Polish stratification can be explained, current sociological research in Poland shows the existence of dissociated hierarchies of power, prestige and remuneration. Thus a three-dimensional approach remains necessary to analyse this system of stratification and education cannot be considered as the only relevant variable.

[30] Cf. S. Nowak " Changes of Social Structure in Social Consciousness," in C. S. Heller (ed.) " Structured Social Inequality," op. cit. p. 244 f.
[31] Cf. A. Sarapata and W. Wesolowski, " The Evaluation of Occupations by Warsaw Inhabitants," in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66 (May 1961).
[32] W. Wesołowski, " Klasy, warstwy i władza," op. cit. p. 213.
[33] Cf. S. Nowak " Changes of Social Structure in Social Consciousness," op. cit. loc. cit.

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The Ordeal of Nikola Petkov and the Consolidation of Communist Rule in Bulgaria

John E. Horner

THE years 1947–48 marked for most of Eastern Europe occupied by the Red Army the rapid establishment of monolithic regimes.[1] Yugoslavia and its Albanian dependency had earlier reached that stage but indigenous forces led by Josip Broz-Tito, whose main emphasis was nationalism, were primarily responsible rather than a barefaced Soviet military presence. The trial in Bulgaria of Nikola Petkov in the autumn of 1947 was matched by the comparable trial of the leader of the Romanian National Peasant Party, Juliu Maniu, who was sentenced to life imprisonment on 11 November 1947, two months after the party itself had been outlawed. The leader of the Polish peasants, Stanislaw Mikolajack, avoided a similar fate by escaping to England. In Hungary, Soviet interposition had steadily reduced the parliamentary majority of the Smallholders Party, and in March 1948 a widespread purge of the Hungarian social democrats led to the liquidation of " bourgeois democracy " by the police of Klement Gottwald. The communist putsch in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was accompanied by the deaths of Jan Masaryk and Eduard Benes. The Berlin blockade coming hard on its heels, was the culminating move in bringing into being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[2] The United Nations had failed to provide convincing defences for these and other countries such as Greece, Iran, and Turkey.[3] The armed concert of the major Allies of the second world war was being torn asunder by the Cold War, leading to the political atomization of the world and the cultural fragmentation of society. A clash of ideologies purporting to ignore national frontiers was, through doctrinal rigidities, beginning to thwart most attempts at international collaboration.

When Georgi Dimitrov returned to his native land of Bulgaria in

[1] The credo was well expressed by Georgi Dimitrov in an article in the Sofia *Rabotnichesko Delo of December* 18, 1948: " It should not be forgotten that—in spite of the fact that the Communist International does not exist—all Communist parties in the world form one single Communist front, under the direction of the most powerful and most experienced Communist party, the party of Lenin and Stalin; that all Communist parties have one common scientific theory as a guide to their actions —Marxism-Leninism; and that all Communist parties have one leader and teacher, recognized by all—Comrade Stalin."

[2] 4 April 1949

[3] The Truman Doctrine of 12 March 1947, was a riposte to Soviet attempts to subvert Greece and Turkey. The United Nations Commission on the Balkans provided in its reports to the Security Council convincing evidence of Bulgaria's aid to the Communist EAM/ELAS in Greece.

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October 1945 after having relinquished his Soviet citizenship the preceding month, he was sixty-three years of age and in poor health, most of his active life lay behind him, but in the four years remaining to him he was to demonstrate the truth of Karl Marx's assertion[4]: "History itself is nothing but the activity of men pursuing their purposes."[5] His return came two months after the resignation of Nikola Petkov, Secretary of the Agrarian Union, from the Fatherland Front government which he had helped to found after the Soviet invasion and the *coup d'état* of 9 September 1944. In the thirteen months which followed that event, membership of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) had swelled from 15,000 to 250,000. The wartime partisans now constituted the People's Militia which, under the communist Interior Minister (and future Prime Minister) Anton Yugov was carrying out a widespread policy of intimidation against the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The Bulgarian Army, purged of its right-wing officers, was fully tamed under Bulgarians most of whose adult lives had been spent in the Red Army.[6] Quisling Agrarians and social democrats had been formed and joined the Fatherland Front Government headed by the hubristic Kimon Georgiev.[7] The opposition press had been suppressed; the first to go in October 1946 was *Zname*, organ of the small Democratic Party. In October new parliamentary elections were held under conditions of fraud and intimidation which gave the BCP and its allies 78 per cent of the vote: even so, the support given the opposition parties was the largest in any of the Soviet-occupied countries during the postwar period. Georgi Dimitrov formed a new government in which the BCP held all the key ministries, and he was now in a position to extirpate the opposition. The Allied Control Commission was completely dominated by the Russians, largely as the result of an agreement reached between Anthony Eden and Molotov in October 1944.[8] Yet, with the tide running so strongly in favour of the communists, Nikola Petkov, leader of the Agrarian Union, remained the hope of the majority of this

[4] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thoughts of Karl Marx* (Cambridge University Press, 1968).

[5] Dimitrov's earlier career had been illustrious if not stormy, but throughout he was Stalin's man. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from 1921; in 1923 he and Vassil Kolarov led an ill-fated communist rebellion within Bulgaria, having failed to grasp the opportunity to support the Agrarian Union of Alexander Stalboliski. In exile, he was the hero of Hitler's Reichstag Trial of 1933. In 1935, as Secretary-General of the Comintern, he enunciated the Popular Front policy which ended with the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939. He died in a Moscow clinic in July 1949. Today, the body of this poorly-educated son from a family of ruined artisans lies entombed in a mausoleum scarcely less opulent than that of Lenin.

[6] One of these was General Georgi Damianov, who became Bulgarian Chief of State in the period 1950–68.

[7] In January 1945, Dr G. M. Dimitrov, then Secretary of the Agrarian Union, had been obliged by Soviet Col. General Sergei Biryuzov to resign from his post. In May, a packed Congress of the Agrarian Union won control of the party organization which was placed in the hands of Alexander Obbov, described by the then Foreign Minister Petko Stainov as a "worn out prostitute."

[8] Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (HMSO, 1962).

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unfortunate country, who, unable to work out their own salvation, would never know what it was to be saved.[9]

The culmination of Dimitrov's pogrom came on 5 June 1947, and a few hours later word was received in Sofia of the ratification by the United States Senate of the Treaty of Peace.[10] The record of the 80th session of the Naroden Sobranie,[11] held on the evening of 5 June provides a graphic picture of communist procedures and the raw courage of the opposition. It began with the reading by a minor BCP deputy, Vladimir Dimchev, of a letter from the Public Prosecutor attached to the communist-controlled Justice Ministry accusing Nikola Petkov of planning the forcible overthrow of the government. The evidence consisted of written statements by Peter Koev, an Agrarian deputy earlier arrested, and various members of a somewhat shadowy group called the "Neutral Officers" who had been rounded up the preceding December.[12] These statements, undoubtedly exacted under torture, were supplemented by affidavits from various *agents-provocateurs*. Presided over by the veteran communist Vassil Kolarov,[13] who throughout maintained an attitude of spurious impartiality, the proceedings were marked by several interventions by Interior Minister Yugov,[14] and warnings such as "all those who encourage organizers of *coups d'états* and who participate in conspiracies will have a similar fate." The Agrarian deputy Assen Stamboliski, son of the Agrarian Prime Minister murdered in 1923, made a spirited defence of Petkov. He said publicly what was common knowledge: "It was whispered to us in the corridors before we entered the session—'Now we shall understand which of you are wise'—You wish to find traitors among us? You will not find them . . . I will be the first *udarnik* (shock worker) to go to prison after Nikola Petkov." Kosta Lulchev, elderly leader of the small opposition social democrats, took his stand against the lifting of Petkov's parliamentary immunity: "The decision of the Bulgarian people to fight for freedom and democracy shall not be crushed."[15] Petkov was the final speaker, and he placed the issue on a level above his personal fate. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior "stressed very clearly that the personality of Nikola

[9] Guidance from the State Department was rarely swift. When he met Kimon Georgiev (then Foreign Minister) on 4 Jan. 1947, Maynard Barnes, the American Representative, was obliged to admit that he still had no Washington reaction to the elections of the preceding October.

[10] The treaty had been signed in Paris on 10 Feb., and the instruments of ratification were deposited in Moscow on 13 Sept. It is interesting that 5 June was the date Secretary of State Marshall proposed the European Recovery Program or "Marshall Plan." Bulgaria followed the Russian lead in rejecting it.

[11] *Excerpts from the Stenographic Minutes*, prepared by a Bulgarian employee of the British Legation, Sofia. Not published.

[12] There is considerable doubt whether, in fact, any such organization ever existed.

[13] Kolarov had been a student of the Marxist sage George Plekhanov in Switzerland.

[14] Yugov finally was purged from the BCP in 1962 for "crude violations of legality" during the 1949 trial of the communist Traicho Kostov.

[15] On 15 November 1948, Lulchev was sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment and his party dissolved. His offence was his decision to vote against the government's budget, which, in Dimitrov's words, made him a foreign agent.

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Petkov was not aimed at. The aim is different, to strike down the Secretary of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union." The position of the Agrarians, Petkov went on, remained as it always had been: "Collaboration with the Communist Party on the basis of equal rights and obligations, and the right of a free organizational existence for the Agrarian Union." In conclusion, Petkov predicted, and this proved to be the case: "You will not find a turncoat among these comrades" (of the opposition). The lifting of Petkov's parliamentary immunity followed as a matter of course and he was arrested as he was leaving the building, and action was immediately taken against his followers throughout the country.

The arrest of Petkov and his forthcoming trial, while not a surprise, came suddenly. The new British Minister, J. C. Sterndale-Bennett,[16] lodged a strong protest with the Prime Minister, as did the Acting American Representative.[17] In reply, Dimitrov asserted that Petkov would be tried by "sovereign Bulgaria and not in London and Washington. . . . Intervention will be useless and the intervention of foreign countries will only arouse suspicion that he had foreign connections." To the Acting American Representative, he added: "If Petkov is an American agent you should take steps to defend him," and with a straight face, he claimed that the arrest only happened to coincide with Senate ratification of the peace treaty. Dimitrov concluded with an old Bulgarian saying: "One should not burn a quilt to catch a flea." These were palpable untruths, and the Acting American Representative strongly recommended to Washington that the earlier decision to recognize the Dimitrov regime be reconsidered, adding that a decision to recognize accompanied by a "pious statement that we hope they will observe Aricle II (of the peace treaty, which dealt with human rights) would be the least desirable of the alternatives open to the United States." Nevertheless, two days later on 9 June, it was decided at the Secretary of State's staff meeting that the United States should not alter its plan to recognize the Bulgarian Government or the coming into force of the Peace Treaty: on 11 June the State Department issued a statement expressing concern over the violation of civil liberties in Bulgaria; on 14 June, President Truman signed the instrument of ratification, at the same time publicly regretting that the commitments entered into at Yalta remained unfulfilled. Such were the taurine reflexes of Washington.[18]

If he had had a record of right-wing or pro-German sympathies, it would have been easy for Georgi Dimitrov to have eliminated Nikola Petkov as a "fascist." In fact, as the symbol of "peasantism," Petkov had collaborated loyally with the Bulgarian Communists during the

[16] The British had formally recognized the Bulgarian Government on 11 February. The United States was still in the process of weighing its future actions.

[17] The author.

[18] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. IV (1947) (U.S. Dept. of State). This was released on 11 September 1972, and contains the more significant telegrams sent to the Department of State by the American Mission.

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war,[19] was a founder of the Fatherland Front and a signatory of the armistice with the USSR on 28 October 1944, and stood somewhat to the left of the Bulgarian political spectrum. A convinced democrat, his Agrarian Union almost certainly would have obtained a majority in a free election. But Petkov was a symbol, and, as such, he had to be crushed if the BCP was to impose its untrammelled rule. Georgi Dimitrov, who, like Stalin, was fond of proverbs, may have thought of an old Turkish one: "If a stone falls on an egg, alas for the egg. If an egg falls on a stone, alas for the egg." The stone in this instance was the BCP: if the egg was Petkov, he was one with a hard shell not easily shattered. His arrest on 5 June was no isolated or hasty action on the part of the recently-returned Georgi Dimitrov. The trial of the so-called "Neutral Officers" and the extorted confession of Peter Koev were by way of preparation. And between June 5, the date of Petkov's arrest, and the beginning of his trial two months later, Anton Yugov's police were in action. The period was marked by an extensive series of arrests and quickly-staged trials. A superficial cover of legality was maintained, but confessions patently were obtained by torture or its threat: the fabrication of evidence was designed to spin a web of cross-incrimination implicating the entire opposition in treasonable conspiracy.[20] In the process, of course, many Bulgars who had taken no political position at all, or were unsympathetic to "peasantism," suffered simply because they came from bourgeois backgrounds or had past ties with the West.[21]

In his trial, which opened on August 5, Nikola Petkov was charged under Articles 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the "Law for the Defence of the People's Government," a law passed ironically enough while Petkov was an active participant in the Fatherland Front Government then headed by Kimon Georgiev.[22] The particular crimes of which he stood accused were [23]

1. Organizing a fascist *coup d'état* designed to overthrow the Fatherland Front;
2. Fomenting disorder and sabotage to induce unspecified "foreign powers" to intervene in Bulgarian affairs;

[19] Petkov and his followers had opposed the pro-German policies of Tsar Boris during the period between the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the German invasion of Russia. During that period, the BCP followed the Soviet line.

[20] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror* (London and New York: MacMillan, 1968). Mr Conquest served on the staff of the British Legation in Sofia.

[21] Robert Rossow, *Bulgarian Political Summary Since 1944*. This was prepared on 27 September 1947, and is a most valuable contemporary account. Not printed.

[22] In February-March 1945, the Fatherland Front's People's Courts handed down a series of sentences against members and associates of the old regime on a scale unprecedented in their severity in occupied Europe. Maynard Barnes, the American Representative in Sofia, remarked that the non-communist members of the government, "in bowing without protest to the severity of the sentences . . . have become more completely than ever the prisoners of their communist colleagues." See *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. IV (1945).

[23] *The Trial of Nikola D. Petkov, August 5–15, 1947—Record of the Judicial Proceedings* (Sofia: Department of Information and Arts, 1947). A presentation of the Communist case.

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3. Encouraging resistance to governmental authority; and
4. Undermining through his party newspaper, *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname*,[24] the fighting spirit of the armed forces.

While the United States was not mentioned by name during the trial, the press, completely in the hands of the government, was not reticent in charging Petkov with being an agent of "American Imperialism." For the purpose of these judicial proceedings was not simply to destroy the Agrarian Union of which Petkov was the leader; it was equally important to show the Bulgarian people that the only power which carried any weight in the country was the Soviet Union. Regarding this second purpose, it may be said with certainty that Petkov would have been insulted at the very suggestion that his actions in opposing the communist consolidation of power had been taken on the instructions of the United States.[25] Mistakenly or not, his role was that of a freedom-loving Bulgarian patriot resisting the forcible rule of the USSR acting through its appointed Bulgarian agents. It was equally absurd to suggest that Petkov had the capability of subverting the Bulgarian armed forces, which had been thoroughly shaken-up and placed under the command of Bulgarian officers with long Red Army service, nor was any such intention in keeping with Petkov's character.

Petkov's two principal defence attorneys had been arrested by the militia before the trial began: their replacements stuck to the charges and attempted, quite competently given the circumstances, to demonstrate the falsity of the accusations on which they were based and their internal contradictions. But, as in the series of Soviet trials in which the egregious Andrei Vyshinski played a stellar role, Petkov's co-defendants were actually his accusers, turning, as one would say in the West, "state's evidence," either voluntarily or under torture. In addition, the lawyers of these co-defendants actively joined in the attack on Petkov. There were three judges, all members of the BCP, the senior of whom made long political harangues throughout the trial which had little relevance to the proceedings. Favourable evidence on Petkov's behalf offered by former Regent Vanelin Ganev and others was excluded by the judges as being "not of essential importance." The court, in fact, professed to be more impressed by organized demonstrations throughout the country.[26] In the words of the Public Prosecutor, "hundreds of thousands of telegrams passed by rallies, meetings and

[24] On 30 Apr., the Social Democratic newspaper *Svoboden Narod* was suspended by government fiat. Thereafter, *Narodno Zemelsko Zname* reached its end through the "spontaneous" refusal of the printers' union to work for it. Georgiev, replying to a protest by the author, claimed the paper had urged the peasants to withhold their harvest. In fact, it was the only Bulgarian newspaper to have printed a full summary of Secretary of State Byrnes's statement in Moscow on 28 April.

[25] The author can attest to Petkov's patriotism and refute the charge that at any time he received instructions from American sources.

[26] One could witness from the offices of the American Mission truckloads of peasants from the country carrying banners denouncing Petkov. These were pawns in a game being played by Dimitrov.

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conferences in villages and towns demanding the heaviest penalties for Nikola Petkov are sufficient evidence of the people's verdict." [27] And, as Vassil Kolarov was to remark later, this procedure might not accord with Anglo-Saxon legal principles but was a common feature of Bulgarian trials.[28]

During the eight days in which he stood in the dock, Petkov was remarkably composed, patient, even resigned, but still vigorous in his defence.[29] He could have had no illusions about his fate but he never gave an inch, nor was he aggressively defiant or emotional against his prosecutors, and there was no evidence of brain-washing or drugging. "The net memory is of his extraordinary dignity and complete self-control, a sort of weary serenity," recalls Robert Rossow, Political Officer of the American Mission.[30] There was a strong element of fatalism in Petkov's character [31]: both his father and his elder brother had met violent death in those recurrent acts of political insanity which have so disgraced the Balkan scene.[32]

The death sentence, when it was handed down, was inevitable considering the tenor of the trial and the circumstances which surrounded it. Both the American and British representatives in Sofia promptly recommended to their respective governments that, were the sentence carried out, the Bulgarian representatives in Washington and London be expelled: a simple warning to this effect might have altered the outcome. However, neither the State Department nor the Foreign Office felt this suggestion deserved consideration. Various other steps were taken, however. The two Western members of the Allied Control Commission on 18 August protested to the Soviet Chairman that the trial had been a travesty and suggested sentence be suspended pending review by that body. The protest was summarily rejected by General Cherypanov on 22 August on the grounds that the trial was "an internal matter." On 23 August, the two Western embassies in Moscow proposed tripartite discussions in consonance with the Yalta agreements: two days later Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andre Vyshinski held that the Petkov trial was solely within the competence of the Bulgarian authorities.

[27] *The Trial of Nikola D. Petkov, August 5–15, 1947—Record of the Judicial Proceedings* (Sofia: Department of Information and Arts, 1947). A presentation of the Communist case.

[28] Whereas this was characteristic of other trials such as that of Traicho Kostov in 1949, it was not the case during the pre-Communist period.

[29] The author and a British colleague were denied admittance to the courtroom. However, the trial was covered by a few foreign correspondents who shared their impressions with the American Mission. One of these, W. H. (Bill) Lawrence of the *New York Times*, was soon expelled for his frank reporting.

[30] Robert Rossow, letter to the author of 7 July 1972.

[31] In talks with Petkov long before his arrest, the author gained the strong impression that he was reconciled to violent death at the hands of his opponents. It would have been comparatively easy for him to escape; even simpler to compromise with Dimitrov.

[32] His father, Dimitur Petkov, was murdered by a disgruntled official in 1907. His brother, Petko Petkov, was assassinated by a Macedonian terrorist in 1924.

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On the diplomatic level in Sofia, the British and Americans made further efforts. The Acting American Representative, on his own initiative, drove to Varna to appeal to the titular President of the Republic, the venerable Vassil Kolarov.[33] Kolarov stated solemnly that he himself had been aghast at the charges against Petkov, which, even if only 20 per cent true, were sufficient for conviction. He, Kolarov, was known as the most tolerant member of the BCP,[34] and he shrank from carrying out extreme measures save through extreme necessity. He had earlier issued instructions that the trial be scrupulously fair and had every reason to believe that it was. He did agree that the trial might not accord with Anglo-Saxon standards of justice[35]: expressing himself as upset that the Petkov case might adversely affect relations between the United States and Bulgaria, he avoided replying to the Acting American Representative's statement, twice repeated, that the next step would be the outlawing of the Agrarian Union.[36]

The execution of Petkov was carried out on 23 September. That he was hanged rather than shot by a firing squad was one measure of Georgi Dimitrov's animus: Dimitrov had shown himself peculiarly sensitive to Petkov's taunts in Sobranie debates on his former Soviet citizenship and obvious allegiance to the USSR.[37] After the execution, Dimitrov produced a transparently false "confession" which no one took seriously, and he refused to allow Petkov, a notably religious man, a proper burial with the rites of the Church. Dimitrov also had been oblivious to pleas of clemency from numerous international personalities including former French premiers Leon Blum and Eduard Herriot: another appeal he ignored came from an attorney who had defended him at Leipzig in 1933. It would be comforting to believe that Petkov's sacrifice was not in vain: his body lies in an unmarked potter's grave, and his name is practically unknown, even in Bulgaria.[38] At the time, however, the transparent brutality of his trial, combined with comparable Soviet actions in Romania and in Hungary, may have been one of Stalin's major blunders. The Petkov trial had a profound effect on the non-Communist left in France and Italy, and probably contributed

[33] Kolarov was living in regal fashion in an old palace which had once belonged to Queen Marie of Romania.

[34] There is nothing in his record to suggest that Kolarov possessed a spirit of benevolence: he was a person of some culture, spoke excellent French, and the impression he gave was more benign than that of the coarse Georgi Dimitrov.

[35] Hannah Arendt has written: "Bolshevik assurances inside and outside Russia that they do not recognize ordinary moral standards have become a mainstay of communist propaganda, and experience has proved time and again that the propaganda value of evil deeds and general contempt of moral standards is independent of mere self-interest, supposedly the most important psychological element in politics." See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951).

[36] *Foreign Relations, 1947.*

[37] Voltaire once wrote that "there is nothing more annoying than to be obscurely hanged."

[38] An epitaph to this Balkan populist might be William Balke's aphorism: "I must create a system or be enslaved by another man's."

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in some measure to the ultimate failure of Communist United Front tactics in those countries.

Within Bulgaria, the Sobranie on 26 August had passed a bill outlawing the Agrarian Union and making it a criminal offence to retain membership in it or to be active on its behalf. This ban was accompanied by further widespread arrests by the militia. At the same time, the controlled press and the utterances of Fatherland Front leaders reached a crescendo of truculent hostility towards the United States and the West generally. Meantime, the Treaty of Paris came into force on 13 September. Earlier, on 8 September, the State Department again considered the future of American relations with Bulgaria. Non-recognition was ruled out as likely to play into the hands of the USSR: presumably the American Mission would have been obliged to close. No consideration seems to have been given to establishing American representation at the chargé d' affaires level, the classic way of demonstrating coolness. On 16 September, the Mission at Sofia was instructed to obtain *agrément* for a Minister prior to 22 September. The request was made immediately, but the Dimitrov Government astutely delayed an official announcement of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations until four days after Petkov's execution. Throughout the period, State Department policy respecting Bulgaria was characterized by what an internal memorandum called a "flexible approach." This memorandum, dated 28 October 1947, indicated reluctance to "crystallize the US and UK positions in regard to specific action in advance of consideration of individual problems."[39] In fact, American relations with Bulgaria were to be of short duration: in February 1950, as an outgrowth of the trial of the Communist Traicho Kostov, the Bulgarians asked for the recall of the American Minister and the United States then severed diplomatic relations.[40]

[39] *Foreign Relations, 1947.*
[40] They were resumed in Mar. 1959.

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The "Revolution in Military Affairs" and Party-Military Relations, 1965–70

Christopher D. Jones

WHAT the Soviets call the "revolution in military affairs" has precipitated a revision of strategic doctrine and has had considerable impact on Party-military relations. The revolution involves two elements: (1) the technology of intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads and (2) the strategic adaptations necessitated by this technology.

The Party and the military have found some aspects of the revolution largely beyond their control: the rapidity of technological developments and the strategic decisions of other nuclear powers. Other factors partially within the control of the Party are the choice of trade-offs within the economy between military and non-military sectors and the possibility of an agreement among nuclear powers to limit the arms race. The revolution has forced the Party and the military to carry out immensely complicated strategic and logistical planning operations before war breaks out. Much of this preparation is based on hypotheses. The confusion over the actual course of a nuclear war has resulted in two lines of approach to preparation for such a conflict. One is to have the military thrust itself into politics in order to integrate the strategic, economic, scientific, foreign and domestic policies necessary for atomic war. The other is to have the Party assume the task of integration and determine military strategy, tactics and organization as well. To date, it is the Party, not the military, which has integrated the revolution in military affairs. This may be due not just to the strength of the Party but perhaps to the true significance of the revolution in military affairs. A French general has argued that the revolution has not changed strategic and foreign policy except in ruling out nuclear war as a policy option. "Strategy ends where the war aim can be attained only at the risk of self-annihilation," writes Miksche.[1] In his opinion conventional warfare remains the only conceivable kind of strategic conflict. According to Miksche, the Americans have been so swept away by the technological possibilities of destruction that they have lost all conception of the political ends of war. In his analysis, the Soviets "... have subordinated technology to their political planning."

The Party's response to the technology of intercontinental devastation was to reorganize strategic doctrine and the structure of the military in

[1] Ferdinand C. Miksche, "Is the Atomic Deterrent a Bluff?" in John Erickson, *Military-Technical Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 39.

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1960. The military at first vigorously protested this invasion of its expertise. By 1962 the Party had beaten the soldiers into submission and appointed a new head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, A. A. Epishev. General Epishev has since demanded and obtained complete docility of the military professionals towards the Party and its control organs.[2] The next effect of the new technology was to split the military temporarily into a traditionalist faction familiar with the conventional technology and a group of military technocrats presiding over the new weapons systems.[3] The contending factions eventually achieved a new corporate solidarity only to have Epishev begin a campaign in 1967 to adjust the control system to politicize the new weapons as it had politicized all previous military technology.

The revolution in military affairs has not tipped the balance in favour of military autonomy. What wrought this revolution was not the Soviet General Staff but scientific and technical developments in the Soviet Union and other nations. Roman Kolkowicz is quite right to say that the complexity of the new technology defies understanding by the political decision-makers. The point, however, is that they do not have to understand nuclear physics or orbital mechanics. The technocrats have always known more about technology than the politicans. The use of technology in human affairs has been and remains a political question. It was not Peter's skills as a naval architect or artillery officer that gave him victory over Charles XII; it was his appreciation of the political, economic, and social policies necessary to create a superior military force. For Peter's successors, the use of a modern military machine has continued to be a political and not a technical matter.

If the apolitical specialists in the Soviet military were to succeed in removing their weaponry from the political sphere, they could eventually establish an autonomous base from which they could contest the political control of this technology. The Party probably perceives such apolitical tendencies in the armed forces as posing political threats in the distant future. The more immediate threat to the Party is that it will lose its legitimacy in the military sphere if it cannot prove that its presence is necessary to the development of Soviet military power. What the Party fears is that the administration of things will replace the administration of persons. To pre-empt this possibility, the Party has placed renewed emphasis on the role of "the moral-political factor" in military affairs.

THE Party has argued that the moral-political factor has become the crucial variable in atomic warfare. Technology, according to the

[2] Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Army and the Communist Party: Institutions in Conflict* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, Aug. 1966), R-446-PR. This was also published by the Princeton University Press in 1967 under the title, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*. All references in this paper are to the RAND edition.

[3] Ibid.

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Deputy Head of the MPA, "...is only a means in the hands of man for the achievement of the goals he has set."[4] This argument has been dutifully traced back to Engels and Lenin. The authors of the Sokolovsky volume, *Soviet Military Strategy*, cite Engels to the effect that in wartime the element of morale becomes immediately transformed into a very important factor.[5] Writing in *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, a Colonel Baranov noted in 1970 that there was still truth in Lenin's dictum that military victory is determined by the moral qualities of individuals willing to shed their blood for the cause. He dismissed the American emphasis on technology as an indication that the Pentagon could not rely on its personnel and had to put its trust in machines. He concluded, "No changes in military technology can alter the well-known Leninist thesis that 'without a conscientious soldier and sailor of initiative, success in contemporary war is impossible....'"[6]

In 1968, a Colonel Bondarenko elevated the moral-political factor into a third dimension of the revolution in military affairs. The first was the development of the atomic bomb; the second, the combination of the bomb with the intercontinental missile; and the third, scientific troop control, based on the moral-political factor.[7] In staking out the area of human behaviour as their special preserve, Party spokesmen have come close to creating a disguised science of sociology. In 1970, two officers distinguished among three elements in "Leninist" leadership in the armed forces: the ideological-political, the professional-organizational and the moral-psychological.[8] In 1966, a Colonel Seleznov made a roughly parallel distinction among three factors in morale: the ideological, the social-psychological, and the individual-psychological.[9] During the later 1960s both *Krasnaia Zvezda* and *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'* frequently carried articles on the proper handling of both individual and group psychology. To the outside observer, these articles seem to admit tacitly a range of human behaviour that is beyond the scope of Marxist analysis. Writers on these subjects avoid the charge

[4] Gen. M. Kh. Kalashnik and Col. S. K. Il'in, "Revolutsia v Voyennom Dele i Vospitanie Sovietskikh Soldat" in *Problemi Revolutsii v Voyennom Dele*, *Voyennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oboroni* (Moscow: 1956), p. 169.

[5] V. D. Sokolovsky *et al.*, *Soviet Military Strategy* (RAND Corporation and Praeger, 1963), p. 123.

[6] Col. A. Baranov, "V. I. Lenin on the Relationship Between Man and Machine in War," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 5 (Mar. 1970). Transl. in Joint Publications Research Service (*JPRS*) Cat. No. 7350–25 (May 1970), Soviet Military Translation (*SMT*) 600, p. 60.

[7] Lt. Col. V. Bondarenko, Col. S. Tyushkevich, "The Contemporary Stage in the Revolution in Military Science and Demands on Military Personnel," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'* (Mar. 1968). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 9189–12 (July 1968), *SMT* 434, pp. 16, 17.

[8] Capt. 2nd Rank A. Belyayev and Capt. 2nd Rank A. Plechov, "The Leninist Style of Leadership as a Factor of the Scientific Control of Troops" in *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 6 (Mar. 1970). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 8829–22 (June 1970), *SMT* 608, p. 26.

[9] Col. I. Seleznov, "The Morale Factor and Ways of Forming It," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'* (Mar. 1966). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 10700–23 (July 1966), *SMT* 274.

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of heresy by blending the ideological-political, professional-organizational and moral-psychological into "scientific troop control," a corollary to the Party's science of social engineering. One writer explains that since these individual and organizational psychologies rest on a socialist base, the Party can activate them in a number of ways, all of which are socialist. The writer notes, "... Engels pointed out that man is appraised not only by what he does but by how he does it. Therefore, style of control, being [leadership's] active aspect, is relatively independent." [10] If the political officers can manipulate non-political factors affecting human behaviour they can claim that these factors are ideologically orthodox because the Party did the manipulating. The political officers have decided to acknowledge and master social psychology in order to prove their utility in the military and also to prevent the regular officers from acquiring a monopoly on expertise in personnel management.

The professional military officers have been willing to accept the Party's theses on scientific troop control because they probably believe in them—at least partially. The authors of *Soviet Military Strategy* write that the initial period of a future war will be of critical importance.[11] General Kurochkin noted in 1965 that in past wars morale could be developed during the course of the conflict; in future wars morale must be at its peak at the outbreak.[12] The MPA's Kalashnik adds that because atomic war will eliminate the difference between the front and the rear areas, the importance of the moral-political factor obtains in all of Soviet society.[13] The author of *Moral'nii Faktor v Sovremennoy Voyne* suggests that it is the duty of the Party to prepare soldiers for psychological shocks resulting from mass destruction. The political officers, not the military professionals, are primarily responsible for this training. Soldiers must be taught to have confidence in their eventual victory over the imperialists, avoid fear and paralysis, put on their protective devices against nuclear and chemical contamination and continue the battle.[14]

The Party ideologists have further argued that the basis of the moral-political factor is conviction of the righteousness of the Soviet system. The control organs repeatedly tell the soldier and officer that they fight only just wars for just causes. Such conviction, argues Butsky, enables servicemen to look upon their difficult duties as "socially useful and honourable." [15] Ideology also teaches the soldier how to view his

[10] Belyayev and Plechov, "The Leninist Style of Leadership as a Factor of the Scientific Control of Troops," *JPRS*, transl., p. 24.
[11] V. D. Sokolovsky *et al.*, *Soviet Military Strategy*, pp. 516, 517.
[12] General of the Army P. A. Kurochkin, "Sovremennii Boi i Edinonachalie" in *Problemi Revolutsii*, p. 156.
[13] Kalashnik, "Revolutsia v Voyennom Dele i Vospitanie Sovetskikh Soldat" in *Problemi Revolutsii*, p. 173.
[14] S. K. Il'in, *Moralynii Faktor v Sovremennoy Voyne* (Voyenizdat: Moscow, 1967). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 15343-28 (Oct. 1967), *SMT* 396, p. 30.
[15] I. Butsky, *Political Work in the Soviet Army* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, no date, probably 1967), p. 11–12.

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opponent. If he is to fight at full strength, the Soviet soldier must learn to hate his enemy "passionately."[16] The military press constantly makes the claim that ideological conviction provides the will to master complex technological equipment. A Soviet general declared in 1967 that Party-political work was one of the most crucial factors in the technological training of personnel in the Rocket Forces.[17] In Party theory, the bases of the moral-political factor are love for the socialist homeland, hate for the predatory imperialists and zealous application to the mastery of military technology. "Combat capacity," writes another Soviet author, "is directly proportional to the level of political knowledge and moral firmness of the rank and officer personnel."[18]

IN January 1967, the Central Committee adopted the resolution, "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" and in September 1967, reorganized the entire military control structure. Apparently, the Soviets have not published any comprehensive description of the new organization. Extrapolating from the materials available, the control system has four main divisions. First, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (MPA), which parallels the Ministry of Defence at the higher levels, supervises the other three divisions, and reports directly to the Central Committee. Second, there are the Political Administrations that parallel the command structure of each of the five services. The Political Administration of the Strategic Rocket Forces was established in 1963 and the others were created in September 1967, in the Ground Forces, the Air Defence Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy. Under the Political Administration is the third main division, the Political Department. Political Departments exist in the Military Districts (into which the USSR is divided), Force Groups stationed in Eastern Europe, and Fleets of the Navy. In 1967 Political Departments were also established in the Ministry of Defence, the Airborne Troops, and all military academies and scientific research institutes. Under the Political Department is the fourth division, the Political Section. A Political Section supervises the affairs in a *soedinenie* or its equivalent (roughly equal to a division in the American military). The Sections administer the operational work with soldiers and sailors, which begins at the *chast'* (regiment) level. The Deputy Commander for Political Affairs (*zampolit*) of the *chast'* presides over the secretaries of the Party and Komsomol organizations, the propagandist, the director of the *chast'* club, and lecturers and agitators. In August 1967, the MPA established the position of Deputy Commander for

[16] Ibid. p. 90.

[17] Col. Gen. A. Shevtsov, "Improving the Combat Skill of Missile Men," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 24 (Dec. 1967). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 6280–27 (May 1968), *SMT* 418, p. 24.

[18] N. P. Prokop'ev, *O Voyne i Armii* (Voyennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oboroni: Moscow, 1965), p. 285.

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Political Affairs at the *podrazdelenie* (company) level.[19] According to the Soviet military press, putting a *zampolit* in the *podrazdelenie* would help meet "... the need to increase educational, particularly individual work with cadres at the level where the success of combat and political training are resolved."[20] It is up to the *podrazdelenie* deputy commander to put the theory of the moral-political factor into practice.

General Epishev probably put a political officer in the *podrazdelenie* to deal with the new situation created by the Universal Military Service Law adopted in October, 1967.[21] According to this law, all male Soviet citizens are required to do military service. In place of three years active duty in the Army and four in the Navy, the 1967 law requires only one year of active duty for all soldiers and sailors. Two draft calls are made annually for 18-year-olds, all of whom have received some previous military training in DOSAAF—Dobrovol'noe Obshchestvo Sodeistvia Armii, Aviatsii i Flota. This law also provided for the training of many more junior officers, although the Soviet press has not indicated the details of their service or the qualifications necessary for an officer candidate.

After a year of active duty, Soviet servicemen from urban areas spend one year in the reserves and receive special technical training while holding down a regular job in the civilian economy Recruits from rural areas spend the second year in full-time technical training while receiving 50 per cent of their pre-draft civilian pay and a guarantee of return to their former employment. Enlistment after the first year of service is voluntary. The law thus provides the Soviet Union with a very large reserve of trained military manpower and at the same time frees all males by the age of 20 to begin their careers. As far as the MPA is concerned, a premium has been placed on the time available for indoctrination of the non-commissioned personnel. The *podrazdelenie zampolit* must make the most of the one-year tour of duty. In 1967, the Party esablished special educational institutes for the *zampolit*, apparently to prepare him better for his task in the *podrazdelenie*.

In most military units there are three additional control systems besides those of the MPA and the regular command structure under the Ministry of Defence. They are: (1) the local Party and Komsomol organizations, closely linked to the MPA system; (2) the KGB officials

[19] This composite picture of the control system is based on Roman Kolkowicz, "Political Controls in the Red Army: Professional Autonomy Versus Political Integration" (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, July 1966), Memo. P-3402, pp. 6, 7; Butsky, *Political Work in the Soviet Army*, pp. 22–26; Col. P. Isakov, "Scientific Approach to Political Work Proposed," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 5 (Mar. 1969). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 8994–28 (June 1969), *SMT* 518; Col. V. Kolychev, "V. I. Lenin and Party Development in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 15 (Aug. 1969). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 15897–30 (Nov. 1969), *SMT* 546.

[20] Kolychev, "V. I. Lenin and Party Development in the Soviet Armed Forces," p. 25 of *JPRS*, Cat. No. transl.

[21] Lt. Col. G. Dubrovskii, "The Task of All the People," *Sovetskii Patriot*, 17 Sept. 1969. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 17124–22 (Dec. 1969), *SMT* 558, p. 15.

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on the lookout for political misconduct; and (3) the *prokuratura,* concerned with criminal offences. The Party and Komsomol organizations were probably reorganized in 1967 along with the MPA structure. There are several other control organizations with wide competence. Military Councils exist in all Military Districts in the USSR. In theory they are the supreme authorities in all District matters, both political and military. Their membership includes the civilian Party chief in the area (usually the *Obkom* secretary), the military commander of the District, his Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, and sometimes a KGB official. Party commissions within the military act as appellate bodies for all Party matters in the armed forces. In 1963 Krushchev established Party-State Control Cooperation Groups and Committees to engage soldiers and civilians in checking on graft and waste in the military. During their first year of existence the press reported the crimes and errors discovered by some of these committees. But it also reported the tendency of the commitees to get involved in red tape and to investigate less than controversial areas, such as kindergartens for dependents of military personnel.[22] During 1968 and 1969, the press again took note of the existence of these committees and called upon them to increase the scope of their activities.[23] Should any of these organizations miss something, the practice of *kritika/samokritika* in Party organizations affords opportunity for *kontrol* by individuals. Since about 90 per cent of the officer corps belong to the Party, this device can potentially bring almost everyone under scrutiny.

The 1967 changes were more concerned with the role of the control organs in indoctrinating and training both the troops and the officer corps than with mere *kontrol.* In September 1967, Epishev tried to provide his political officers with better preparation for their dual jobs as monitors and inspirational leaders. He established a system of schools for political officers in which the curriculum was evenly divided between ideological studies and technical military subjects. Before 1967, the *zampolit* who worked directly with enlisted men was expected to absorb military technology through osmosis.

In 1963 Minister of Defence Marshal Malinovsky began to call attention to the need of political officers for technical education. He wrote in *Krasnaia Zvezda* that if political officers "... do not properly know modern military technology, they will not be able constructively to carry out political-educational work among the personnel."[24] Former

[22] For a discussion of the activities of these committees during 1963 see: unsigned article "Party-State Control Cooperation Groups and Committees," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 14 (July 1963). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 20857, *SMT* 129; Lt. Col. B. Popov, "Golden Injury," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 23 July 1963, p. 3. Transl. in *JPRS*, ibid.; Lt. Gen. N. Petukhov, "Party-State Inspection in Action," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 16 (Aug. 1963). Transl. in *JPRS*, ibid.

[23] See short art. by Col. Bedenkov, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 25 May 1968, p. 2. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 10019–15 (Aug. 1968), *SMT* 449; Maj. Gen. Ya. Artamonov, "Concerns of a People's Controller," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 4 Apr. 1969. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 12875–29 (Sept. 1969), *SMT* 521.

[24] Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Army and the Communist Party*, p. 443.

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Chief of the General Staff Marshall Zakharov strenuously argued the case for technical education of all military personnel and by implication has suggested that anyone lacking technical expertise simply has no place in the Soviet armed forces.[25] General Kalashnik of the MPA noted in 1965 that the defence capacity of the USSR depended on both ideological and technological education.[26] In 1962, another MPA official suggested that the political officers not only acquire familiarity with the technical aspects of the military, but prepare themselves to accept command positions. He also suggested that the Party recruit political officers from the professional officer corps.[27]

It is not clear whether the Party ever tried to recruit men with specialized technical or military educations for the MPA. In 1967, it decided first to recruit political workers and then to give them technical military training. Most of these recruits apparently had only a secondary education at best. The recruiting advertisements invited applications from military servicemen (with no educational requirement mentioned), members of the Suvorov and Nakhimov military societies in the armed forces and civilians, aged 17–23 who had completed a secondary general or technical education, had good recommendations and were Komsomol members or Party candidate members.[28]

General Epishev established at least eight institutions to train the new political officers: the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School, the Kurgan Higher Military-Political Aviation School, the Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Tank-Artillery School, the Donetsk Higher Military-Political School for Engineering and Signal Troops, the Simferopol' Higher Military-Political Construction School, the Leningrad Higher Military-Political Anti-Aircraft School, the Kiev Higher Naval-Political School, and the Military-Political Faculty of the Rostov Higher Command-Engineering School.[29]

According to the head of the Sverdlovsk school, the "main thing" in the curriculum was still the development of "...a Communist ideology, ideological conviction and strength" but technical-military subjects were to receive as much time as the political courses.[30] The chief problem of the new schools seems to be the students' lack of aptitude for technical subjects. The head of the Simferopol' school noted that many of his students neglected their technical studies and preferred to

[25] See M. V. Zakharov, *O Nauchnom Podkhode k Rudovodstvu Voyskami* (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defence, 1967). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 15343–28 (Oct. 1967), *SMT* 398.

[26] See Kalashnik and Il'in, "Revolutsii v Voyennom Dele i Vospitanie Sovetskikh Soldat" in *Problemi Revolutsii*, p. 170.

[27] Maj. Gen. L. Vakhrushev, "Improve Work With Political Cadres Every Way," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 23 (Dec. 1962). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 8470 (May 1963), *SMT* 118.

[28] Unsigned article in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 29 Jan. 1970. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 7350–24 (May 1970), *SMT* 593, p. 63.

[29] Ibid. p. 62.

[30] Maj. Gen. B. Utkin, "The Vocational Knowledge of a Future Political Worker," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, (13 July 1969). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 15897–30 (Nov. 1969), *SMT* 541, p. 95.

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concentrate on the political courses.[31] The head of the Kiev school gave the impression that his students were not exactly the elite of the Soviet educational system but rather people for whom the career of a political officer was the only white collar job available. He noted that many of his pupils were former servicemen and many were the sons of political workers.[32] On the first anniversary of the founding of these new MPA schools, a Soviet general revealed more about the calibre and status of political officers. He answered a rhetorical question about whether the position of a political officer is a temporary job, a question that implied that the job was something less than a career. He declared that the political officer served in a high calling and had good cause to be proud of his work.[33] In 1969 and 1970, the MPA began offering its political officers post-graduate education through occasional short Party conferences on a variety of political and technical topics.

In virtually requiring Party membership for officers, the Party has tried to make the experts red. In its new education programme for the *zampolit*, it is trying to make the reds expert. The new political officer is to combine "the qualities of a political and military leader and a Party figure of the Leninist type," according to the director of the Sverdlovsk school.[34] A general of tank troops writes of the graduates of the MPA schools: "... in all of this [technical] work, we can tangibly feel the leading role of the Communists. They unite and cement the ranks of the personnel."[35] Brezhnev had earlier summed up the work of the political officers in 1968:

> ... success [in military affairs] is determined by people equipped with modern technology who know how to use it to perfection, who are ideologically stable and convinced of the rightness of that which they are defending.[36]

ARMED with ideology and technology, the *zampolit* must concern himself with literally everything in his unit. His regular duties consist of arranging seminars, lectures and independent political study programmes for officers, for whom attendance is compulsory. Enlisted men are treated to two-hour political classes twice weekly. The Deputy Commander for Political Affairs and his staff are also responsible for

[31] Col. Ya. Shevchenko, "Problems at Military Political School Discussed," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 5 Sept. 1969. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 15897–30 (Nov. 1969), *SMT* 550, pp. 68–69.

[32] Col. M. Zimenkov, "Kiev Higher Naval-Political School Discussed," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'* (Oct. 1969). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 1980–30 (Feb. 1970), *SMT* 571, p. 12.

[33] Maj. Gen. I. Mednikov, "The Vocation of a Political Worker," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 17 Sept. 1968. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 17643–10 (Dec. 1968), *SMT* 483.

[34] Utkin, "The Vocational Knowledge of a Future Political Worker," *JPRS*, transl., p. 92.

[35] Maj. Gen. V. Tabakin, "The Communists of the School," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 24 (Dec. 1969). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 5722–31 (Apr. 1970), *SMT* 581, p. 31.

[36] Col. V. Larionov, "The Political Side of Soviet Military Doctrine," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 24 (Nov. 1968), Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 5808–13 (Apr. 1969), *SMT* 503, pp. 9–10.

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operating Evening Universities of Marxism-Leninism, evening Party schools and seminars, study circles and political schools for the enlisted man and his dependants. In addition the political officer is to make use of mass meetings public readings from Lenin, Lenin reading-rooms, cultural entertainments of all sorts, and sports programmes. He is also to make sure that each soldier gets his personal copies of the appropriate military journals.[37]

The political officer is expected to supplement ideological work with lectures, evening schools, conferences and study circles devoted to military technology. He is to demonstrate to all personnel that the political control system helps facilitate the mastery of technical knowledge in the military. The *zampolit* is to encourage officers and soldiers to make improvements in military technology by their own inventions and to "rationalize" all aspects of the military. One of his most useful tools in inspiring officers and men to these efforts is that of socialist emulation—competition among servicemen for the successful performance of military duties. According to an article in *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, the political officer dispenses material rewards to the winners of these contests.[38]

The *zampolit* is also to concern himself with the individual psychology of each soldier and the social relations of the entire unit. The Deputy Commander of the Rocket Forces—an MPA official—writes, "It is well known that successful solution of problems in training and education, for the most part, depends on knowing the people. . . ."[39] Accounts from the military press show that this means checking on and intervening in a soldier's personal life, providing a unit with better food, more comfortable quarters, etc. The *zampolit* is also expected to show great sensitivity to the national, ethnic and religious differences among the personnel in the armed forces.

Above all, the political officer is to set a personal example, inspiring to all officers and soldiers. He is to demonstrate high moral character, wide political knowledge and complete technical mastery of the military sciences. Articles in the MPA journals frequently suggest that the *zampolit* must prove the legitimacy of the Party by sheer force of his own personal example.

The Response of the Officer Corps to the Revolution in Military Affairs

Some members of the officer corps have used the revolution in technology to present another version of the traditional argument for a greater degree of *edinonachalie*—one-man command. In advocating more authority for the commander, they do not necessarily attack the Party.

[37] Butsky, *Political Work in the Soviet Army*, pp. 54–64.
[38] Col. K. B. Platonov, "Horizons of Socialist Competition," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'* (Apr. 1968). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 11019–15 (Aug. 1968), *SMT* 439.
[39] Col. Gen. P. Dankevich, "Educate While Training," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 6 (Mar. 1970). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 8829–22 (June 1970), *SMT* 608, p. 55.

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The Party wants an effective military and believes that *edinochalie* is the most "rational" way to achieve this effectiveness. Both military and Party spokesmen cite Lenin as the first to champion the utility of *edinonachalie*. The Party makes the qualification, also traced to Lenin, that *edinonachalie* is based on Party principles and organizations. The military has not challenged this qualification in print. General Kurochkin cites Lenin's dictum that *edinonachalie* is in fact the expression of the will of the masses, but adds, "Soviet *edinonachalie* is the more strong the more it is built on a Party base: our commander everywhere in everything emerges as the representative of the Party, as the advocate of its ideas, its policy." [40] Other military spokesmen have justified *edinonachalie* on the grounds that it is based on a classless society. Since there is no class conflict in the USSR, *edinonachalie* does not represent political domination but the fact that the people, the Party and the government have given commanders authority to act in the common interest.

The revolution in military affairs has added a new shading to the art of making fine distinctions about *edinonachalie*. Chief of Staff Zakharov has argued forcefully that officers will have to develop initiative and independence in decision-making.[41] According to John Erickson, Zakharov tried to cultivate these qualities by staging frequent troop manoeuvres in which the emphasis is placed on decision-making by the commanders. Erickson also notes that Marshal Zakharov rotated officers through command positions much more quickly than in the past. Colonel Wolfe interprets the military's emphasis on the increased necessity for *edinonachalie* as an indication that the military would like more professional autonomy.[42] Kolkowicz goes somewhat further in asserting that military spokesmen have argued that self-reliance in the officer corps simply cannot be developed in the atmosphere of fear and mistrust allegedly created by political controls.[43]

The Party has handled this question by endorsing the independence and initiative of commanders—on a Party basis. Il'in of the MPA writes that the commander will have to make his own decisions during the course of war and that making such decisions requires raising the morale and technical skill of the troops. For this, the commander must rely upon the Party and Komsomol organizations.[44] General Bochkarev argues that the *edinonachalie* required by modern warfare is made possible by the fact that the commander is first a representative of the Party, secondly a figure in close alliance with the political organs, and thirdly, a technical military expert.[45] The professional military agrees with this

[40] Gen. P. A. Kurochkin, "Sovremennoy Boy i Edinochalie," *Problemi Revolutsii*, pp. 149, 156.
[41] Zakharov, *O Nauchnom Podkhode k Rukovodstvu Voyskami*, *JPRS*, transl. p. 8.
[42] Thomas W. Wolfe, *The Soviet Military Scene* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1966), p. 36.
[43] Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Army and the Communist Party*, p. 558.
[44] Il'in, *Moralnyy Faktor v Sovremoennoy Voyne*, *JPRS*, transl. pp. 29–31.
[45] Maj. Gen. K. Bochkarev et al., *Programma KPSS o Zashchita Sotsialisticheskogo Otechevstva* (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1965). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 12088–25 (Aug. 1966), *SMT* 283, p. 29.

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Party interpretation of *edinonachalie*. Marshal Zakharov cites the same three conditions for *edinonachalie* and adds a fourth, the ability of the commander to apply cost-accounting techniques to his operations.[46]

Cooperation between military and political officers is supposed to achieve true *edinonachalie* and maximum combat strength. According to one authority, the well-run *chast'* is the result of "the friendly, cooperative activity of all commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol organizations."[47] Marshall Malinovsky pointed out in 1962 that unless the commanders and political officers work together, military units cannot achieve their full potential.[48] Many other writers on military affairs have made the same point.

The Party's acceptance of the need to develop *edinonachalie* and initiative in the officer corps could be interpreted as a concession to the military's strength as an institution. Conversely, the military's acceptance of *edinonachalie* on a Party basis could be interpreted as a concession to the Party's strength. There may have been an institutional compromise over *edinonachalie*. But it is also possible that the Party and the military both view this "compromise" as the most effective means for maximizing combat strength. The MPA has told the *zampolit* to raise morale, encourage mastery of technical skills and support the commander in developing combat ability. The work of the political officer, writes General Epishev is "that of improving the combat readiness of the troops."[49] But for the Party the question is not only one of developing initiative in the officer corps. It is also a question of the method used to develop this quality. More competent officers are of little use to the Party if they are free of Party control. The Party is committed to strengthening *edinonachalie*, but in a Party manner.

The military may find the Party's efforts on behalf of *edinonachalie* actually productive if the Party does succeed in raising morale and encouraging technical skills. Top-ranking officers frequently point out the military's own command structure as the primary obstacle to developing initiative among commanders. The Party could conceivably lend support to the effort of lower echelon officers to acquire more authority on their own. Marshal Malinovsky complained in 1965, ". . . it frequently happens that an older superior, without any need whatsoever, intrudes in the functions of the commanders."[50] In discussing the command struc-

[46] Zakharov, *O Nauchnom Podkhode k Rukodstvu Voyskami*, *JPRS*, transl. p. 23.
[47] Kurochkin, "Sovremennoy Boy i Edinochalie," *Problemi Revolutsii*, p. 157.
[48] Marshall R. Ya. Malinovsky, "Vital Problems of the Indoctrination of Soviet Army and Navy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'* (Feb. 1968). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 7765–21 (June 1968), *SMT* 433, p. 23; Col. M. Timofeyechev, "Elements of Command Authority," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 14 (July 1968). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 14238–7 (Oct. 1968), *SMT* 468, p. 5.
[49] A. A. Epishev, "The Communist is an Active Party Warrior," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 24 Nov. 1968. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 2048 (Feb. 1969), *SMT* 496, p. 16; also, p. 19. "By struggling to achieve a high level of combat and political training, improved military discipline and organizational ability and increased efficiency in Party-political work, a Communist helps to implement Party policies in the area of military construction and thus fulfills his primary Party obligation."
[50] Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Army and the Communist Party*, p. 560.

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ture of the military, a Soviet colonel criticized superior officers for rebuking subordinates every time they took action on their own initiative.[51] In World War II Soviet commanders often found that the quickest way to win an argument with the central military command was to appeal to Stalin through their political commissars.[52] Khrushchev, once a political general, frequently gave such support to his military colleagues.

Leading military figures like Sokolovsky, Malinovsky and Zakharov have often stressed the positive role of the Party in supporting *edinonachalie,* raising the morale of servicemen, providing economic and scientific resources for the military and defining the objectives of Soviet strategy. It is conceivable that they view active cooperation with the Party as the only way to cope with the revolution in military affairs. In admitting the importance of the morale factor in war, they may welcome the Party's efforts to increase the loyalty and devotion of Soviet soldiers, sailors and civilians. In their view, resistance to the Party and its control system might succeed only in impairing the strength of the Soviet military in a situation that requires full strength at all times. During the 1960s the military leadership has often taken the initiative in putting lower-level officers in line with Party policy. Working with the Party might very well appear to them to be the best way to maximize Soviet military power. "Life," observed a Soviet general, "requires a close alliance between the commander and the Party organization." [53]

IN theory the political officer, a paragon of personal integrity and political consciousness, and a master of individual and group psychology, is to raise the morale and technical proficiency of officers and troops. Given the universal scope of his responsibilities, it is not surprising that he should sometimes fail to achieve everything the Party asks of him. The MPA press has criticized the *zampolit* for three kinds of failure: ideological, cultural and psychological work among personnel; dissemination and mastery of technical knowledge; and maintaining the quality of activities and personnel in Party units.

During the late 1960s, the military press found that some political officers tended to bury themselves in paperwork rather than take a lively interest in the affairs of their units. According to press reports, such officers succeed only in creating an atmosphere of boredom. Political education for officers, notes an MPA official, often tends to be boring and dull. Many articles in the Soviet press have complained about the failure of political officers to undertake interesting ideological work during the long ocean cruises. In 1968, the deputy head of the MPA took political workers to task for failing to produce interesting ideological lectures and seminars, failing to organize interesting theatrical

[51] Kurochkin, "Sovremennoy Boy i Edinochalie," *Problemi Revolutsii,* p. 155.
[52] Sidel'nikov, "The Political Content and Heightened Importance of Command by One Man," *JPRS,* transl. p. 9.
[53] Lt. Gen. S. Akhromeyev, "Close Work Needed Between Party Groups and Commanders," *Krasnaia Zvezda,* 21 Mar. 1969. Transl. in *JPRS,* Cat. No. 8494-28 (June 1969), *SMT* 516, p. 45.

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performances and failing to build large, interesting libraries for military units. The military press, he also noted, often failed to publish inspiring articles. He singled out the "total" ideological failure of an officer club of the Far Eastern Military District, which had succeeded only in showing a few movies during the previous year.[54]

General Epishev has on occasion noted such shortcomings in ideological work and has also sharply criticized his subordinates for what he assumed was the consequence: failure to inspire enlisted personnel to master military technology.[55] A Soviet colonel complained in 1969 of frequent failures on the part of political officers in encouraging servicemen to master military technology.[56] The establishment of political-technical schools for the *zampolit* in 1967 testifies to the failure of the control system up to that time to inspire servicemen to master military technology. The continued emphasis on the need for political officers to improve work in this area seems to indicate that the 1967 changes have not yet solved the problem.

Another frequent complaint in the MPA press is that the Party organizations in the military (not the control organs) are lax in their admission standards and lethargic in their activities. The political officer is held responsible for these failures. According to the press, the political officers have often tolerated over-hasty review of candidates and bureaucratic formality in accepting new members. The result is that ". . . not infrequently persons are accepted into the CPSU who are unworthy because of their actions or their political or moral qualities."[57] Admitting politically unqualified military personnel is not only incompatible with the high standards of the Party, noted one MPA general, but lowers the overall quality of personnel work.[58] A political officer noted mournfully in 1968 that his Party organization had previously been held in high esteem but recent laxity in admission standards and a concomitant decline in the level of Party activity had produced a situation in which even Party members had taken to violating military discipline.[59]

[54] Col. Gen. M. Kalashnik, "On Improving the Efficiency of Ideological Work," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 1 (Jan. 1968). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 6280–27 (May 1968), *SMT* 421, pp. 23–25.

[55] Gen. A. Epishev, "The Need for Increasing Activity and Combat Readiness of Party Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 23 Dec. 1967. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 4830–32 (Mar. 1967), *SMT* 366.

[56] Col. V. Kolychev, "V. I. Lenin and Party Development in the Soviet Army and Navy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 15 (Aug. 1969). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 15897–30 (Nov. 1969), *SMT* 546, p. 27.

[57] Col. V. Spiridonov, "Improvements in Military Party Organization Needed," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 21 Nov. 1968. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 8587–28 (Mar. 1966), *SMT* 226; also Maj. Gen. I. Semenov, "Party Ranks are Being Filled with Active Servicemen," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 6 (March 1970). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 8829–22, (June 1970), *SMT* 608.

[58] Col. Gy. A. Shmelev, "Guarding the Purity of Party Membership," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 13 (July 1968). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 15866–8, (Nov. 1968), *SMT* 475.

[59] Maj. V. Devin, "Lack of Strong Discipline in Party Members Chided," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 21 Nov. 1968. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 2048–8 (Feb. 1969), *SMT* 497, p. 1.

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In the same year the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs in the Siberian Military District reported that in one of the *chast's* in his District there had been absolutely no Party work for six months; each of a series of Party secretaries refused to conduct any meetings or to involve himself in the political work of the regiment.[60] An MPA colonel suggested in 1968 that the solution to the problem of Party activity in the military might lie in establishing closer ties with the local civilian Party organizations.[61] Apparently the MPA has not acted on his suggestion.

The solution chosen by General Epishev and his colleagues has been to try to recruit better applicants for the control system and to establish political-technical training schools for them.

In 1969 the MPA began holding short conferences for political officers to acquaint them with the latest developments in military indoctrination and technology. The Party has also tried to raise the prestige of the *zampolit* by calling on military periodicals to publish more articles praising the importance and quality of the work performed by the political officers.

THE Party has demanded that the soldier keep his proper place in the military. Not since 1962 have the military professionals ventured to criticize the control system in print or has the MPA felt it necessary to criticize publicly the higher echelons of the Ministry of Defence or the various service branches. Since Epishev came into office, the MPA has apparently succeeded in exercising *kontrol* over the officer corps.

The MPA has tried to politicize the revolution in military affairs not just to monitor the professionals but to legitimize its presence in the armed forces and to pre-empt the potential autonomy of the technical experts. The control system has tried to convince soldiers and civilians that it is only through the Party and its ideology that they can master the skills necessary to defend the Soviet Union. Perhaps the MPA is headed towards a functional division between the political officers charged with *kontrol* and the officers responsible for the more complex tasks of inspiring morale and demonstrating the legitimacy of the Party's role. For all the criticism of the control system's failures in mobilizing the moral-political factor, the Party has apparently been satisfied enough with the MPA not to intervene in two areas that could improve the effectiveness of morale work: the quality of the *zampolits* and the living standards for Soviet servicemen.

The MPA press leaves little doubt the Party has chosen not to recruit the best minds of the USSR to serve in the political officer corps. The MPA recruits non-commissioned soldiers who may not have completed

[60] Col. I. Chudinov, "The Responsibility of Party Organizations," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 16 Nov. 1968. Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 2048-8 (Feb. 1969), *SMT* 494.

[61] Col. V. Kommissarov, "Party Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. (Feb. 1968). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 7766-21 (June 1968), *SMT* 433, p. 27.

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their secondary educations and secondary school school graduates who are not headed for the universities or technical institutes. Members of both groups probably do not have access to any other white collar position. One article spoke of three brothers in a factory, each of whom "firmly resolved" to become a political officer. It seems unlikely that they could have carried out firm resolutions to become engineers, managers or scientists.

The educational level of other military personnel is constantly rising. MPA publications note this fact and urge the political officers to adopt more sophisticated teaching methods. Seminars, independent study and movies are much in vogue. In 1970 more than 30 per cent of all professional officers had a higher military or technical education; 46 per cent of all military personnel had secondary or higher educations; the remaining 54 per cent had incomplete secondary educations.[62] Political officers usually have less education than regular officers and only a little more than the average soldier or sailor. In these circumstances, the *zampolit* probably finds it difficult to speak with authority. The Party's solution to date has been to try to raise the educational level of the political officers after they have joined the MPA.

The military press notes that living conditions are often difficult for servicemen. Barracks are sometimes poorly constructed and heated, food is mediocre, leave is rare and pay is low. The fact that the *zampolit* dispense material rewards to the winners of socialist emulation contests indicates that the Soviet soldier would like more compensation for his services. The low living standards undoubtedly have a depressing effect on morale and performance. The control system may be responsible for persuading the soldiers to accept these conditions with a minimum of complaint. The 1967 draft law may make military life more palatable by reducing active service to only one year and giving relatively high pay for reserve duty during the second year. In any case, the Party has consciously given a low priority to improving the soldier's living conditions.

The morale of the soldier is probably affected by considerations beyond the Party's immediate control. The average serviceman more than likely has formed his opinions about the Party, the Soviet system and his obligations as a citizen before he enters the military. Whether these views are positive or negative, the *zampolit* is probably not able to change them appreciably, no matter what he does.

More indoctrination may have an anaesthetic effect on people who have progressed through the Octoberists, the Pioneers, the Komsomol, DOSAAF, and the Soviet educational system. It is unlikely that the political officer can inspire his audience by repeating what it has often heard before.

The fact that the Party has tolerated the MPA's shortcomings in the

[62] Gen. I. Mednikov, "Communist High Demands and Principles," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, No. 5 (Mar. 1970). Transl. in *JPRS*, Cat. No. 7350–25 (Mar. 1970), *SMT* 600, p. 57.

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moral-political area may indicate that on balance the control system succeeds in convincing the soldier to carry out his duties in a satisfactory manner. If he is bored by the ideology, he probably does not question it or the Party. If in fact the control system actually decreases Soviet military power, the Party is willing to accept this result because military strength has little value if it does not reinforce the Party's position. It would prefer to risk military defeat than grant autonomy to the officer corps. If the control system achieves some degree of success in utilizing the moral-political factor, it also succeeds in legitimizing the role of the Party in the armed forces. Success in this area also means pre-empting the professional officers of an area of expertise that might enhance their autonomy.

The Party has its priorities in order. The Party recognized, more quickly than the professional soldiers, the strategic and political implications of the new defence technology. It reorganized the armed forces to adjust to the new weapons and then it reorganized the control system to politicize this technology. The Party is certainly aware of the failures of the control system, but does not consider them costly enough to spend more human and material resources to improve the MPA's results. The only true test of the control system is war. So far, the Party has won all its wars.

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War and Communism

Robert G. Wesson

IN March 1917, the Russian generals, despairing in the face of defeats and disorders in the capital, pressed the incompetent Nicholas II to abdicate and thereby decapitated the imperial state. The succeeding Western-oriented Provisional Government, born in a euphoria of liberation, soon began sinking into a morass of anarchy and disillusionment. Concurrently, the most well-organized of the extremist parties, Lenin's Bolsheviks, an almost insignificant faction when the tsar was overthrown, swelled rapidly, promising land, bread, peace, a people's regime, and utopia for the suffering masses. By late September, the Kerensky regime had no firm basis, while the Bolsheviks had become the largest party in all major centres. By early November, the garrison of the capital was paying more heed to the Bolshevik commissars than to the constituted authorities. Power was thereby largely transferred de facto several days before the Leninists called out the Red Guards of the factories—Lenin's was the only party with a military auxiliary—to liquidate the "bourgeois" government and take power in the world's largest state.

War is not the midwife of revolution but its mother. Had there been no Russian defeat in a great war, Lenin would hardly have earned a footnote in the history of his country. In the decade prior to 1914, Russia was advancing economically at an unprecedented rate, the standard of living was rising, and the radicalism of the intellectuals was receding. Introduction of semi-constitutionalism and a sort of legislative assembly in 1905, followed by police repressions, reduced the revolutionaries to minor sects, more given to doctrinal disputation than political action. The Bolsheviks were sufficiently demoralized for Lenin's hopes not to be high. As he said in January, 1917, in Swiss exile, "We of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this revolution."[1] More perceptively, various conservatives, from the monk Rasputin to the Minister of the Interior, had warned Nicholas in 1914 that war would endanger the dynasty and might bring chaos. It may well be argued that the tsarist regime was anachronistic, outworn, and incapable of maintaining itself indefinitely. It may also reasonably be assumed that Russia was too big, too backward, and too divided for a liberal-democratic evolution. But if the old order were not crumbled by an external onslaught, breakdown would in all probability have brought a mere dictator or semi-dictator to power, like the anti-Bolshevik leaders in the civil war or like the rulers of most less developed countries today. It is inconceivable that Lenin could have come to power without the

[1] *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1964), Vol. 23, p. 253.

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prior destruction of the forces of order. As stated by a resolution of the 1928 Congress of the Comintern, for a revolution "there must exist a revolutionary situation, i.e. a crisis for the power of the ruling class brought about by military defeat." [2]

Not only to Russia did defeat in the Great War bring communism. There were radical stirrings in various countries in 1918–1920, especially in defeated Germany and Hungary. Revolution surged onto the streets of Berlin, as in January 1919. It failed because the old order had not been thoroughly discredited and the army had not been shattered; defeat was on foreign soil. Moreover, the left was badly divided between those who favoured legality and those who would copy the violent methods which had succeeded in Russia.[3] In Bavaria, a soviet republic was proclaimed after the socialist prime minister was assassinated on 21 February 1919. It turned more and more radical as the situation deteriorated, and passed all manner of decrees to remake society. But the grandiose revolutionary decrees had no effect; and the radical government was unable to bring order, never controlled much more than the city of Munich, and was easily repressed by early May.[4]

The Hungarian revolution was more effective,[5] and it is of interest because it was the nearest of all in character to Lenin's revolution. As in Russia, the political and economic situation continued to deteriorate after the monarchy was overthrown in November 1918; in the general breakdown the moderate socialist government of Count Karolyi lost support and fell apart much as Kerensky's did. On 21 March 1919, the government, faced with an Allied ultimatum which they felt unable either to accept or reject, gave up. The leaders turned to Bela Kun, communist and associate of Lenin, who had been jailed for his part in

[2] Quoted by T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940), p. 34. Marx and Engels, were keenly aware of the relation of war and revolution, however contrary to the spirit of economic determinism. In 1848 and afterwards, they looked eagerly to a European war to unite and revolutionize Germany [Bertram D. Wolfe, *Marxism: A Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (New York: Dial Press, 1965), Chap. I.] On one occasion, Engels wrote to Marx, "Surely the fact is evident that a disorganized army and a complete breakdown of discipline have been the conditions as well as the results of a victorious revolution." [Quoted by Stefan T. Possony, *A Century of Conflict* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 5.] Engels participated in skirmishes in the disorders of 1848 and saw himself as an officer in the revolutionary war; an expert in military affairs, he earned the nickname of "The General." As the nineteenth century wore on, it became increasingly apparent that economic forces were not bringing proletarian revolution nearer, while improved weapons made it hopeless for a city crowd to stand against a disciplined military force; hence the philosophers of communism looked to war to overthrow capitalism. [Lewis S. Feuer, *Marx and the Intellectuals* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1969), p. 17.]

[3] Cf. Rudolf Coper, *Failure of a Revolution: Germany in 1918–1919* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1955).

[4] Coper, op. cit. pp. 256 ff.; Allan Mitchell, *Revolution in Bavaria, 1918–1919* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 310, 314.

[5] Cf. Ivan Volgyes, ed., *Hungary in Revolution, 1918–1919* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1971); Oscar Jaszi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969); for an eyewitness account, Ellis Ashmead-Burtlett, *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923).

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disturbances a month before, and offered him the government which no one else was prepared to assume. The socialist and communist parties were merged, and the dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed. Soviet Hungary allied itself with Soviet Russia, then improving its fortunes in battle with the Whites supported by the *entente*.

Communist revolution came to Hungary without resistance as the apparent last hope of national salvation, infused with patriotic enthusiasm. Its troubles were greater than its strengths, and the rule of Bela Kun lasted only 133 days. But he embarked upon a remarkably extensive program. In the midst of a desperate war and the reorganization of the army, the Hungarian Communists overturned property relations, levelled salaries, campaigned against religion, alcoholism, and prostitution as capitalist hangovers, reformed education, instituted free medical care, and launched terrorism against the politically unreliable—all closely in the Leninist style.

The Bolsheviks laid great hopes on the communization of Hungary, but it represented a highwater mark of revolution west of Russia; after it the wave receded. Despite the best efforts of the Russians and the Comintern, Europe quietened down; and after 1923 the Soviets had to recognize the "stabilization of capitalism." Even the economic depression of the 1930s, the severest in history, which the Stalinists hailed as the long awaited and much postponed crisis of the capitalist order, failed to bring new revolutions. Its most obvious effect was to facilitate the rise of fascism to power in several countries, especially of Central Europe, and to promote statist intervention in the economy almost everywhere.

The second world war, however, carried forward the work of the first world war and brought communism to power in a dozen states, with or without the direct assistance of the Soviet armed forces. In China, the progress of Mao's guerrillas was directly proportional to the Japanese attack, especially after 1937, when the invaders drove the Nationalist government out of the major centres near the coast. The communists promoted themselves more successfully as true patriots than as advocates of Marxist social revolution, while the less dedicated and less disciplined Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek were unable to cope at the same time with communists and Japanese. When the latter withdrew in defeat, the communists were able to occupy the vacuum, win the civil war and take the Mandate of Heaven.

In Europe, the communists leaped into the resistance struggle when the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941; and nearly everywhere they came to play an important role by virtue of their organization and determination. In Albania and Yugoslavia, they formed the postwar governments; and they would have done so in Greece but for British intervention. It is not improbable that communist parties of Western Europe, especially France and Italy, might have converted domination of the underground into postwar rulership had the United States not undertaken to furnish economic and political aid for non-communist

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forces. War also nourished communism in Vietnam. Japanese occupation having removed colonial rulership, communism was married to nationalism in the struggle, 1946–54, against the French. Nationalist-inspired communism was stiffened in battle against American forces and under their bombs, 1965–72.

LONG before Lenin's revolution and its potent example, wars, especially unsuccessful ones, generated revolutionary movements. For example, the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904 led to the Russian semi-revolution of 1905, the radical fringe of which exercised some power briefly through workers' councils ("soviets") in major centres, while peasants rampaged across the countryside, in a curtain raiser for the bigger upheaval to come from a bigger defeat twelve years later.

The defeat of France by Prussia in 1870–71 gave birth to an attempt to reorder society, the Paris Commune. This is of special interest because Marx adopted it (although few Marxists were involved) and analyzed it at length as an episode in the "proletarian struggle,"[6] and Lenin treated it as precursor and model for the Soviet state. Leftist-republican Paris, surrounded by Prussian forces, drew apart from the more conservative elected government which replaced Napoleon III's Empire and made its headquarters at Versailles. The insurrection began, 18 March 1871, when the government tried partially to disarm the Parisian National Guard. The government withdrew its administration from the tumultuous city, leaving it in the control of the Central Committee of the National Guard. This was composed much less of proletarian radicals than of middle class patriots unwilling to accept defeat by Prussia, and initially the whole affair was a French civil conflict rather than a social revolutionary movement. But the Commune government which was soon elected drifted under pressure toward radicalism. It had little of an economic programme, and notably failed to expropriate the Bank of France; but it abolished the regular army in favour of the workers' militia, separated the Church from the state and attacked religion in principle, tried to suppress such vices as prostitution and gambling, formed a Committee of Public Safety (after the model of 1793) to protect the revolution, made some moves toward levelling incomes, and talked of the working class and its special destiny. The communards, influenced by Proudhon, hoped to convert France into a federation of self-governing communes; but there was only feeble resonance elsewhere. The national armies gradually closed in, entered through an unguarded sector of the walls on 21 May, and liquidated the commune in a week of bloodshed.[7]

[6] On the Commune in Marxist tradition, see Bertram D. Wolfe, *Marxism* (New York: Dial Press, 1965), pp. 105–47.

[7] Cf. Roger L. Williams, *The French Revolution of 1870–1871* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); Frank Jellinck, *The Paris Commune of 1871* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965); André Decouflé, *La commune de Paris* (1871) (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1969).

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In our day, the espousal of communism by a state has depended strongly on war. All countries which at present call themselves communist have come to that condition by virtue of a major war, with the exception of Cuba. Even in this case, the conversion to communism was preceded by a small-scale civil war fought in the name of liberation from the Batista distatorship, not by a social revolution.

From Old to New Authority

Not only the privileged but the masses are usually the opposite of radical. In the ordinary course even those who might be said to have nothing to lose but their chains are distrustful of disruptive change and respectful of the social order, preferring to seek improvement within accustomed ways to risking their overthrow. Thus the Russian peasants met the populist missionaries of the 1870s with incredulity and often turned them over to the police. Routine ways of thought prevail as long as the old political system functions.

Traditional loyalties are initially strengthened by war, as people almost automatically rally around the leadership for the common defence and the shared cause. The beginning of the war in 1914 brought the supposedly internationalist socialist parties all over Europe to the support of nationalist governments. In Russia a strike wave came to an immediate halt; all parties except the Bolshevik fraction of the Marxists embraced the Russian cause against the Germans. But failure more than undoes the cementing effect of war. In 1914, Nicholas, who had hoped to steady the throne by a victory parade against Japan in 1904 and had seen his position shaken by defeat, knew that failure would probably cost him his crown. War is the supreme effort of a society; and unsuccessful war more than anything else delegitimizes the government and to some extent the entire social order, the more so when the government is authoritarian, claims total power, and bases its claim to rule upon its strength. Defeat is equalitarian in its effects, as the upper strata are shown to be incapable and hence unworthy of their status. Repressed hatred for the privileged boils to the surface; the elite are seen to have betrayed their responsibilities.

More concretely, the forces upon which a regime counts to maintain the social order are physically consumed by war and made less loyal by non-success. The traditional communist goal of replacing the regular army by a people's militia becomes realistic only when the army is ground down and discredited. A large part of the well-indoctrinated tsarist soldiery and officer corps were lost in battle by 1917, replaced by hastily trained recruits and promoted cadres, men less willing than their predecessors to fire upon rioting civilians. The generals who had sworn fealty to Nicholas II forced him out when they came to see him as a cause of defeat. After his abdication, the famous Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet further undercut the army as the bulwark of order by reducing the authority of officers; a monarchist said of it, " This is the

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end of the army." [8] It was still possible in July 1917 for Kerensky to stir the army to a major offensive; but the resultant fiasco, after so much exhortation, left it in a state of near collapse. This became almost total after the confusion of Gen. Kornilov's attempted *coup*. By October, the soldiers' chief, almost sole, concern was to avoid fighting.

War at the same time breaks normal rhythms and imposes unaccustomed hardships. Men are pulled out of normal occupations, and people assume new responsibilities. In Russia in 1917, inflation was mounting and shortages (conspicuously not shared by the elite) were deepening. Lack of normal supplies of bread triggered the riots which led to the end of the Romanov dynasty. Perception of hardships is much augmented by fear and uncertainty, and the very values which led the country into trouble become questionable. Feelings of powerlessness and insecurity lead people to seek new bonds of security.[9] Anxiety born out of war may induce collective paranoia, mass hysteria, and chiliasm. Displaced hostility seeks scapegoats.[10] Dogmatism becomes a refuge from disquieting facts.[11]

In this situation, a party prepared to promise new solutions, stronger certainties, and new leadership unassociated with defeat can offer itself as saviour. It is not the hesitant who take the field in the time of troubles but the self-assured; and in Russia in the summer of 1917 hardly anyone but the Bolsheviks was prepared to claim the succession of the tsars. At the April Congress of Soviets, the moderate socialist Tseretelli declared: "There is no political party in Russia which would say at the present time, 'Give us power.'" Lenin shouted from the audience, "There is such a party!" [12] The exclamation has rightly become enshrined in Soviet Leninolatry.

But defeat is not only uniquely effective in undermining accustomed authority; the experience of war at the same time lays foundations for a more ruthless and more effective regime. It inures to all manner of regulation which would otherwise be felt as excessive and which can function well only when generally supported. Price controls, commodity allocations, etc., were extensively applied almost without protest even in Britain and the United States in the world wars. Lenin's government could socialize the Russian economy by merely extending somewhat the controls already in effect, using some of the bureaucratic apparatus instituted by the tsarist regime. Subsequently in the civil war the Soviet imposed as total controls as ever attempted, with central direction (so far as feasible under the circumstances) of all transactions and practical phasing out of money in favour of allocation and rationing. As long as the conflict raged, this worked tolerably well and may have enabled the

[8] William H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), p. 86.
[9] Cf. Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941).
[10] K. and G. Lang, in George H. Grosser et al., eds., *The Threat of Impending Disaster* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), pp. 66–67.
[11] L. Grinspoon, ibid. pp. 123–24.
[12] Chamberlin, op. cit. p. 159.

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Bolsheviks to win. Likewise, the Bolsheviks, after having dissolved authority in the old army, inaugurated an even more severe discipline in the new; many a commissar was ordered to be shot by Trotsky for insufficient vigour in battle.

War gives the rulers full powers over all aspects of life; communist discipline goes little beyond martial law. Censorship having been excused by military necessity—which excuses almost anything—there was no real resistance when the Bolsheviks restored it and applied it to class enemies and then to non-Bolshevik socialists, despite the opposition's traditional stance in favour of freedom of speech and the press. Likewise, the restoration of political police, the step-by-step development of terrorism, and the dissolution of the elected Constituent Assembly were all accepted with little more than scattered groans. War had made not only arbitrary command but death and suffering commonplace. War is politically-sanctioned mass murder; after the millions slaughtered on the battlefield, the execution of thousands in the name of the new order was less shocking. Combat hardened to uninhibited use of power for the general safety, and to discipline for stress; violence justified violence. When so many private interests had been wiped out by the war, there was little protest that the state should take others for its allegedly higher needs.

Destruction and hardships bring people into closer subordination to the overarching authority which should protect them. It has been an amazing discovery that bombing, with large scale wrecking of cities, does not weaken but strengthens mobilization regimes. War requires and justifies the overriding of individual desires and rights; it discredits self-interest and demands sacrifice for a general and distant cause. When the state to whom men look for safety shows itself incompetent (as the Provisional as well as the tsarist government did) men will listen to the leader who claims to hold the key to the situation, even though his proposals may be ruthless. Few in the Russia of late 1917 felt much revulsion at strong arm methods for a cause which proclaimed itself holy. Ruthlessness is the essence of totalitarianism, and war often creates the conditions for the foundation of a totalitarian state.[13]

Better than any other party, the communists offered the security of a strong collective bond in times of maximum insecurity; their allegedly scientific doctrine with ageless millenarianism offered new certainties mixed with new hopes. In Lenin's analysis, the entire meaning of the first world war was greed for markets and colonies, hence it was no shame but true virtue to turn away from it. As an Hungarian journalist put it: "The revolution had to come to usher in those virtues which enabled us to reconcile ourselves to a lost war."[14]

The communists could demand greater sacrifices because the victory they offered promised a total peace; after the universal victory of the

[13] The relation of fascism like communism to the decomposition of old values and institutions combined with political hardening in war is obvious.
[14] Quoted by G. Vermer, in Volgyer, ed., op. cit. p. 31.

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anointed working class, there should be no more conflict between classes, hence no more conflict between nations, indeed no more conflict of any kind, so that the state itself should "wither away." In the depths of a tormented and unsuccessful war, Lenin promised the Russians enchanting deliverance, and "Peace" was the most effective of his slogans, especially with soldiers apprehensive of being sent to the front, who became the chief force lifting the Bolsheviks into power. No other party could pledge so effectively to bring peace; to be for an immediate end to the "imperialist" war was almost equivalent to being Bolshevik. This theme then and later appealed not only to the unsophisticated but to many intellectuals horrified by the stupidity of war, who would otherwise choke at the crudities and logical weaknesses of communist theory and practice.

Yet the communist call for peace has of course never resembled Gandhian nonviolence. In theory as well as in deed, the communists have always energetically opposed pacifism, just as they refuse to admit conscientious objection to military service. Even in "bourgeois" states, the doctrine has been that workers should not refuse to bear arms but should enter the army and endeavour to take it over.[15] The communist demand is to improve and elevate the struggle, not to renounce it. Lenin spent the war years prior to April 1917 pleading not for an end to the slaughter but for conversion of the "imperialist" war of nations into a civil war of classes, the only way, he contended, to obtain true victory and enduring peace. Lenin saw a basic necessity for violence; as he wrote in 1905, "So long as there are oppressed and exploited peoples in the world, we must strive not for disarmament but for the universal arming of the people."[16] Class warfare is the heart of Marxism-Leninism, the final peace being an ever-receding glory for which the Party demands present sacrifices.

Lenin for a few months after the seizure of power permitted the demobilization of the exhausted and demoralized armed forces to proceed, as he counted on revolution to follow the Russian example in Germany and elsewhere. But it was soon evident that propaganda was not enough; and new legions were mustered under Lenin's banner, the Red Army, to defend and restore the Russian domains. No other communist movement has had such an interval before the guns began to speak the message. Other communist leaders—Tito, Mao, and Ho Chi-minh—were from the beginning preoccupied with warfare.

Communist militarism

It is ironical that a communist party should be coming to the fore in a situation of military defeat, because it is the most militant and military of political movements. The ideal army, on the other hand, should be much like the model Leninist party, particularly as it fulfills

[15] Taracouzio, op. cit. pp. 37–38.
[16] *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1943), Vol. III, p. 339.

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its *raison d'être* in combat. Its soldiers should be dedicated to the cause as defined by the leadership, inspired to enthusiastic service, obedient to death yet resourceful and capable of bold initiative. Like a communist party or a religious order, the model army is hierarchic, anti-individualistic and anti-property, authoritarian and idealistic in spirit, demanding adherence to a creed and sacrifice for a higher good. Party and army are ideally ascetic, favouring moral over material reward. They favour political authority over economic enterprise.[17] They are collectivistic in that men should act and feel themselves primarily members of the group. They are egalitarian in that differences between individuals are not personal but organizational; differences are less of property than of power, and they result not directly from achievement but from conferral of status by higher powers. The necessities of life are furnished communally in army barracks; the luxuries, in the army as in the party, are mostly obtained as perquisites of rank, not possessions of individuals. Party and army tend towards introversion, disliking competing organizations and values, offering members emotional and economic security in return for fullness of loyalty.[18]

Alexander I of Russia at one time thought to improve both his army and the life of the peasants by uniting military discipline with communist living. In his military colonies, men ploughed and drilled collectively and by command.[19] These efforts to perfect society soon collapsed under the imperfection of human nature. More successful military-socialists or socialist-militarists were the ancient Spartans, the inspiration of Plato's ordered state. To assure dominion over their restive subject peoples, the Spartans devoted themselves to the community. Children were for the state, not the family; at age seven boys were taken from their mothers to begin indoctrination and training as warriors. Men ate together, citizens being equalized in subordination to the collective. Commerce was scorned, and precious metals were theoretically outlawed. Personal adornment was disdained; and individual wealth, so far as it existed, was concealed, as it usually is in communist states today. There were a ruthless secret police and an obligatory ideology in the form of the sacred constitution.[20]

Militarism and communism have been entwined in Marxist-Leninist movements.[21] Lenin avidly studied Clausewitz, whose *Art of War* was one of two books he took along when he went into hiding in Finland in July 1917 (along with Marx's *Civil War in France*). Going beyond Clausewitz, Lenin asserted, " War is not only a continuation of politics

[17] Even in America. Cf. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 246.

[18] On the communal character of military life, see Kurt Lang, in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 848–50.

[19] Sidney Harcave, *Years of the Golden Cockerel* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 45–49.

[20] Cf. H. Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge: University Press, 1952); and Pierre Roussel, *Sparte* (Paris: Editions Boccard, 1960).

[21] A thesis stressed by Stefan T. Possony, *A Century of Conflict* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953).

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but a summation of politics." [22] As early as 1904, the Mensheviks objected to the military discipline and the language of Lenin's embryonic party,[23] but this character was retained and strengthened. Lenin's party inaugurated the military auxiliary (Red Guards), later copied by fascist Black Shirts, SA, et al. The party was hardened and matured into a national government in the desperate civil war, when it became practically a military organization and the backbone of the Red Army. It used some 50,000 officers of the old army, the most important sector of the tsarist elite to serve the revolutionary state. After the struggle was ended, Lenin spoke emphatically of the inevitable resumption of the armed struggle with world capitalism, and Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution implied an unremitting contest until total victory. The Red Army showed itself unable, in the war against Poland, to carry communism to the West, but Trotsky tried to reconstruct as he had conducted the war, by military command. Four "labour armies" began operations in February 1920.[24] But the discipline which was effective in wartime failed in peacetime. Labour armies, like "war communism," proved unworkable, and in 1921 Lenin sounded the retreat to his New Economic Policy and an essentially monetary economy.

The political standing of the Soviet military has since fluctuated. It was at a low ebb in the latter 1920s; since the death of Stalin it has tended to rise. The Communist Party and the Soviet Army have come close together, and Soviet society has been militarily tinged. Soldiers are mostly Komsomol members, and officers nearly all belong to the Party (or juniors to the Komsomol) and are subject to Party along with military discipline. "Ours is an army," said Marshal Grechko, "in which the officer as well as every soldier is called upon to be a political warrior, an active propagandist and agitator." [25] The Soviet military makes much of the trust and cooperative relations resulting from the supposed absence of property instincts in Soviet society.[26] Military men and deeds, on the other hand, have been abundantly glorified in Soviet art, literature, and journalism. For example, "The warrior, taking the oath, kneels and kisses the edge of the army banner. A dedication to knighthood, the poet might say . . . 'Soldier' is a title surrounded with honour and love." [27]

"The democratic politician is essentially a civilian. . . . In contrast, the Communist model is deployed in military units on the field of battle. . . ." [28] Despite some "democratic" forms, the Communist

[22] *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 68.
[23] John S. Reshetar, Jr., *A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 43.
[24] James Mavor, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1928), pp. 217–21.
[25] *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 27 November 1969.
[26] As in A. V. Barabanshchikov et al., *Psikhologiia voinskogo kollektiva* (Moscow, 1967), passim.
[27] Caption in *Eto i est sovetskaia zhizn* (Moscow, 1971), before p. 337.
[28] Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 27.

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Party is much like an army, whose line officers are entitled " secretaries." The vocabulary of Soviet politics has been to a surprising extent military, with " vanguard fighters " leading the class struggle, " marching at the head of the movement," " shock workers " taking objectives, " launching an offensive " or " mobilizing reserves," " heroes of labour " winning " the battle of the harvest " through " battle-readiness," etc.[29] Correspondingly, the world scene is depicted, even in times of relative *détente*, as an arena of relentless struggle between the forces of dark and light. Uniforms are mandatory for numerous occupations, and there are formal ranks everywhere. Moral incentives are preferred to purely material ones; in no other land are there so many orders, medals, ribbons, citations, banners of honour, etc. The Soviet Union has also probably seen more glorification of things military, if not of war itself, than any other major state of modern times except Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.[30]

Much the same may be said of various other communist parties and states. In China, Party-military relations have been even closer. Prior to 1949, the army and Party were almost indistinguishable. *The People's Daily*, 1 July 1950, pointed out that about a million Party members lived on rations without pay. " In other words, they have led a life of strict military communism," making them, " the most outstanding members of the working class." [31] Civilian rule was fairly effective by 1954, but after 1960 the People's Liberation Army was apparently more effective in propaganda than civilian agencies.[32] In the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao called upon all to " learn from the PLA," the mainstay of communist purity when the Party itself was found " revisionist." For a time, the army practically took the place of the dismantled Party as the chief agency of order and unity. The rebuilt Party became representative mostly of the military; in 1969, nearly half of the Central Committee and over half the Politburo wore military uniform.[33] According to Mao, " The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out political tasks of the revolution." [34] But his best aphorism is: " Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Communists and Militancy

The army-like Leninist party is probably the best leader, organizer, and mobilizer of the warring state; the political soldiers excel in battle.

[29] Cf. ibid. p. 29.
[30] Cf. R. G. Wesson, " The Military in Soviet Society," *Russian Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (April 1971), pp. 139–46.
[31] Robert Conquest, *Where Marx Went Wrong* (London: Tom Stacey Ltd., 1970), pp. 55–56.
[32] Parris H. Chang, " The Changing Patterns of Military Participation in Chinese Politics," *Orbis*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall, 1972), pp. 780–802.
[33] The Soviet party, on the other hand, has been wary of admitting strictly military men to the highest seats of power; they have held only 8–10 per cent of the Central Committee and, except for a brief stay of Marshal Zhukov in 1957, have been excluded from the Politburo until Marshal Grechko was seated in April 1973.
[34] *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1967), p. 100.

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Communist parties, having come to power in or through a war situation, have had greatest success not in bringing justice, equality, abundance of goods, and social harmony, as they have promised, but in the destruction of their enemies. They organize an offensive better than they organize production, and they produce military wares much better than civilian ones. They give unceasing attention to morale and indoctrination, and they demand and get more from their people than their antagonists are usually able to exact. Communist revolutionary war is revolutionary mostly in that it is wholehearted and total.

The record of military virtuosity of communists and near communists, from ancient Sparta to contemporary North Vietnam, is long and striking. The Taborites, who spent most of their time fighting while preaching millennial concord, were the scourge of their day, so feared that imperial armies sometimes scattered upon the mere rumour of their approach.

Lenin assessed most highly the military capacity of the nation at arms. In November 1905, he wrote: "No power on earth will dare make an attack on free Russia if its liberty is defended by an armed people which has destroyed the military caste, which has made all soldiers citizens and all citizens capable of bearing arms soldiers." [35] In effect, that is, Russia would have won the war with Japan if it had benefitted from communist leadership. In March 1917, he pursued the same theme, arguing for "A genuine *people's* militia, i.e. one that, first consists of the entire population, of all adult citizens of *both* sexes. . . ." [36] In *State and Revolution,* completed in the summer of 1917, he postulated that proletarian democracy involves "the replacement of the police and army, which are separated from the people and opposed to it, by the direct arming of the entire nation." [37]

Lenin was not so consistent, however, as many of his successors in appreciation of the potentialities of the fusion of communism and a national cause. Before coming to power, he wrote of the Paris Commune, "In the contradictory uniting of contradictory goals—patriotism and socialism—lay the fateful error of the French socialists." [38] When the Germans presented peace terms in 1918 which not only other Russians but most Bolsheviks considered quite unacceptable, Lenin forgot his faith in the power of the armed people (or doubted his ability to lead them to victory). Instead of conducting a people's revolutionary war against the invaders, Lenin insisted on the acceptance of the peace of Brest-Litovsk, realizing that it was necessary to preserve his regime, although bidding for time in such circumstances outraged Russian national feeling and strengthened the widespread belief that he was pro-German, if not in German hire.

Lenin and Trotsky, however, later reversed the demobilization of

[35] *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 338.
[36] *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1964), Vol. 23, p. 327.
[37] Quoted by Jellinck, op. cit. p. 390.
[38] Quoted by John S. Reshetar, op. cit. p. 113.

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Russian forces and, despite the sagging economy and isolation by Allied blockade, they gradually put together an effective fighting force. Compulsory military service was reintroduced in the spring and summer of 1918, election of officers was ended, and discipline was made sterner than ever. The backbone of the new army was the Party; Party members were sent in to stiffen the otherwise crumbly mass by persuasion and example and to prevent surrender no matter how hopeless the situation appeared to be. Thanks to the Party, the Red Army was able to win out over the better armed but much divided White forces.

In 1939, the Red Army did poorly against Finland, a nation with a fiftieth of the population of the Soviet Union. This was partly a result of the purges which two years earlier had taken about half the officer corps and nearly all in the highest ranks. In the first three months of war against Germany, likewise, Soviet forces reaped little but disaster. But as Party and people alike became convinced of the Nazi menace, Nationalism and communism joined for the salvation of Russia, leader and motherland of the workers. The Soviet state performed miracles of mobilization. It mustered hundreds of new divisions after Hitler thought he had practically destroyed the Soviet army. Despite loss of a large part of Soviet industry to German occupation, many plants were efficiently transported to eastern regions; and production of some categories of war materials was raised to levels comparable to those of the United States. Hitler found his generals' reports of Soviet production of tanks and planes quite unbelievable.

The Russians have not been tested in battle since, but the Soviet economy continues to excel in the military sphere. It maintains armed forces quantitatively superior to the American in most categories, such as numbers of soldiers, armoured divisions, aircraft, and nuclear megatonnage, despite the fact that the Soviet GNP is approximately half of the American. The essentially military priority of heavy industry seems deeply rooted in the Soviet system. The current five-year plan promised slightly better treatment for light industry, but this seems to have been frustrated. The Soviet Union is a minor economic power on the world scene, as its share of world trade outside the Soviet bloc is under 2 per cent. Its status as a superpower rests primarily on its military might, a first-class and growing navy and air force, the world's biggest land army, the ability to arm its friends anywhere, and immensely powerful strategic nuclear forces.

CHINESE communism took shape in nearly twenty years of almost continual fight for existence and power; and its exploits have been very striking. Mao's forces in Kiangsi in the early 1930s had virtually no arms except what they could capture, yet they repulsed repeated Nationalist onslaughts. Finally they broke out of encirclement in the Long March, a 6000-mile feat of endurance. In the Yennan retreat which they reached thereby, the Communists performed miracles of improvisation; they were the world's experts in achieving the most with

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the least.[39] The Nationalists had all the material advantages, control of the cities and means of communication, the governmental apparatus, international recognition, and assistance of the great powers, including the Soviet Union. But the Maoists were able to wear down their enemies and eventually win because they were better able to mobilize human energies.

In the Korean war, both the North Koreans and the Chinese who came to their rescue showed military capacities embarrassing to the United States. The attack of 25 June 1950, was not entirely unexpected; and the ability of the communists to overrun nearly all the southern part of the peninsula in six weeks was due not only to surprise and superior armaments but to organization, skill, and determination. In November-December 1950, the Chinese were able to use mobility (on foot), concealment, and surprise to overcome inferiority of firepower, not to speak of airpower, and inflict a severe defeat on the American-U.N. forces, driving them back to the 38th parallel and beyond. The Americans were able to stabilize the front, but their great material superiority did not suffice to push the communists back.

Like the Soviet Union, China has a military ticket to the great power club. It is very poor, its foreign trade is less than that of Taiwan, and its industrial growth has lagged over the past fifteen years. But it has mastered the production of nuclear weapons and has begun a missile system, while having no private automobiles at all; and the world has much respect for the prowess of Chinese soldiers.

The Maoist speciality is indoctrination (that is, morale-building) and by extension the employment of human resources. As Mao has it, "The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people,"[40] and "the outcome of a war is decided by the people."[41] The Maoist communist approach was especially suitable for guerrillas, who lack almost everything necessary for warfare except manpower. Following Maoist doctrines, communist-led peasants in many places but most prominently in Asian jungles, have demonstrated the skill to stand off, wear down, and defeat better armed forces perhaps ten times as large. Typical have been the opponents of first French and then Americans in Vietnam. Massive military and economic assistance for many years was insufficient to give victory to the city-based pro-Western regimes. Until 1965, the Viet Cong received inspiration but very little material help from its foreign patrons; what flowed down the jungle trails was less than a hundredth that which poured into the hands of the Saigon regime. American advisors could hope for nothing better than that Republic of Vietnam forces should learn a fraction of the tenacity and initiative of their enemies.

Native guerrilla forces in South Vietnam were gradually worn down after 1965 (at a cost to the US of several hundred thousand dollars per

[39] Cf. Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, rev. ed. (New York: Grover Press, 1968).
[40] *Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, p. 87.
[41] Ibid. p. 140.

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guerrilla), and the brunt of the fight against a Saigon army approaching a million and American forces ultimately swelling over half a million was taken over by North Vietnamese operating at the end of a difficult supply line and numbering not more than 150,000. Their military skill was evident in the daily reports of battle; especially striking was their ability to hold positions in the face of the most intense bombardment of history. Americans saw North Vietnamese, small and largely untutored, as equals of the world's best infantrymen. At home, meanwhile, North Vietnam, under continual bombardment and supporting a disproportionate military effort, became the model communist state. But if the single-minded communists of North Vietnam either win reunification or give up the battle to achieve it, they lose their inspiring goal. Instead of struggling for the universally esteemed goal of national unity, the leadership will have to exhort the people to struggle for the fulfilment of the plan. From ingrained habit, most will probably follow fairly willingly for a few years; but graphs of production are never so exciting as battle lines, and they lose glamour. The international class war ceases to be very exciting when it has no concrete direct meaning. People want more for themselves as they are less consumed by the cause, expecting material compensation for years of sacrifice. Corrosive foreign ideas seep in as contacts open up and dissenting thoughts are no longer seen as treason. Elite coherence subsides, and cadres begin using authority more or less for their own benefit. It is difficult to suppose that, without a special source of inspiration, North Vietnam can long remain much more virtuous and efficient than its neighbours.

The Soviet Union and China, as big powers much impressed with their role in the world, are in a somewhat different situation in this respect. China aspires to the leadership of the underdeveloped countries of the Third World; the Russians could still regard their country as the leader of the world proletariat carrying on a struggle against the forces of capitalism, subject to the perennial danger that desperate reactionaries might launch an attack on the fortress of socialism. It has been possible to insist on the reality of conflict while advocating international trade and cooperation. Lenin kept the supposed inevitability of war between "socialism" and "capitalism" always in the background to keep a sense of purpose and direction in the Soviet state, while he rationalized dealings with "enemy powers" as diplomatic manoeuvring or using the disunity and greed of the "bourgeoisie" to hasten its downfall. This was fairly convincing in the years immediately after the civil war and Allied intervention, and it became so again as Hitler raised an overt threat. After Stalin, Khrushchev realistically espoused the idea of "Peaceful Coexistence" and excluded large scale war from the ideological picture; but he had still to maintain ideological warfare and contend that the rival social systems were engaged in life-and-death competition.

In 1972 and 1973 trade with Western powers and technological borrowing have seemed more important to the Russians than the

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promotion of communism, and *Pravda* has given many columns to praise of the Brezhnev policy of better relations with the United States. Billion-dollar deals concluded with American firms and the opening of branches of American banks in Moscow make the duel of "capitalism" and "socialism" seem remote. Yet the old themes of militancy have been persistent, although the danger is no longer seen in specific countries but in "imperialism" (the military side of capitalism). *Pravda* warns of relaxation: "It is well known that the forces of imperialism, despite the failure of their aggressive adventures, by no means renounce their goals."[42] Brezhnev underlined: "The CPSU stood and stands on the principle that the class struggle of two systems—capitalist and socialist—in the realm of economics, politics, and of course ideology, will continue. It cannot be otherwise, for the philosophy and class goals of socialism and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable."[43] *Pravda* scolded "naive people . . . [who] expect the recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence by leaders of the greatest capitalist power to eliminate or weaken the basic conflict of our epoch—the conflict between capitalism and socialism—or that the ideological struggle between them will lose its significance."[44] "Peaceful Coexistance" may even be favourable for armed struggle. A writer in *Izvestia*, referring to violent actions on less than the interstate level, stated: "The more deeply the principles of peaceful coexistence are implemented, the more confidently the people fighting for . . . radical change of the sociopolitical conditions in the world can act."[45] The ever recurrent section headlined "On the Barricades of Class Struggle" (or equivalent) vanished from *Pravda* in 1973. Yet the Soviet reader should bear in mind that "Peaceful Coexistence" implies no letup in the anti-Soviet efforts of imperialism, only a change of tactics: "One observes a tendency to increased activity of imperialist ideology, its determined effort to adapt itself to the new situation. Consequently we may expect not a weakening but a strengthening of imperialist ideological subversion."[46]

It is very difficult for a communist state such as the Soviet Union entirely to abandon militancy and militarism. The military is its area of excellence in production and provides a chief means of influence in the world. While Western powers have mostly dropped military conscription, Soviet youths still undergo 2 or 3 years of military training, and military propaganda has continued pervasive in the time of overt *détente*. War and violence, or at least their image or expectation, are essential to keep ideology vigorous; ideology is intellectualized violence. The Soviet Union needs ideological legitimacy to make workable the

[42] Editorial, 16 Mar. 1973.
[43] Speech for the Soviet Union's fiftieth birthday, quoted by *Pravda*, 31 Mar. 1973, p. 4.
[44] Article by D. F. Kraminov, *Pravda*, 30 May 1973.
[45] A. Bovin, in *Izvestia*, 10 Sept. 1973.
[46] A. Lilov, in *Pravda*, 17 Oct. 1973.

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centralized management of the economy, the party's monopoly of political power, and the control of communications, which are essential components of the Soviet system. Such controls tend to break without ideologically motivated militancy. If the Soviet Union really makes peace with the outside world, the system as we have known it can no longer endure.

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The Communist Party of Great Britain

Walter Kendall

Origins and Originators

Although no less than five British revolutionary groups were invited to the founding Congress of the Communist International on 6 March 1919, none in fact received news of the Congress until after its conclusion. Unlike most other sections of the Comintern the British Party arose from a fusion of several organizations and not from a split off the main body of social democracy. Lengthy negotiations extending over almost two and a half years, two Unity Conventions, one at London in August 1920, the other at Leeds in January 1921, were required before the various contending groups could be fused into a unified Party. At every stage Comintern influence proved the decisive factor.

The founding groups comprised the British Socialist Party, the largest group, a lineal descendant of the SDF founded by Hyndman in 1884; the Communist Unity Group, a small split from Britain's De Leonist Socialist Labour Party; the Communist Party (British Section of the Third International) a body which had sprung from Sylvia Pankhurst's pre-war women's suffrage agitation; the ILP Left Wing, a minority group which left the ILP after that party's Easter Conference in 1921, the rump of the war-time shop stewards' organization of industrial militants and a number of groupings of a local character. At its foundation the CPGB claimed 10,000 members. The actual figure was probably between 3,000 and 5,000.

The Party's Chairman and leader in its first years was Arthur Macmanus, a shop steward leader of Irish origin, who died in 1924. Originally dominated by the BSP the Party's leadership quickly passed to the industrial militants and former members of the SLP.

The new leadership hinged around the Socialist Labour Party/shop stewards trio Macmanus, Bell and Murphy with other figures such as William Gallacher, J. R. Campbell and William Paul in the immediate background. Inkpin, former secretary of the BSP, acted as Party secretary. Palme Dutt, later the Party's best-known intellectual, first achieved prominence at this time. In the process of consolidation the Party lost Sylvia Pankhurst and some figures later prominent in the Labour Movement such as Ellen Wilkinson and Raymond Postgate. Two of the Party's first three MPs, Colonel Malone and Walton Newbold, were also lost in the process.

Bell and Inkpin were moved into the background with the onset of the Comintern's Third Period when the Dutt-Pollitt leadership was pushed to the fore by the Russians with Pollitt becoming Party secretary.

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Murphy, who had been the shop stewards' theorist, was the most able of the early leaders. Murphy, with Lozovsky and Tomsky, was one of the founders of the Red International of Labour Unions. As a member of the Comintern Executive, Murphy moved the expulsion of Leon Trotsky from the Communist International. After the change of leadership in 1928–29 Murphy was expelled. The pretext was the advocacy of increased trade with the Soviet Union during the Third Period in 1932.

Official communist hagiography treats the Party as an essentially British institution. In fact without the ideological and financial intervention of the Communist International, without the work of its agents in Britain, the CPGB would never have been founded. Until September 1918 the key Russian agent in Britain was Maxim Litvinov, later a Soviet diplomat. Theodore Rothstein, later Soviet Ambassador in Persia, took Litvinov's place until the foundation of the Party in August 1920. Amongst other Russian socialist emigres who played a role in the pre-revolutionary British Socialist movement were Chicherin, later Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maisky and Petroff, both later involved in the diplomatic service. The Comintern representative in 1922 was Michael Borodin (George Brown) later Comintern political adviser to Chiang Kai Shek. Borodin was succeeded by Petrovsky (Bennett).

Organization, Social Composition, Strength

The organizational structure of the Communist Party of Great Britain follows the standard practice of democratic centralism, extending pyramid fashion from the Party secretary (John Gollan) and political committee, down through the Central Committee and the District Committees to the Party branches and Party factions in front organizations and such trade unions as the Party has membership of importance.

The composition of the Party membership, predominantly working class at its foundation, is probably now much less so than that of the Labour Party. The Communist Party today is predominantly a middle class institution. Since the days of the Popular Front the Party has consistently attracted support from two basic elements; middle class strata at one pole; industrial militants who join the Party on the basis of a misunderstanding at the other. At present Party control rests firmly with the hierarchy without any challenge from either wing. The Party no longer enrols or directly influences a significant number of intellectuals. The Party has full legal status although its members are subject to some important security bars as far as employment in civil service, and defence-based industries are concerned. A diminishing minority of trade unions also restrict the rights of communists to hold office.

Apart from a secondary shift in 1923, one important change of leadership in 1929, and a temporary shift in 1938, the CPGB has been singularly free from the normal pattern of purges and abrupt changes in leadership.

The leadership installed in 1929 has remained in power, with

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inevitable changes due to death and retirement, until the present day. The first General Secretary, inherited from the BSP, Albert Inkpin, held office from 1920–29. The second, Harry Pollitt from 1929 until 1956, shortly before his death. The present secretary, John Gollan, was groomed for the succession and succeeded without dispute. The Party's Young Communist League has some 3,000 members and is overshadowed both by the official Labour Party youth movement and the Trotskyist "Young Socialists." The Party claimed 1,000 student members in 1973 and exercises a certain limited influence in this field.

The Party claims a membership of 30,000 and this probably overstates the position. That a high proportion are relatively inactive is fairly certain. The major geographical concentrations are in London (5,000), Scotland (7,000), Wales (1,800) and Yorkshire (2,000). These four regions collectively comprise more than one half the total membership. The fact that at its 1963 Congress the Party boasted of its 2,300 members in Glasgow (population 1,050,000) and its 1,000 members in Birmingham (population 1,100,000) adequately indicates its level of support in the rest of the country. In the 1970 General Election the Party's 58 candidates gathered 38,431 votes out of the total poll of 28,345,000. Unrepresented in Parliament for more than 30 years of its existence, the Party has never elected more than two MPs at any one time and has not been represented in the House of Commons (there is one Communist Lord) since 1950.

History

The sharp social contradictions of immediate post-war years 1919–20 offered unrepeated opportunities of which the Communist Party was unable to take advantage due to the inability of the quarrelling revolutionary groups to fuse into a single united party.

The fused CPGB of 1920 remained largely social democratic in organization and leadership. The Party did not begin to adopt a Bolshevik form of organization until after accepting the Report of a Party Commission on Organization in October 1922 and was not fully "Bolshevized" until around 1924. The General Strike of 1926 and its immediate aftermath allowed the Party to reach the highest membership (10,730) in the first 15 years of its existence. The end of the General Strike, the subsequent defeat of the coal-miners led to a sharp setback, which was accentuated by the adoption of the "social fascist" Class against Class policy in 1929. This quickly reduced the Party to a skeleton of professional functionaries, thinly clothed by a small transient membership consisting largely of unemployed. In organizing the unemployed, the Party in the 1920s and 1930s gained important success and its methods were subsequently recommended by the Comintern as a model to its other sections. The rise of Hitler, the war in Spain, the Popular Front, allowed the Party to make considerable membership

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advances, notably amongst the middle classes. Thus the social composition of the CPGB changed almost beyond recognition between 1929 and 1936. The about-turn on resistance to fascism, which followed the Nazi Communist Pact of 1939, caused heavy losses in membership. The German invasion of Russia, the switch of national press and radio in favour of the Russian Government which followed, allowed the Party to reach its peak membership of 56,000 in 1942–43. The Party's calls for a Second Front, its strike-breaking, its demands for more production, won it new allies, although amongst different social elements than in either of the previous decades. The end of the war-time honeymoon in international relations, the opening of the Cold War, reduced membership drastically. Following the twentieth congress and the Hungarian Revolution the Party experienced the most severe crisis of its existence and lost the larger part of its remaining intellectuals. Membership fell to 24,000 by 1959. Despite a limited recovery to 30,000 at the present time the Party's influence remains greatly below that of the immediate second world war years.

The Communist Party has never at any time come close to its objective of displacing the Labour Party as the political organization of the working class. In the fourteen General Elections since its foundation the Party has only once (1945, 102,780) exceeded 100,000 votes. In 1964 the 36 candidates all lost their deposit. In 1966 and again in 1970 the Party polled less votes than in 1923. This was partly due to the two-party bias of the British system, but mainly to the Communist Party's total inability to win the electoral support of any large section of the working population. The prosecution of the Communist journalist, J. R. Campbell, and the publication of a (almost certainly forged) Zinoviev letter were contributory causes to the fall of the 1924 Labour Government and its subsequent election defeat, but apart from these incidents the Communist Party's electoral influence has been minimal.

The British Labour Party decides issues by the votes of a majority of affiliated trade unionists and a minority of individual members. Despite repeated endeavours the Communist Party has never been able either to join, or to split, this federal power structure. As a result, cut off from the basic roots of the working class, the Communist Party has never been able to develop a serious rival role of its own.

THE Party's greatest influence on the course of British political life was exercised in the years 1924–27. In mid-1924 the Trades Union Congress dissenting from the rigid anti-communism of the International Federation of Trade Unions—IFTU—opened direct contact with the Russians (who had split the International Trade Union Movement with the Red International Labour Unions—RILU—in 1920). The outcome was an Anglo-Russian (Trade Union) Joint Advisory Committee which seemed for a while to offer the Russians the opportunity to re-enter the

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international trade union movement. This association was valued and utilized by the Russian and British leaders for conflicting ends. The TUC leaders (who had used the pact as a means of disciplining their own Communist opposition) jettisoned the deal in January 1927 when the General Strike and its aftermath were safely over. The onset of the Third Period finally brought to an end all hopes of a reconciliation between the British and Russian trade unions. In the early part of this period the miners, under their leader, A. J. Cook, faced with the coal-owners' demands for cuts in their living standards, responded with the slogan, "Not a penny off the Pay—Not a minute on the day." The resulting dispute brought the general strike of 1926. Cook was not a Communist, nor did the Party control the miners' executive, but there can be no doubt that Communist influence upon A. J. Cook, the militancy of the Party's cadres in the pits, played an important role in the development of the struggle. The Government thought it necessary to arrest twelve key Communist leaders in 1925 in order to limit the Party's effectiveness in the expected dispute the following years.

In these years the communist-led trade union Minority Movement enabled the Party to lay the foundation of much of its subsequent industrial influence. A. J. Cook was elected miners' leader as a Minority Movement candidate. The Minority Movement in the unions however, like the Party-founded National Left Wing, which sought to lead a struggle inside the Labour Party and also achieved considerable influence, was brought to nothing during the ultra-left Third Period which followed.

THE Third Period, by reducing the Party to a mere cadre of its most determined supporters (membership fell to 1,000–2,000 members), laid the basis for the final Stalinization of the Party. As the cadres emerged into the easier atmosphere of the 1930s there grouped around them new converts who knew nothing of the original history of the Comintern and were thus to prove largely immune to the Moscow Trials and the Purges of the 1930s. The Party's most popular leader, Harry Pollitt, became General Secretary and proletarian figurehead of the Party in 1929. The Pollitt-Dutt leadership which emerged set the face of the Party for the next decades.

After the victory of Hitler and the turn of 1935, the Party, whilst never emerging as a challenge to Labour, gained more widespread support, especially amongst the middle classes, than ever before. One contributing cause seems to have been increased financial support from the Russian Government via the Comintern. The Party's anti-fascist record won it strong support amongst sections of the British Jewish population and its support for Republican Spain added to its credit. There can be little doubt that at this time, through its influence on the climate of public opinion, the Party's importance was greater than its 10,000 to 15,000 members suggest. Thus the Left Book Club with Laski, Strachey and Gollancz on the Board of Editors, heavily under Party

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influence, was reaching 50,000 readers a month. Yet with only one MP (W. Gallacher) in a House of over 600, with the TU Labour Alliance intact, the Party was quite unable to emerge as a challenger for power. The leadership nevertheless was able to carry the Party through the Soviet Purge trials, and the GPU activities in Spain, without any difficulties with the membership.

The Party supported the Communist-Nazi, Russo-German Pact of 1939 as a "dramatic move to halt aggression." When Britain declared war, however, the Party, under Pollitt, maintained its former line of resistance to fascism and broke the Comintern front. A few weeks later the line changed and Pollitt was temporarily deposed. As a result the bulk of the intellectuals and others who had been attracted to the Party left as a body, and the sympathizers, Strachey, Gollancz and Laski amongst them, broke away as well. In August 1940 at the height of the Nazi invasion danger the Party mounted a People's Convention to call for a negotiated peace. Once Germany invaded Russia the Communist Party unhesitatingly expressed its support for the "Churchill Government . . . without reservation." Abandoning its former anti-war supporters the Party now experienced the largest expansion in its history doubling its membership with a 25,000 increase in the first quarter of 1942 alone.

In line with this influx of "Red Army Communists" the Party made efforts to Anglicize itself, and after Yalta, became the advocate of a class peace at home after the war to match the international Big Three Alliance. The CPGB called for a "new National (Coalition) Government" to govern after the war. The Labour Party, however, ignored Communist advice and was elected to office in 1945 with a massive majority on a policy of its own. An emergent left-wing opposition was steam-rollered at the Communist Party's 1945 congress.

In the immediate post war years, the Party maintained a stand of critical support for the Labour Government. After the foundation of the Cominform the Party gave greater support to industrial militancy and turned to a strident nationalism and anti-Americanism, in ugly contrast to its alleged socialist beliefs. Greatly influenced by the success of Rakosi-style "salami socialism" in Eastern Europe, the Party in 1951 adopted a new programme, the "British Road to Socialism." This expressly abandoned revolutionary views, and called for a Parliamentary Road to Socialism. The new programme however did not prevent either the continuation of an intensely loyalist attitude to Moscow extending to even the smallest of issues, or a continuing drain of membership. The twentieth congress and Hungarian Revolution produced a fundamental revulsion and the Party experienced the most serious crisis in its history. Pressure from below forced a special congress in April 1956 at which the leadership emerged triumphant. The result was widespread disillusionment, both within and outside the Party ranks and a great exodus of members, amongst whom were some of the best-known intellectual figures.

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INSIDE the unions, the Communist Party made important gains during the war, on the basis of its support for the government, the union's official leadership, and its patriotic appeals. Inside a number of the largest unions in transport, electricity and engineering, the Party became very influential. The changed pattern of the post-war years and the Party's attacks on its former allies, led to a steady erosion of support. The expulsion of the communist-led Electrical Trades Union from the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party in 1961, followed allegations of ballot forging against its leaders. Their subsequent removal from office lost the Party the sole large union remaining under its control.

At the present time the Party occupies something of a middle ground in the international communist movement, essentially loyal to the Russian Soviet position but critical of certain aspects of Russian policy, for example the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Amongst the pro-Russian minority on this issue is the now retired Party leader Palme Dutt. A small pro-Chinese group has split from the Party and within the unions faction struggles between "Russian" and "Chinese" communists are on foot. In its present situation the Party's hopes for significant advances, even with a Conservative Government in office, are unlikely to be fulfilled. The decision to change the working class title of the Party's *Daily Worker* to the politically neutral *Morning Star* is an indication of the crisis with which it is faced.

The Party is surrounded by the usual constellation of front organizations, none of which exercise great influence, often because, as in the case of the World Peace Council, the field has already been preempted by other organizations more genuinely concerned about the issues involved.

Comintern, Cominform and Moscow Leadership

The dominant role played by the Comintern in the CPGB foundation ensured its subsequent ultra-loyalist record. The power of the Bell, Macmanus, Murphy grouping was steadily eroded in the years after the adoption of the Party Commission Report in October 1922. The whole Executive Committee was called to Moscow in June 1923 to discuss differences regarding its implementation and newer members such as Pollitt and Dutt were advanced closer to the centres of power although the old leadership was not yet displaced. The Party's only serious crisis of leadership arose in 1929 when those reluctant to accept the greater insanities of the Third Period were displaced. In a clean sweep of the old top leadership only Murphy temporarily survived and the Pollitt-Dutt partnership which was to control the Party's destiny for the next thirty years was enthroned in its place. The new leadership conducted the about-turn towards the Popular Front in 1934–35, without a tremor. It failed to protest at the execution of its former Comintern adviser, Petrovsky, or at the disappearance of his English-born wife, Rose Cohen, during the purges. Nor did it offer a protest at the fate of Borodin after the war. The release from imprisonment in Vorkuta of the sailor, Len

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Wincott, who led the Invergordon naval mutiny of 1931 and later joined the Communist Party was accomplished by non-communist protests and not by the action of the Party he had joined.

The Party's support for the war against Hitler in 1939 is said to have been reversed by the arrival of Dave Springhall, bringing the Comintern line from Moscow. Yet even in this case Pollitt's demotion proved only temporary. After an appropriate recantation he was quietly restored to office to dominate the Political Committee for some forty years, and only passed from the scene with retirement, for reasons of age, in the 1960s.

Trotskyist groups which were formed in the early 1930s and gained numerous recruits from the Party after 1956, have proved unable either to hold them or to emerge as an alternative. The British Party in short has never grown beyond the limits of a bureaucratically-dominated sect. As a result the Party has remained insulated from the great debates over such issues as unilateralism which caused serious tensions in the mass organizations of the British Labour Movement. The Party is small enough to be able to lose one set of membership, opposed to the change of line, on each turn, and to pick up others who support it at the same time. Whilst it retains hidden financial resources to maintain an artificially-inflated bureaucracy and party press the Party can continue to manipulate this transient-member membership around its basic cadre indefinitely. Equally, there is no reason to believe that it can break out of its isolation. This last judgment is supported by the growth of mass radical movements like that against the nuclear deterrent and the war in Vietnam, both of which mustered most of their supporters outside the Communist Party's ranks and largely beyond its influence.

In words at least, since 1951, the Party has accepted a peaceful and democratic road to socialism. In this the British Party seems to have received the direct encouragement of Joseph Stalin, who is reported by Djilas as expressing the view that "Today socialism is possible even under the English monarchy. Revolution is no longer necessary everywhere.... Yes, socialism is possible even under an English King." The emergence of Russia as a world power has diminished the importance of the British Party as a defender of the Russian state. Stalin's rule and the experiences of Eastern Europe as a whole have shattered the idealized reputation of the Soviet state. In such circumstances it is not at all clear what genuine role there is left for the Communist Party to perform in British political life.

Alliances, Fronts, Unity

Since its foundation the Communist Party has traversed a wide range of positions in regard to cooperation with other organizations. During its first two years of existence the Party was often anti-Labour and at times the statements of some of its leaders were frankly anti-parliamentarian. In the years from 1922 onwards it pursued a united front policy towards the Labour Party. Originally an attempt at a united

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front from above, this later became an endeavour to consummate a united front from below. As, particularly after the General Strike of 1926, individual communists lost positions previously held in the Labour Party, this shaded into a position of increasing hostility. As a result of the ninth and tenth Plenums and the sixth world congress of the Communist International, the British Party following a change of leadership switched to denouncing trade unions and the Labour Party as capitalist and fascist organizations with which no cooperation was possible. Following the Nazi conquest of power and the seventh congress of the Comintern in 1935, the CPGB abandoned its "social-fascist" policy, going so far as to withdraw all but two of its parliamentary candidates, to make way for Labour representatives in the election of 1935. In the years that followed the communists reached out for an alliance that went beyond Labour to encompass also the Liberal and Conservative Parties and especially the professional middle class. In 1944–45 this process went so far as to lead the Communists to oppose the slogan of a Labour Government after the war and to call instead for a continuation of the Conservative-Liberal-Labour alliance. The Communist Party reverted to a position of "ourselves alone" after 1947 and in the General Election of 1950 ran a larger number of candidates than ever before (100). In later years, through the 1950s and 1960s, the main communist line has been to call for the election of a Labour Government with communist support. Thus the draft resolution submitted to the 1970 Congress called the members: "To win a Labour Government with new socialist policies... (which)... requires the breaking of the right wing political group, a new leadership, and a continuous mass movement of pressure to ensure socialist policies are carried through."

In terms of alliances with other bodies the Communist Party has succeeded best when able to tap grass roots feelings amongst the most backward elements of the working class. In recent years the political issue on which the Communist Party has exercised most influence has been against British entry to the European Economic Community. On this an alliance was created which extended from wide sections of the Labour Party and the trade unions, through nationalistically-minded Conservatives and Liberals as far as the expressedly fascist National Front. In general, however, the Communist Party has not succeeded well in this field. The most widely successful national movement in recent years, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, was mounted without communist participation and in face of their opposition. (The *Daily Worker* was the only British national daily to welcome warmly the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima in 1945.) In later years, in communist eyes, the Russian bomb was good, only the American bomb bad. The movement against the war in Vietnam was led to an important degree by the Vietnam Solidarity Committee in which Trotskyists of multitudinous hues and descriptions, rather than the Communist Party, provided the leading force.

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Trade Unions

The decisive feature of the British trade union situation is that communist endeavours to split the mass labour movement have never met with any marked success. As a result 10,000,000 British labour unionists are grouped in a single national centre, the Trades Union Congress—TUC. Some 5,500,000 of the 11,000,000 trade unionists are affiliated members of the Labour Party. British union rules, with only one or two minor exceptions, do not contain clauses forbidding Communist Party members to hold office. Despite this open procedure communist influence is limited. The number of shop stewards exceeds 200,000. It is doubtful if even one per cent of these are Communist Party members. The Communist Party controls no major national union. The swing to the left in recent years has elevated left-wing Labour men (Frank Cousins, Jack Jones in the TGWU, Hugh Scanlon, Bob Wright, AUEW, Lawrence Daly, NUM) rather than Communist Party members to office. The Communist Party in the unions mainly relies upon an ageing cadre recruited in the 1930s and 1940s. Replacement of these individuals is likely to prove exceedingly difficult in the years to come. All this is not to say that within the unions communists do not frequently appear as spokesmen of movements of "money wage militancy." In this, however, they largely articulate a pre-existing mood of discontent rather than add any particularly important flavour to the nascent agitation.

Communists exercise an influence of some importance within the metal workers (AUEW), amongst the miners (NUM) notably in the declining coal fields of Scotland and South Wales, and to a limited extent in the building industry. In the ports, contrary to a widespread impression, communist influence is not at all great.

The recent wave of "sit downs" and "work ins," of which over fifty were reported during the first six months of 1972 alone, do not seem to have been connected with any particular sect or tendency. They seem rather to reflect a changed mood at the base, a mood probably best articulated by the Institute for Workers Control and the rank and file journal *Voice of the Unions*. The Upper Clyde shipbuilders (UCS) "work in" where James Reid, a former member of the CPGB Political Committee played a leading role, needs to be understood more in the particular context of Scotland's chronic unemployment problem, Scottish nationalism, a declining shipbuilding industry, and discontent with a Conservative Government, than in any particular renewal of Communist Party influence in Scotland, or in shipbuilding as a whole.

In the efflorescence of somewhat mindless violence which has characterized certain elements of the "left" in the last half decade the Communist Party has played no part. A tiny group of Scots nationalist "revolutionaries" who conducted badly bungled bank robberies in Glasgow during 1971–72 were, to the extent that their ideas had meaning at all, dissident "Maoists" rather than members of the CPGB. "Punch-

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ups" with the police which characterized some Vietnam demonstrations were the work of Trotskyist fringe groups rather than members of the CPGB.

In terms of political outlook and behaviour the CPGB is to be understood in socialist terms as an ageing, conservative and bureaucratic force. It retains political significance largely due to its special relationship with the Russian Government. Were the Party dependent for existence on members' subscriptions it would have vanished long ago.

Electoral Performance

The Communist Party of Great Britain has contested fourteen general elections since its foundation in 1920. Six of these elections took place in the years before the second world war, eight in the years after the second world war. Essential details of the electoral performance on each occasion are given in the table which follows. In each case the Labour vote and number of Labour candidates is given for purposes of comparison.

A number of important features are immediately obvious. First: the Communist Party has never been an important electoral force in Britain. Second: inasmuch as the Party enjoyed any success, it was in electoral terms more important before the second world war, than in the years that followed. Third: that in the years since 1950 the Party's electoral performance has shown a steady and close to catastrophic decline. Fourth: the Communist Party in Great Britain was able to muster only 38,000 votes in the election of 1970, as against 52,000 in the election of 1922, the average vote per candidate declined from 7,520 to 660, whilst the electoral performance of the Labour Party which the Communist Party set out to replace improved enormously over the same period. In 1922, the Labour Party polled 4,241,000 votes with 411 candidates. In 1970 the Labour Party polled 12,180,000 votes with 624 candidates.

At the present time it would seem to be incorrect to speak of the existence of a Communist vote in any serious sense. What exists is only a "protest vote" of the same order as that which could be reasonably expected by a "freak" candidate in any constituency at a General Election or by-election. By comparison the vote polled by Welsh and Scottish Nationalists is higher and far more consistent. To quote but two examples: the Communist Party fought Llanelly, a mining seat in South Wales, in 1966 and 1970, in each case with the same candidate. In the 1970 election the order of poll was Labour 31,398, Plaid Cymru (Welsh Nationalist) 8,387, Conservative 5,777, Liberal 3,834 and Communist 603.

The Communist Party has fought the Glasgow Gorbals constituency, a working-class stronghold, in every election since 1950 (1950, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1964, 1966, 1970). In 1970 the order of poll was Labour 10,260, Conservative 3,071, Scottish Nationalist 1,087, Communist 376.

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This decline in electoral performance is the more remarkable in that in the years since 1945 and more particularly since 1955 the Communist Party has paid far more attention to fighting seats consistently and building up electoral organization within them than ever before. A study of the twelve seats fought most consistently by the Party over the period 1945–70 (five in Scotland, one in Wales, four in Greater London and two elsewhere in England) shows a very large fall observed in each case. In 1945 the Party fought four seats, won two, and came close to winning two more. The collective vote for the four seats fought in 1945 totalled 48,530; by 1970 the vote polled for 12 seats had fallen to only 3,606.

The Communist Party is thus not an electoral force of any importance on the British scene. In the years since the Party's foundation the communist vote has diminished considerably, whilst over the same years that of the Labour Party has increased enormously. Since 1950 the communist vote has shown a steady decline. The probability is that this decline is irreversible.

Parliamentary Representation

In the fifty years since its foundation the CPGB has won five seats in the House of Commons. The Party's first Parliamentary representative, Colonel L'Estrange Malone, was a Conservative MP and war hero who transferred his allegiance to the CPGB after a visit to Russia in 1920. Malone, who was for a time a member of the Central Committee, resigned from the Party in 1922.

J. T. Walton Newbold, a member of the Independent Labour Party, won the Motherwell seat (Scotland) in the general election of 1918. Newbold was one of a small section of the ILP which split off to join the CPGB in 1921. Newbold fought and held Motherwell as a Communist but with Labour Party support in the election of 1922. As a Communist MP he was co-opted to the Executive of the Communist International. Newbold lost the seat in the General Election of 1923 and left the Party in 1924.

S. Saklatvala, a member of the Tata family of Indian industrialists, left the ILP in 1921 at the same time as Newbold and joined the CPGB. Saklatvala, although a member of the CPGB, fought and won the Battersea North (London) constituency in the General Election of 1922 as a Labour Party candidate with official Labour endorsement. Saklatvala lost the seat to a Liberal, by a narrow 200-vote majority in a two-way fight the following year, 1923. In the General Election of 1924, Saklatvala regained the seat, this time as a Communist, but in a two-way fight, without official Labour opposition. Saklatvala continued to hold Battersea North until the General Election of 1929, when the Conservatives captured the seat on a split Labour-Communist vote. On this occasion the official Labour Candidate polled 11,985 votes as against 3,021 for Saklatvala the sitting member.

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In the General Election of 1935, William Gallacher, a former syndicalist, contested and won a seat for the Communist Party in the constituency of West Fife. Gallacher fought and held the seat at the next General Election in 1945, only to lose it at the subsequent poll in 1950. The communists have never come close to winning the seat since that time. The original victory seems to have been more due to intense internal conflicts in the miners' union in the 1920s and 1930s than to any other factor.

In the General Election of 1945, Philip Piratin, subsequently a Party apparatchik, won the Mile End constituency in London against Labour and Conservative opposition. This was a seat with a heavy Jewish vote, denuded of population by bombing and evacuation (the total poll was less than 10,000). The constituency boundaries with many others were subsequently redrawn. Piratin lost the seat in the General Election of 1950.

In the years since 1945, the Communist Party has fought 296 constituencies in General Elections (as against 98 in the years 1920–45) without winning a single seat. In the 1974 general election on February 28, the Communist Party put forward 43 candidates with little more hope for an electoral success than on previous occasions.

There is one Communist (Lord Milford) who sits in the House of Lords.

	Communist Party			Labour Party		
Year	Candidates	Vote	Average Vote	Candidates	Vote	Average Vote
1922	7	52,639	7,520	411	4,241,383	10,320
1923	9	76,741	8,550	422	4,438,508	10,518
1924	8	55,355	6,920	512	5,489,077	10,721
1929	25	50,614	2,020	571	8,389,512	14,693
1931	26	74,824	2,880	515	6,649,630	12,912
1935	2	27,117	13,560	552	8,325,491	15,082
1945	21	102,780	4,890	604	11,995,152	19,860
1950	100	91,746	917	617	13,266,592	21,502
1951	10	21,640	2,160	617	13,948,605	22,607
1955	17	33,144	1,950	620	12,404,970	20,008
1959	18	30,897	1,720	621	12,215,538	19,671
1964	36	45,932	1,280	628	12,205,814	19,436
1966	57	62,112	1,090	621	13,064,951	21,039
1970	58	38,431	660	624	12,179,166	19,518

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Communist Party of Great Britain Congresses 1920–71

1920	July	First (Unity) Congress	London (City)
1921	January	Second „ „	Leeds
1921	April	Third (Rules)	Manchester
1922	March	Fourth (Policy)	London (St. Pancras)
1922	October	Fifth	London (Battersea)
1924	May	6th	Manchester
1925	May	7th	Glasgow
1926	October	8th	London (Battersea)
1927	October	9th	Salford
1929	January	10th	London (Battersea)
1929	November	11th	Leeds
1932	November	12th	London (Battersea)
1935	February	13th	Manchester
1937	May	14th	London (Battersea)
1938	September	15th	Birmingham
1943	July	16th	London (City)
1944	October	17th	Birmingham
1945	November	18th	London (Marylebone)
1947	February	19th	„ „
1948	February	20th	„ „
1949	November	21st	Liverpool
1952	April	22nd	London (Battersea)
1954	April	23rd	„ „
1956	April	24th	„ „
1957	April	25th (Special)	„ (Hammersmith)
1959	March	26th	„ (St. Pancras)
1961	April	27th	„ „
1963	April	28th	„ „
1965	November	29th	„ (Camden Town)
1967	November	30th	„ „
1969	November	31st	„ „
1971	November	32nd	„ „

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Totalitarianism, Democracy and the British Labour Movement before 1917

James D. Young

> "'*Hundreds of brave men and women who helped to make broad the highway of freedom which we now tread—their names shall never more be known.' True, most true if you Bruce (Glasier) are to be the chosen historian of the movement.*"
>
> Andreas Scheu

> "*The voice of the poor themselves does not come to our ears.*"
>
> John and Barbara Hammond

> "*What is the prevailing spirit of modern literature? To defame men of letters. What are the publications that succeed? Those that pretend to teach the public that the persons they have been accustomed unwittingly to look up to as the lights of the earth are no better than themselves, or a set of vagabonds, miscreants that should be hunted out of society. Hence men of letters, losing their self-respect, become government tools, and prostitute their talents to the most infamous purposes, or turn dandy scribblers, and set up for gentlemen authors in their own defence.*"
>
> William Hazlitt

> "*The idea that outstanding political acts and state actions are the decisive acts in history is as old as written history itself, and is the main reason why so little material has been preserved in regard to the really progressive evolution of the peoples which has taken place quietly in the background behind these noisy scenes of the stage.*"
>
> F. Engels

IN contemporary historiography as well as in the hagiography of the labour movement there is a recurring assertion that pre-1917 European social democracy was profoundly democratic.[1] But in practice it was simultaneously democratic and anti-democratic.[2] Modern labour historio-

[1] P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburgh* (London, 1969), p. 1. Nettl seemed to have some doubts about the mythology of the profoundly democratic nature of pre-1917 European social democracy. Lewis Coser in his introduction to a new edition of A. Bebel's classic *Women under Socialism* (New York, 1971), p. xiii.

[2] As a socially sensitive and perceptive socialist put it: "Capitalist industrial society tends to encompass the whole of the world, fashioning all aspects of life to its design. Consequently, ever since the beginning of the twentieth century, Marxism has aimed to renew and transform everything: the property system, the organization of work, the map of the world (through the abolition of frontiers), and even the

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graphy is still trapped in the self-images of middle-class activists who made the labour movement, and this has led otherwise astute and perceptive historians to commit themselves to what are really contradictory assessments of particular labour movements. For example, in his brilliant study of German social democracy down to 1917, Carl E. Schorske contrasted Lenin's dictatorial, elitist concepts of party organization with "the traditional ultra-democratism of the German left" [3]; and yet he also recognized that the same German left believed that "with historical conditions as their goad and the Party as their teacher the proletarian masses as a whole would shatter the old, irrational social order." [4]

Moreover, it is now a part of the orthodoxy of contemporary historiography that Lenin's concept of the "vanguard Party" giving direction to the class struggle was implicitly anti-democratic and even potentially totalitarian.[5] Such a conception of the role of socialist parties within the industrial societies of Western Europe had, in fact, been developed and carefully formulated by Karl Kautsky, H. M. Hyndman and many others before Lenin evolved his ideas on the subject. By comparison with Karl Marx's conception of how capitalism might be replaced by socialism, Kautsky and Hyndman were anti-democratic in the sense that they repudiated Marx's thesis that "the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves." [6]

A more consistent democrat than Frederick Engels,[7] a thinker who always tended to adopt authoritarian postures when he found himself in difficult circumstances, Marx never abandoned his conviction that socialism had to be a movement of the vast majority of working people. Engels, under the influence of Marx, became a democrat from about 1846; yet he often felt pulled in authoritarian directions in later years. For Marx the indispensable pre-conditions of socialism were industrialization and "a mass communist consciousness." In 1846 Marx and Engels explained why such a transformation of working class consciousness was necessary before socialism could be effectively established:

> Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the *alteration of men on a mass scale* is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrow-

inner life of man (through the extinction of the religious mode of thought). Aspiring to a total transformation, it has consequently been, in the etymological sense of the word, totalitarian. It presents the two faces of the ascendant society, simultaneously democratic and authoritarian." Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary 1901–1941* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 133–34.

[3] C. E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy 1905–1917* (Harvard, 1955), p. 326.

[4] Ibid. p. 323.

[5] Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York), p. 259.

[6] Provisional Rules of the International Working Men's Association, drafted by Marx and adopted 1 Nov. 1864.

[7] Hal Draper, "The two souls of socialism," *Anvil* (July 1957).

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> ing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of the ages and become fitted to found society anew.[8]

A few years later Marx reiterated the view that the workers had to transform themselves: "You must go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of war and civil war, not only to alter existing conditions but to alter yourselves and make yourselves fit to take over political power."[9] As pre-1917 European social democracy increasingly, if unintentionally, helped to integrate the workers into the existing social order, socialists began to despair of the emergence of a mass socialist consciousness and contributed to the process which stifled it.

As Kautsky saw the problem, the transition to socialism pre-supposed "intelligence, discipline and a talent for organisation."[10] Like Marx and Engels, Kautsky and Hyndman saw capitalism as historically progressive because (a) it conjured up the possibility of material abundance and (b) created an organized and disciplined working class.[11] Since capitalism, in Kautsky's view, automatically widened the workers' "horizons beyond the boundaries of the workshop and the church door," many socialists regarded the existence of an industrial society as a vital pre-condition for a socialist society.

A profound, though sub-conscious and half-hidden, duality in pre-1917 European social democracy was that between voluntarism and determinism. The contradictory commitment to voluntarism and determinism existed within the same individuals as well as within the same European social democratic movements. Nevertheless a consistent theme of the European social democrats was the important and indispensable role of industrialism in transforming a pre-industrial labour force into a modern proletariat. The classic statement was formulated by Engels in his study of the *Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, where he wrote:

> But intellectually, they were dead; lived only for their petty, private interest, for their looms and gardens, and knew nothing of the mighty movement which, beyond their horizon, was sweeping through mankind. They were comfortable in their silent vegetation, and but for *the industrial revolution they would never have emerged from this existence*, which, cosily romantic as it was, was nevertheless not worthy of human beings. In truth, they were not human beings; they were merely toiling machines in the service of the few aristocrats who had guided history down to that time.[12]

[8] K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology* (London, 1942), p. 69.
[9] Bertram D. Wolfe, *Marxism: 100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (London, 1967), p. 159.
[10] K. Kautsky, *The Social Revolution* (Chicago, 1902), pp. 184–85.
[11] "Nevertheless it is incomparably easier to transform this bureaucratic collection, detestable as it is, into the democratic socialism of an educated, free and self-disciplined people, than to do the like at the earlier stages of competitive, or monopolist, capitalism." H. M. Hyndman, *Justice*, 5 April 1917.
[12] F. Engels, *Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844* (London, 1892), pp. 3–4. My emphasis.

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There were, of course, differences as well as similarities between British and German social democracy during the classic period and these were alluded to by J. Hunter Watts in an article he wrote for *Justice*, the organ of the Social Democratic Federation [13]:

> The German socialist party has incorporated in its ranks all the forces of discontent with military feudalism, as well as those of discontent with industrial feudalism or capitalism. It is no exaggeration to say that at least fifty per cent of its members became socialists after they joined the Party, whereas in this country we are still jealous of anyone who cannot utter the Party shibboleths.[14]

The leading spokesman of European social democracy shared the assumptions of Marx and Engels about the indispensable role of industrialism in forging a class-conscious working class; yet, in spite of the theoretical disagreements between different European socialist leaders, a thread unifying their anti-democratic elitism was their explicit repudiation of Marx's concept that the emancipation of the working classes had to be achieved by the workers themselves.[15]

Karl Kautsky challenged Marx's most fundamental, democratic concept of how socialism could be accomplished when, in the early twentieth century, he wrote:

> Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed, modern economic science is as much a condition for socialist production, as, say, modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other, no matter how much it may desire to do so; but both arise out of the modern social process. The vehicles of science are not the proletariat, but the bourgeois-intelligentsia: it was *out of the heads* of this stratum that *modern socialism originated*, and it was they who communicated it to the more intellectual-developed proletarians who, in their turn introduce it into the proletarian class struggle where *conditions allow* that to be done. Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without, and not something that arose within it spontaneously. Accordingly, the old (Austrian) Hainfeld program quite rightly stated that the task of social democracy is to imbue the proletariat with the consciousness of its position and the consciousness of its tasks. There would be no need for this if consciousness emerged from the class struggle.[16]

A mass socialist consciousness developing in a "practical movement,"

[13] Hereafter referred to as the SDF.

[14] J. Hunter Watts, "In the Prison of Our Own Past," *Justice*, 19 July 1913.

[15] In April 1879 Marx and Engels wrote in criticism of the German social democrats: "On founding the International, we expressly formulated the battle cry: the liberation of the working classes must be the work of the working class itself. We consequently cannot go hand in hand with people who openly declare that the workers are too uneducated to liberate themselves, and must be liberated from above at the hands of the philanthropic big and petty bourgeois." Quoted in A. Lazovsky, *Marx and the Trade Unions* (London, 1935), p. 169.

[16] Quoted in Max Shachtman, *The Bureaucratic Revolution* (New York, 1962), p. 212. Author's emphasis.

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leading to "the alteration of man on a mass scale," had been replaced by a new emphasis on the decisive role of the "vanguard" party.

Moreover, in a country with a mass movement nominally committed to Marxism, it was much easier for Kautsky and the German social democrats than for Hyndman and the SDF to derive optimism from the promised collapse of capitalism. A detailed study of the socialist "movement" in Britain will illustrate how socialists, whether they belonged to the SDF, the Fabian Society, the Socialist League or the Independent Labour Party, alienated themselves from the working classes and helped to integrate these groups into the existing capitalist system.

NEVERTHELESS many British socialists believed in the ultimate collapse of West European capitalism,[17] and, in 1889, J. Hunter Watts predicted that the existing social and economic system "would die of self-immolat(ion)."[18] There was, however, a working class hostility to socialist ideas. This led Harry Quelch, an exceptionally talented and "intellectual-developed proletarian member" of the SDF to argue that the British workers were "most backward in contrast to elsewhere in Europe."[19] Such pessimism, together with the importance they already attached to "bourgeois" science and raising the general cultural level of the working classes, increasingly led socialists into an elitist posture.

Appalled by the illiteracy and ignorance of the working classes and profoundly convinced of the utility of science and education, H. M. Hyndman wrote: "Nowhere more than in England do we need the help of the class which has absorbed all the higher education."[20] Then, in an editorial entitled "Ignorance and Education," *Justice* put the socialist case for more and better education and criticised those Establishment elements who were opposed to educating the working classes: "No doubt they think that if the 'lower orders' were educated they would not be such subservient slaves as they are today. Well, we are inclined to agree with them, and it is precisely the reason why we want better education."[21] This commitment to raise the cultural level of the workers was quite compatible with the elitist outlook of most socialists. Working class cadres were just as elitist as their middle class counterparts and were, in their own estimation, culturally superior.

A decisive circumstance in deepening the socialists initial elitism and hostility to working people was their complete isolation from the mainstream of working class social life.[22] From 1883, when the SDF became

[17] H. M. Hyndman, *Economics of Socialism* (London, 1896), pp. 246–47.
[18] J. Hunter Watts, "Signs of the Times," *Justice*, 13 Aug. 1889.
[19] H. Quelch, "Social Democracy and Trade Unionism," ibid. 22 May 1897.
[20] Ibid. 11 Mar. 1905.
[21] Ibid. 11 Mar. 1905.
[22] "In sum the Socialist parties as they developed their institutions from the 1890s onwards could absorb much of the energy and much of the leisure time of the workers, who, for whatever reason, felt alone in a hostile world. This was

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committed to socialist principles,[23] down to 1917 almost all the members of the SDF adopted an elitist position which was out of alignment with Marx's fundamental thesis that the workers had to emancipate themselves. The members of the SDF broadly identified themselves with Marxism; but they also separated themselves from some of the basic assumptions Marx repeatedly expounded about the complex relationship between politics, education and economics. Hyndman wrote: "That, as Marx said, the emancipation of the workers must be brought about by the workers themselves is true in the sense that we cannot have socialism without socialists. But a slave class cannot be freed by the slaves themselves. The leadership, the initiative, the teaching, the organisation, must come from those who are born into a different position, and are trained to use their faculties in early life." [24]

For the SDF the relationship between the innate laws of history which would ultimately create the supreme revolutionary moment and the political role of their cadres was complementary and not dichotomous.[25] Democracy and authoritarianism, like voluntarism and determinism, existed within the same individuals. In 1885 the British working classes were being gradually "stampede(d) towards socialism" and "a compact minority" of revolutionary socialists were waiting to "take advantage of some *opportune accident* that will surely come." [26] From this perspective "the bourgeois intelligentsia" and "the more intellectual-developed proletarians" had an indispensable role to play in creating a class-conscious working class.[27] In the face of formidable difficulties and mass working class apathy, if not hostility, to elitist socialists and often socialism, too, the social democrats held firmly to the concept of the vital role their compact minority would play in

undoubtedly one of their chief attractions but it may also have curtailed the revolutionary fervour of potentially radical workers. Busy in his separate Socialist society the worker could to an extent ignore the larger environment. In fact the separate Socialist society helped integrate many workers into the industrial world in a variety of ways. It encouraged literacy and acquaintance not just with Socialist work but with the traditional culture as well." Peter N. Sterns in Harvey Mitchell and Peter N. Sterns, *The European Labor Movement, the Working Classes and the Origins of Social Democracy 1890–1914* (Itasea, Illinois, 1971), p. 207. For collaboration of some of these points for a later period of European social democracy, see Joseph Buttinger, *In the Twilight of Socialism* (New York, 1953), pp. 533–535.

23 H. Pelling, *Origins of the Labour Party* (Oxford, 1966), p. 21.

24 H. M. Hyndman, *The Record of an Adventurous Life* (London, 1911), p. 432.

25 There is no historical evidence for Irving Howe's view that there was no conflict in pre-1917 European social democracy between voluntarism and their acquiescence "in the status quo by ceding socialism to the automatic laws of history." I. Howe, "Sweet and Sour Notes: On Workers and Intellectuals," *Dissent* (Winter 1972), p. 265.

26 A. P. Hazell, "Social Degradation of the Worker," *Justice*, 11 July 1885. Author's emphasis.

27 Professor Hobsbawm is in the SDF tradition when he says: "It is not the working class itself which takes power and exercises hegemony, but the working-class *movement* or *party*, and (short of taking an anarchist view) it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise." E. J. Hobsbawm, "Class Consciousness in History," *Aspects of History and Class Consciousness*, ed. Istvan Meszaros (London, 1971), p. 17. Emphasis in original.

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making the socialist revolution when the time arrived for decisive action. As working class hostility towards socialism was intensified, the socialists, whatever their political tendency, persisted for nearly four decades in prosecuting their original approaches to the working classes.[28] Everything that socialists valued most—knowledge, learning, culture and *dignified* protest—was ignored and dismissed by many working people. For example, a semi-literate worker in Glasgow, who wrote to the secretary of the Socialist League in London in 1886, mentioned in passing that socialism, though discussed by working people, was often "a butt for ridicule."[29] When asked what would happen to the workers under socialism, a rather didactic, though idealistic, member of the SDF who was *lecturing* his fellow artisans on the need for a socialist society, replied. "When we get socialism there won't be any people like us, we shall *all* be civilised."[30] Alongside what was only a slightly repressed hatred of the working class as it actually existed, socialists in the SDF, the Socialist League, the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour Party soon discovered a strong, if not always acknowledged, emotional identity with the educated elements of the middle class.[31] Then a vast growth of middle class sympathy for some socialist ideas in the 1890s[32] made most British socialists increasingly sensitive to the possibility of the riotous unemployed and striking workers alienating middle class public opinion.

Moreover, if the working classes were "cussed"[33] and indifferent to their atrocious conditions and fate, this could not be said of the leaders of the middle classes. The latter were fighting for improved working class social conditions and were displaying sympathy for socialism as they understood it. Since patience was a cardinal virtue in

[28] "Economic forms, I repeat, are ready. Intelligence and class discipline are lacking." H. M. Hyndman, "The Need for a British Republic," *Justice*, 5 Apr. 1917.

[29] *Socialist League Archives*, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.

[30] Robert Tresall, *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists* (Harmondsworth, 1941), p. 235. Emphasis in original, Tresall, who wrote the classic British proletarian novel, was a house-painter who had a touch of genius. *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists* was first published in 1914, three years after Tresall (variously spelt Tressall or Tressell) died in Liverpool. His real name was Robert Noonan. An active member of the SDF, he died in great poverty and illness. For biographical details, see F. C. Ball, *Tressell of Mugsborough* (London, 1951) and Raymond Postgate, *The Builders History* (London, 1923). But when Postgate argued that the workers, with their 'ineradical stupidity and servility," greeted Tresall with "stones and jeers," he was not aware of the elitist, anti-working class attitudes of the pre-1917 socialists.

[31] "I have often thanked my stars or my forebears that I was not born a working man. Very likely if I had been I should have grown up just such another as the majority of my 'intelligent' working men countrymen around me. I have no delusions on that head." H. M. Hyndman, "Trade Unions and Progress," *Justice*, 8 Sept. 1900. For similar attitudes, see the *Diaries of Beatrice Webb*.

[32] F. Engels, op. cit. xviii.

[33] "The workers, generally, display the same cussedness in regard to every agitation that could be used by them to advance their interests. It does not matter whether it is against slums, against rack-renting by house farmers, or against the prostitution of young females of their class, they let the opportunity go by. They don't even seem to care to do a little bleating." A. P. Hazell, "The Cussedness of Working Men," *Justice*, 21 Apr. 1888.

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the individual cadres who made up the compact minority,[34] their resolution was of prime importance. As early as 1888 their commitment to wait for the "opportune accident" that would destroy capitalism had been stiffened by their belief that socialist ideas had "permeated the thought of the age."[35] Such reformism and palliatives as the agitation for effective compulsory education and a legal eight-hour day were not therefore ends in themselves[36]; they were the primary means of raising the cultural level and class consciousness of the working classes.[37] Besides, in a society where the working classes were seemingly so indifferent to the things the social democrats regarded as important, and where trade unionism and socialism were often associated in the popular mind[38] with incendiarism and bloody revolution, the social democrats considered it necessary to project a collective image of responsible, if not actually licensed, protest and revolt.

THE young Engels was the first "Marxist" to criticize the workers' intemperance, improvidence, sexual licence and "general inability to sacrifice the pleasure of the moment to a remoter advantage."[39] Nevertheless he praised and identified with "the humanity of the workers," who, having experienced "hard times themselves," were friendly and able to "feel for those in trouble."[40] A similar theme runs through Marx's *Capital*.[41] Far from seeking "reformist" socialism to integrate the workers into the existing social system, Marx and Engels wanted an independently educated and class conscious working class

34 "But the sad truth is that if we would make haste we must make haste slowly, and there is as great heroism in going on from day to day unceasingly, untiringly sapping and mining the citadel of capitalism till it totters to its fall, as in facing bayonets which protect the enemies' outworks. Those who have been longest in the socialist movement know that the highest praise we can award a comrade is this: 'He goes on; he goes on!'" J. Hunter Watts, "Political Arena," ibid. 12 Apr. 1890.

35 Herbert Burrows, "Without Haste—Without Rest," ibid. 29 Sept. 1888.

36 "As a palliative social democrats know very well that were eight hours to be adopted in the mines, it would not be the means of absorbing the unemployed." William Small, "The Miners' Eight Hour Bill," ibid. 22 May 1897. Small, an educated man of middle class origin, gave up his business to become a miners' trade union official.

37 Dr Henry Collins correctly challenged the Webbs' view that the SDF dismissed trade unionism as "a mere 'palliative' of the capitalist system." H. Collins, "The Marxism of the Social Democratic Federation," *Essays in Labour History*, ed. Asa Briggs and John Saville (London, 1971), p. 57. Yet he did not perceive the enormous importance the SDF attached to the creation of an academically educated working class. For the SDF, the existence of an educated working class was the only guarantee of effective democracy once they had attained political power.

38 "William Nairne (a stone mason who was the leader of the SDF in Glasgow) conveyed such an impression of integrity that he was taken to task by a Glasgow policeman, hailing, like Willie from the north country, as to why he, a respectable man, should consort with a lot of Fenians." James Leatham, *Glasgow in the Limelight* (Turiff, n.d.), p. 78.

39 Engels, op. cit. pp. 128–29.

40 Ibid. p. 125.

41 James D. Young, "Karl Marx: Moralist, Reformist, Utopian," *New Politics*, Vol. X, No. 1 (1972).

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who would "*conquer the brutal element of the revolution* and prevent a 'Ninth Thermidor.'" [42] Victims of their own middle class and/or elitist prejudices, and lacking the conviction of Marx and Engels that working people could sometimes "feel for those in trouble," the SDF consistently worked to create an academically educated elite of proletarian cadres. They also systematically proceeded to criticize almost every aspect of working class life.

Socialist criticism of working class life and behaviour was not only abstract; it was also part of a living struggle between conflicting social and moral values. Already remote from the mass of the workers in the 1880s, socialists were still further alienated from working class social life in the period down to 1917 by their repeated contempt for working class life and sub-cultures. But since vast numbers of working people, who were sometimes opposed or indifferent to socialism, were less literate and articulate than their adversaries, we know much less about them and must therefore depend on evidence which is oblique and diffuse.

But if SDF criticism of working people was concrete as well as abstract, a major source of their blistering criticism was the assumption that the workers had little enthusiasm for reforms. Moreover, SDF and Fabian contempt for working people was a motif of their practical and aesthetic activity. Thus George Bernard Shaw, who contributed articles and short stories to diverse socialist newspapers and journals, found the authentic note of British socialism before 1917 when, in his short story, "The Death of an Old Revolutionary Hero," he wrote: "The governing classes keep the mass of the people enslaved by taking advantage of their sloth, their stupidity, their ignorance, their poverty, their narrowness, their superstition, and their vices." [43] In the workaday world of industry, and far away from the "left-wing" novelist's literary workshop, Robert Tresall, who had ironically abandoned his trade union activity to win his fellow artisans to the SDF,[44] lambasted them in life and in literature for opposing reforms. Furthermore, the artisans "he hated and despised" were "the enemy"; and for Tresall, as for many Fabians, the real enemy was not the capitalist class but "those ragged trousered philanthropists, who not only quietly submitted like so many cattle to their miserable slavery for the benefit of others, but defended it, and opposed and ridiculed any suggestion of reform." [45]

In reality the labour movement, of whom the orthodox trade unionists rather than the socialists were the most important elements,[46]

[42] Engels, op. cit. pp. 297–98. Author's emphasis.

[43] G. B. Shaw, "The Death of an Old Revolutionary Hero," *The Clarion*, 24 Mar. 1905. Reprinted in *the Black Girl in Search of God, and Some Lesser Tales* (Harmondsworth, 1946), p. 261.

[44] Postgate, op. cit. p. 390. As Raymond Postgate noted, *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists* was clearly autobiographical; and anyone who has doubts on this score should read F. C. Ball's interesting, though narrow, biography of him.

[45] Tresall, op. cit. p. 33. For evidence on elitist Fabian attitudes, see below.

[46] While there was often an overlap between individuals who were simultaneously socialists and trade unionists, the Lib-Labs sometimes made a bigger impact on

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had succeeded in forcing the Tories and Liberals "to vie with each other in presenting programmes of social reform"[47] between 1883 and 1917. Nevertheless attitudes of hostility to working people were expressed by socialists and employers and both groups voiced their own notions of social and cultural superiority. A strike of engineering workers in 1891 —a strike of elite artisans—provoked one engineering employer in Birmingham to reply to the engineering trade union's demand for shorter hours in the words: "it has pleased God that the masses of the inhabitants of the world should be hewers of wood and drawers of water. . . . You want reduced working hours, the men don't. They want more money for drink."[48] A small army of socialists repeatedly made the same cultural criticisms of the workers, and Robert Selkirk, a veteran trade unionist and socialist, recalls that the puritanical and moralistic temperance advocacy of Scottish miners' leaders, who were usually socialist activists themselves, antagonised many miners and other workers.[49] In the midst of a struggle to extend the "new Unionism," John Burns, a leader of the SDF, told a mass meeting of cab drivers in London: "Now do make a reasonable use of the higher wages which you have fought for. . . . Don't drink, but give the money to the missus." Faced with indignant interruptions and objections, he replied. "Oh, I know you; you can't take me in. Your wives are worth more than you are."[50] And he had just previously written that he had done his "best as an artisan" to "educate" his "unskilled fellow workmen."[51] In the communities, where the socialists gained influence, such elitist attitudes had to be modified.

Scottish miners were particularly prone to riotous drunkenness, and they consequently alienated themselves from the middle classes.[52] Yet in contrast to miners elsewhere in Western Europe[53] (including the English ones), the Scots displayed what was often riotous sympathy for revolutionary socialism.[54] There was little interest in the Fife (as distinct

the social consciousness of working people than socialists or socialist trade unions. This was largely because the Lib-Labs were more tolerant towards what the socialists regarded as working class foibles and brutish behaviour.

47 Royden Harrison in his afterword to the most recent edition of Samuel Smiles, *Self Help* (London, 1968), p. 270; H. V. Emy, *Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics 1892–1914* (Cambridge, 1973), passim.

48 *Workman's Times*, 6 Mar. 1891. Quoted in H. A. Clegg, A. Fox and A. F. Thompson, *A History of British Trade Unionism since 1889* (Oxford, 1964), p. 127.

49 Robert Selkirk, a veteran rank-and-file trade unionist and socialist, who was born into a mining family in Arniston, Midlothian, in 1887, in an interview with the author on 16 and 17 Apr. 1973.

50 Eduard Bernstein, *My Years of Exile* (London, 1921), p. 260.

51 John Burns, *The Man with the Red Flag* (London, 1889), p. 5.

52 J. H. Whitehouse, *Problems of a Scottish Provisional Town* (London, 1911), p. 10.

53 Mitchell and Sterns, op. cit. p. 205.

54 In 1892 William Small, a miners' agent, told the Royal Commission on Labour that the majority of the miners in the west of Scotland were determined socialists. *Royal Commission on Labour, Vol. 2*, 1892, Parliamentary Papers, Q.10,035. For evidence illustrating their mass support for socialism, see Fred Reid's essay "Keir Hardie's Conversion to Socialism," *Essays in Labour History*, op. cit. pp. 17–46 and James D. Young, "Changing Images of American Democracy and the Scottish Labour Movement," *International Review of Social History*, Vol. XVIII, Pt. 1 (1973).

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from the west of Scotland) coalfields for socialist doctrine during the last two decades of the nineteenth century [55]; but Lawrence Storione, a remarkably knowledgeable and highly cultured French anarchist, who lived, worked and agitated in the Fife coalfields between 1901 and his death in 1921, organised militant trade union activity, study classes and a socialist Sunday School for working class children.[56] But while the Fife coalfields became an area where the Communists created a mass, rumbustious and turbulent revolutionary movement in 1917,[57] the miners in the nearby county of Clackmannanshire formed their own armed-guards to protect the coalowners' property.[58]

Working class responses to socialist propaganda within working class communities in the same counties had often been very diverse; and there were enormous differences between rural and urban communities. Addressing a meeting of the Weavers' Association in the Alva Town Hall, in 1889, R. B. Cunninghame Graham, a left-wing Liberal member of Parliament, told the audience that they had " no notion of the dark misery, with utter despair, and never-ending toil that was to be found [in] the great cities." [59] A woman who began to work in the woollen mills of semi-rural Tillicoultry, Clackmannanshire, in 1908 has vividly described working class fears of being buried in a pauper's grave and the tolerable and sometimes friendly social relations between the " backward " workers and the possessing classes in some parts of Clackmannanshire.[60]

Though there were areas where authentically mass militant socialist movements existed down to 1917, they were seldom typical of the British labour experience as a whole. In a provocative essay on " the concept

[55] " To the miners, Karl Marx is but a name: Proudhon, Fourier and other French champions of labour are practically unknown, and the number of professed socialists among the miners is very small." K. Durland, *Among the Fife Miners* (London, 1904), p. 41.

[56] I have gathered a great deal of information about this outstanding but largely forgotten, worker-intellectual from Robert Selkirk, Mary Docherty and his granddaughter Teresa Breslin.

[57] In an attempt at historical analysis, the Rt. Hon. Lady Lee, superficially attributed communist influence in Fife to the " fact " that the Communist Party " concentrated its financial and propaganda powers on the most Left Wing areas, as in the Fife coalfields." Letter from Lady Lee to the author, 14 July 1972.

[58] " Although all the men are staunch and loyal to their union they have recognised from the first that the flooding of the pits in the end inflict greater hardship upon themselves and their families. . . . Not only so, but at some pits they have acted as bludgeon-armed guards in case of an armed invasion of Bolshevik strikers from Fife." *Dunfermline Journal*, 23 April 1921. In Fife 2,000 miners led by miners' agents and ex-servicemen, who had been influenced by Lawrence Storione and John MacLean, looted shops and threatened to use violence against the few railway workers who were reluctant to join the strike. Ibid. 16 Apr. 1921.

[59] *Scotsman*, 12 June 1889.

[60] Conversations with Miss Margaret Peebles, who was a highly skilled, though poorly-paid, warper, 23 and 24 Dec. 1972. A Scotswoman who embodied the traditional values of thrift and respectability, she was capable of displaying her own forms of spontaneous militancy and individualistic protest within the mill in which she worked. Born in 1894 in a mining family in a community lacking strong trade union or socialist traditions, she never belonged to a trade union and is still apolitical.

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of the labour aristocracy," [61] Dr Henry Pelling has argued that the skilled workers (and there were fewer skilled miners in Scotland than England)[62] were more militant and socialistically inclined than most labourers. But while many of the organized skilled workers were sometimes more militant and socialist than the organized labourers, the Lib-Labs were more in touch with the realities of working class social life and more sympathetic to working people than such trade union socialists as John Burns, Dan Irving,[63] Harry Quelch, Tom Mann, Robert Tressell, A. P. Hazell and J. Hunter Watts.[64]

The Lib-Labs, though moving in a left-wing direction under the impact of the intellectual ferment occurring in British society between 1883–1917, were aware of the possessing classes' new social attitudes; and, while supporting some of the SDF demands within the trade unions, nonetheless identified with the working class values and sub-cultures which had crystallized in the mid-Victorian period. Harry Quelch savagely criticised the skilled and unskilled worker for "talking of his home as 'not bad for a working man,' his set of books as 'quite credible to a working man' and his children as a 'good-looking lot of kids for a working man.'" [65] In contrast, George Howell, a traditional Lib-Lab trade union leader, who lacked Quelch's colossal intelligence and devotion to principle,[66] had a much better understanding of conceptions of working class respectability when he wrote: "In the industrial life of England there is perhaps no point so tender as the idea of being buried by the parish. A pauper's grave and funeral are more repugnant to the sensibilities of the working class than any other social degradation." [67]

A degree of distressing ignorance (using the word in a purely descriptive rather than a pejorative sense) did exist in working class communities, and Robert Selkirk has recorded the fact that well beyond 1917 some miners in Fife voted against the miners' trade union agitation for baths at the pithead because, as *they* put it, "washing every day weaken[ed] the back." [68] Moreover, during the period between 1883 and 1917 the Lib-Labs within the trade unions nevertheless got the edge on the socialists when both groups were fighting for conflicting aims and

[61] H. Pelling, "The Concept of the Labour Aristocracy," *Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain* (London, 1968), pp. 37–61.
[62] See, for example, *Dunfermline Journal*, 8 Sept. 1900.
[63] "Cowardice, too, plays a not unimportant part in obstructing our onward march. The haunting fear of poverty, nay, the terror of absolute starvation, holds the worker bound. Slavishly does he obey the behest of his masters. . . ." Dan Irving, "Some Thoughts on the Labour Movement," *Justice*, 28 Jan. 1893.
[64] "Creatures who are content to lead the lives of factory drudges, of mill horses, of wage slaves of any kind, have renounced the right to call themselves men." J. Hunter Watts, "The Unemployed," ibid. 24 Sept. 1887.
[65] Quoted in Z. Bauman, *Between Class and Elite* (Manchester, 1972), p. 78.
[66] Harry Quelch was a warehouse packer who became "one of the literary giants of the Socialist movement. His knowledge of French and German, which he acquired by dint of laborious study in the little leisure which he allowed himself, gave him an international insight which few of us possessed." H. W. Lee and E. Archibold, *Social Democracy in Britain* (London, 1935), p. 83.
[67] G. Howell, *Trade Unionism, Old and New* (London, 1892), p. 100.
[68] Letter from Robert Selkirk to the author, 26 June 1972.

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social and moral values. In theory Tom Mann, a young engineer and member of the SDF in the late Victorian period, had some intellectual justification for arguing thus: " . . . in fact the average unionist of today is a man with a fossilised intellect, either hopelessly apathetic, or supporting a policy that plays directly into the hands of the capitalist exploiter." [69] On the other hand the Lib-Labs, in spite of their " fossilized " intellects, and their deeper ideological influence among labouring men and women, owed much of their influence to their sympathetic respect for working class life and sensibilities.

Respectability was a very real, and from the standpoint of establishing socialism an inhibiting, element in working class social life; and Engels and others denied the repeated Continental and SDF assertion that the British workers were " cowardly." [70] And Engels consistently hailed trade union activity as a manifestation of " the invading socialist society." Trade unions, with their special fund for giving workers' dependants the means to arrange " decent " burials, were capable of being simultaneously reformist and revolutionary. The socialists, instead of striving to give workers' concepts of respectability [71] a socialist content, frequently disapproved of working people for their notions of and adherence to " bourgeois " values of thrift and individualism.[72] If they had really wanted to make tangible and lasting headway in the trade unions, they would have taken the trouble to discover the emotional strength of respectability in particular working class communities by realizing as Thomas Don did that such a concept inhibited workers from joining trade unions.[73]

If temperance advocates in the British labour movement alienated themselves from the workers in general, Scottish trade union activists were (in contrast to the English ones who met in pubs) [74] still further socially distanced from workers by their decisions in the early 1850s to meet in temperance coffee houses.[75] The Scottish miners, who had

[69] Tom Mann, *What a Compulsory Eight-Hour Working Day Means to the Workers* (London, 1886). Quoted in H. Pelling, *A History of British Trade Unionism* (London, 1963), p. 94.

[70] Engels, op. cit. p. 224.

[71] Local traditions and working class sub-cultures had always influenced the development of the labour movement in particular communities, and thereby created a varied and diverse working class response which makes nonsense of trendy attempts at sociological generalization. See, for example, some of the unhistoric sociological generalization in M. Mann, *Consciousness and Action among the Working Class* (London, 1973), passim. Nonetheless local traditions and circumstances are in certain, but not all, communities critically important for the way labour movements develop. As Engels put it: " Political conditions . . . and even the traditions which haunt human minds." Quoted in L. Althusser, *For Marx* (Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 112.

[72] However, the perceptive remarks on these points by W. Nairne, " A Few Remarks about Thrift," *Scottish Co-operator*, 25 Jan. 1901, are worth considering.

[73] See Thomas Don's letter to Sidney Webb, the secretary of the Dunfermline Trades Council, saying that " the rule of working class " respectability was inimical to trade union organization, 14 Nov. 1892. Webb Collection, Library of the London School of Economics.

[74] *Bulletin of the Society of the Study of Labour History*, No. 23 (1971), p. 82.

[75] For details of the high incidence of alcoholic consumption in Scotland, see Dr E. Duncan, " Some Observations on the Consumption of Alcohol and on the Com-

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always elected rotating chairmen at mass open-air meetings in the 1840s, clung to this practice of "primitive democracy" in the mid-Victorian period. When they began to meet in halls and committee rooms in the late 1880s for the first time, they were often troubled by the problems created by drunken delegates.[76]

For well over three decades the SDF criticised the trade unions, and historians have normally explained their overall criticisms of the working classes in terms of doctrinaire sectarianism instead of seeing their socialist' criticism as part of a conscious and carefully worked out philosophy. One labour historian has traced SDF hostility towards trade unions back to Lassalle's concept of "the iron law of wages"[77]; but the SDF mainly opposed trade unions because they allegedly created "inharmonious interests" within the working class[78] and simultaneously alienated public opinion by striking.[79] Yet the Lib-Labs, for all their faults from a socialist standpoint, were less elitist than most British socialists. In 1896 the president of the Falkirk Trades Council might have bemoaned their failure to establish a branch of the Women's Protective and Provident League because they had begun "too low down the social scale"[80]; but they had voiced their disappointments with as much human sympathy and sensitivity for working people as the president of the Aberdeen Trades Council had done a few years earlier. In supporting a strike of labourers, who had had little experience of trade union organisation, he had told the artisan delegates that: "He trusted they would forget that they were masons, joiners, and so many different sections of tradesmen, but that they would keep in mind that they were all workmen and therefore had an interest in the general cause of labour, and in whatever tended to the advancement and elevation of the workmen."[81] Such sentiments, for all their implicit elitism, were much more likely to strike

parative Death-Rate from Alcoholic Excess, in England, Ireland and Scotland," *Proceedings of the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow*, Vol. XXXIX, 1907–1908.

76 In July 1890 the Larkhall Miners' Association, who had begun to meet in committee rooms passed a resolution thus: "That every member of the committee, who in the opinion of a majority of the committee, is under the influence of drink and incapable of conducting himself in a proper manner should be requested by the chairman to withdraw." *Minutes of the Larkhall Miners' Association*, 29 July 1890. National Library of Scotland.

77 Collins, op. cit. p. 60. He is in the tradition of labour historians who have failed to point out that Engels also subscribed to the theory of the "iron law of wages" in 1844. Engels, op. cit. pp. 216–17.

78 See H. M. Hyndman, "Trade Unions and Progress," *Justice*, 8 Sept. 1900. E. Belford Bax also wrote: "Yet what is the greatest obstacle to the formation of a solid Socialist party in this country? Precisely this very trade unionism, the erstwhile pioneer of working class emancipation." E. B. Bax, "Damn the Pioneer," ibid., 14 June 1898.

79 Even as late as 1924 the editor of *Justice* wrote: "The propertyless wage earners constitute the majority of the nation, and they also experience the majority of the suffering and inconvenience that a huge strike undoubtedly causes." Ibid. 27 Mar. 1924.

80 *Falkirk Herald*, 18 Jan. 1896.

81 *Minutes of the Aberdeen Trades Council*, 20 June 1883.

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chords in the emerging social consciousness of many workers who were still being forced into factories by the depopulation of long-established rural communities [82] than the comments in some of the socialist newspapers that were being sold to embryonic proletarians.[83]

Moreover, newcomers to industrial life, who were often bawdy, rumbustious and unruly, were not going to be immediately attracted by the self-conscious, self-righteous socialists who were preaching and *lecturing* on what were essentially middle class values. At a time when Saturday night drunken riots of British working men and women were commonplace, one leader of the SDF wrote: "Socialism is not to be won by riots, but by the steady combined movement of an educated social democracy." [84] An additional sign of the SDF's intense commitment to *law and order* beyond their concern not to alienate middle class public opinion was seen in their criticism of the spontaneous, working class food riots in Italy in 1898, because they were "individualistic" and not an expression of educated social democracy.[85]

Meanwhile as the SDF and other socialist groups denounced the ignorance and stupidity of the workers, Lib-Labs, like T. R. Threlfall, who had, in 1885, drawn attention to "a stronger moral activity amongst the masses" and "a searching desire to get to the primary causes of our troubles" and the urgent need to initiate domestic reforms,[86] had little difficulty in subsequently intensifying their ideological influence within the trade unions. By contrast John Burns, the SDF leader of the "new unionism" before he abandoned his socialism to become the first working class Cabinet minister, said: "We are not going to tell them (the unskilled) how much power they have until they become sufficiently educated to be worthy of it." [87] And the riotous activity of workers, whether they were the "residium," the semi-skilled or the elite artisans, was seen by the SDF, the Fabians and the ILP as hindering the creation of a politically educated working class. But by their open contempt for

[82] "There cannot be less than 30,000 unemployed in Glasgow, while every railway train and every passenger steamer brings unemployed to Glasgow, whose chances, it must be confessed, are somewhat better than the residents, probably because the most robust portion of the citizens are those of most recent importation, particularly from the rural districts." Murray Kaye, "The Transformation of Glasgow: Glasgow As It Is, 1," *Justice*, 6 June 1896. In case anyone might assume that the above figures had been manufactured by biased observers, it ought to be stressed that as early as 1867, a Liberal, anti-working class newspaper, The *North British Daily Mail*, estimated that 30,000 working men had been unemployed for almost nine months. *North British Daily Mail*, 28 September 1867.

[83] Though this particular example came slightly after 1917, see the comments of F. J. Gould: "The proletariat of Great Britain must meet the middle class, negotiate with the middle class, and firmly annex and absorb the middle class by means of middle class instruments; and the instruments are brains, education, discipline, astuteness, and an independent, straight-forward spirit." F. J. Gould, "Shall We Be Bolsheviks," *Justice*, 23 Jan. 1919.

[84] Herbert Burrows, "Physical Force," *Justice*, 5 May 1888.

[85] Ibid. 4 June 1898.

[86] T. R. Threlfall, the Lib-Lab secretary of the Labour Electoral Association. *Annual Report of the British Trades Union Congress, 1885.*

[87] Quoted by R. A. Wood, *English Social Movements* (London, 1892), p. 21.

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the real working class as it existed, they were unwittingly stifling the forces which were capable of creating the socialist society they all wanted to build.

AS the traditional hagiography of the British labour movement has given way to modern historiography a number of professional historians have dissected the roots of reformism and sectarianism in the SDF. An attempt to relate the SDF's opposition to such phenomena as riots,[88] strikes,[89] the agitation for women's suffrage [90] and the imposition of state education on workers who did not want it might have resulted in a new picture of socialist elitism, socialist anti-working class attitudes and socialist commitment to law and order. For socialism in the SDF/Fabian scheme of things was "not to be won by riots, but by the steady combined movement of an educated social democracy" [91]; and "revolutionary socialism dedicate(d) all its forces to the cause of order." [92]

Being prisoners of a social vision in which they saw working people as nasty, violent, riotous and brutal, many British socialists (and particularly those in the SDF) sometimes put themselves to the "right" of middle class Liberals and other Establishment elements. An outbreak of looting by unemployed workers in London in 1886 provoked H. H. Champion to tell one Liberal journalist, who interviewed him, that: "If I had a revolver and I saw the mob looting a shop, I would shoot the fellows down right and left with my own hand." [93] Such attitudes were commonplace in the social consciousness of many socialists; yet Dr. Gareth S. Jones has argued that the reason for Champion's attitude was simply that the SDF drew "a certain distinction between the working class and the 'residium.'" [94] In fact many socialists were terrified by the very existence of the working class, and, by displaying attitudes of cultural superiority, they were crushing the emergence of the latent forces of militant socialism. Nor was their attitude to the agitation in London either exceptional nor unconnected with their desire to win over middle class public opinion.

In 1885 just shortly after a very large number of unskilled male workers had acquired the vote for the first time, J. A. Tait, the secretary of the Socialist League in Edinburgh in which some SDFers were also working, wrote to his counterpart in London: "The *mob* here as elsewhere are, of course, *no use* at the present stage and in Edinburgh the class we want to get hold of just now seems from the results of the

[88] G. S. Jones, *Outcast London* (Oxford, 1971), p. 295; Victor Kiernan, "Victorian London: unending purgatory," *New Left Review*, No. 76 (1972), p. 32.
[89] H. Collins, op. cit. pp. 55–56.
[90] W. Kendall, *The Revolutionary Movement in Britain 1900–1921* (London, 1969), pp. 31–32.
[91] Herbert Burrows, "Physical Force," *Justice*, 5 May 1888, and the various writings of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard Shaw.
[92] J. Hunter Watts, "At the Helm," ibid. 15 Jan. 1914.
[93] *Pall Mall Gazette*, 9 Feb. 1886.
[94] Gareth S. Jones, op. cit. p. 295. His book is nonetheless brilliant, provocative and stimulating.

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recent elections to be far back indeed and hopelessly out of reach. Edinburgh is still the home of Whiggery and orthodoxy: socialism is not yet respectable enough for it I fear." [95] Far from making socialism respectable among the "mob" by supporting actual struggles for elementary justice, they did not even discuss whether the Highland crofters, who were still being dispossessed in the 1860s, ought to use violence as a part of their campaign of resistance. When the controversial issue of the crofters' violence was debated in the Presbyterian church in 1885, there were a few middle class Liberals who were prepared to support the violence of the poor and destitute crofters.[96] Only a few socialists had faith in the decency and creativity of working people; and, though *they* are not central to the story and analysis offered in this essay, they were the men and women who not only initiated militant, mass agitations but also anticipated the totalitarianism of the state socialism they saw around them.

In the late Victorian period, before the Socialist Labour Party was formed, middle class attitudes so dominated British socialism that working class social life represented, in the phrase of Karl Kautsky, "an unknown country." *After* the riots of the Blantyre miners in the west of Scotland in 1887 in a mining area where riots had been the warp and woof of the miners' community life for over a hundred years, and at a time when the members of the Socialist League in Glasgow had created considerable middle class sympathy for the plight of the striking miners, they issued a printed manifesto to the People of Scotland in which they criticized the miners "deeds of aimless violence." [97] Yet only a little earlier, the *Glasgow Observer*, the organ of the Roman Catholic clergy who had already used their newspaper to build up branches of the Knights of Labour in the Scottish coalfields, failed to see why the miners "should be branded because hungry women and children" had "taken a little bread." [98] With the Socialist League—the most libertarian of the socialist organizations before the Socialist Labour Party—inculcating essentially middle class social values in the working class communities where they had most support, the attitude of the SDF towards any attempt to upset the status quo was logically more rigid.

Today, however, most British labour historians are so trapped in their own self-images of the working classes and the relationships between workers and "vanguard" groups that they have failed to develop critical awareness of a certain "socialist" vision of working people which, with other factors, contributed to present-day totalitarianism. They have also unhistorically attributed the SDF/Fabian opposition to the suffragettes' agitation to a narrow sectarianism. What historians depicted as sectarianism was really an elitist fear of a mass, popular

[95] Socialist League Archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. Author's emphasis.
[96] *Proceedings and Debates of the Free Church of Scotland, 1884.*
[97] Socialist League Archives.
[98] *Glasgow Observer*, 12 Feb. 1887.

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movement; and this can be seen in an editorial in *Justice* in 1912 entitled "Votes for Women: Socialists everywhere have always deprecated and condemned riotous violence by whomsoever committed." [99]

Yet most socialists, whether they were middle or working class, were either ignorant of the potential class consciousness existing in those communities where there were well-defined working class sub-cultures or they were often contemptuous of them. For the SDF the academic training of the "vanguard" Party was much more important than worrying about how to trigger off a mass movement; and it is only by considering the analysis of the SDF developed in this essay that Lady Dorothy Nevill's conversation with H. M. Hyndman makes much sense other than showing how much the possessing classes wanted to keep what they had:

> The turn of the people will come one day. I see that quite clearly as you do. But not yet, not yet. You will educate some of the working class. . . . And when you have educated them, we will buy them, or, if we don't, the Liberals will. . . .[100]

Far away from the world of the middle classes there were diverse communities where sub-cultures conflicting with capitalism existed and even flourished; but most socialists, who had been trained in different habits of thought, were not interested except when class consciousness manifested itself through votes for socialist candidates. It ought to suffice to look at what happened in the Highlands, the Scottish coalfields and the British educational system.

In the Highlands of Scotland there was a primitive form of egalitarianism, and for many Highlanders, including members of the justiciary, "poaching" was not regarded as illegal.[101] This tradition not only survived down to the period beyond 1917; but between 1883 and 1917 many Highlanders were evicted from their crofts only to end up working in the coalfields of the west of Scotland [102] where they probably introduced the techniques of poaching to miners belonging to other ethnic groups. In any case poaching was widespread in the Scottish coalfields, and there were several armed battles between miners and gamekeepers in the late nineteenth century. At the same time socialists did not recognize poaching as a form of class alienation from the established social order; and labour historians, who used the statistics of poaching as an index to social tension in the period of Captain Swing, have totally ignored this index to class consciousness in later periods.

Nevertheless in 1884 two miners were found "roaming on a field near Rosebery, and as they carried guns it was presumed that they were in pursuit of wild animals, and from this real or imaginary offence they

[99] *Justice*, 6 April 1912.
[100] Cited by Keith Hutchison, *The Decline and Fall of British Capitalism* (London, 1951), p. 73.
[101] Alexander Robertson, *Our Deer Forests* (London, 1867), p. 29.
[102] See the letters Scots miners sent to Henry George. Microfilm copy of the letters George exchanged with correspondents in the Highlands and the West of Scotland.

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were about to be arrested, when they fired upon your Lordship's employees fatally wounding two of them, while the third man ran a great risk of sharing the fate of his companions." [103] But while the defence of the two miners—Innes and Vickers—was left to the "eccentric" Alexander Robertson (otherwise known as Dundochie) who had been jailed on several occasions in the 1860s and 1870s for opposing the landed aristocracy in the Highlands; and, while the case of Innes and Vickers was not discussed in a single labour or socialist organization, new oral evidence proves that the two Lothian miners who were "hanged for the game laws" were and remained, in the language of Robert Selkirk, "heroes" in the mining community he lived in as a boy and young man.[104]

AS has been suggested elsewhere,[105] the least educated sections of the working classes were sometimes the most radical and militant; and beneath the social world occupied by the activists in the SDF, the Fabians and the ILP, class consciousness was, under growing socialist agitation for the enforcement of "compulsory" attendance in the state schools, manifesting itself in totally new ways. Most socialists were not interested in the content of what was taught in state schools, and they simply did not know that the state schools existed to train working class children to respond to "more prompt obedience to orders." [106] Yet such governmental phrases were constantly appearing in local newspapers. Moreover, the educational system was consciously used throughout Britain to inculcate "good discipline" into the social consciousness of children, and in many schools physical "drill form(ed) a good part" of the social discipline of day-to-day life.[107] However, the diverse responses of different working class groups illustrated the social distance that existed between the workers and most socialists.

Within the labour movement some trade union delegates opposed the socialist agitation for the enforcement of school attendance on the grounds that working class parents needed the earnings their children were making [108]; and only a very small minority of socialists challenged the content of the education being imposed in state schools. Indeed, with the exception of small sects such as the Plebs League, the Socialist

[103] Dundonchie, *Hanged for the Game Laws* (Leith, 1884), p. 4.

[104] In a letter to me on 13 July 1972, Robert Selkirk wrote: "Poaching was not regarded as a crime. When a child I often heard remarks which seemed to imply that a man who was hanged for shooting a gamekeeper was a hero. I think his name was McVickers and the gamekeeper was shot somewhere in the Rosewell area of Midlothian. Poaching was widespread, the idea which dominated the thinking was that "the laird had no right to the game" and "we are not going to starve." Alexander Robertson is unknown to historians, and Mr. Selkirk has never been in the National Library of Scotland where Robertson's surviving books and pamphlets are to be found.

[105] James D. Young, "Belt, Book and Blackboard: the Roots of Authoritarianism in Scottish Education," *Scottish International*, Sept. 1972.

[106] *Stirling Journal*, 9 Nov. 1900.

[107] Ibid. 7 Aug. 1885.

[108] *Report of the Scottish Trades Union Congress*, 1898, p. 34.

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Labour Party and a few anarchists, the SDF, the Fabians and the ILP agitated for more state education without being particularly interested in what was being taught. In the Scottish schools, where there was a long tradition of using education as a means of social control and where children had long been educated in the correct "principles of political economy,"[109] temperance instruction was introduced—and unopposed by the labour movement—in 1903.[110] This was in keeping with the social vision that many socialists had of working people as sub-humans who were in need of training in manners and good behaviour.[111]

Day-to-day violence in state schools was comparable to the present-day social atmosphere in America described in such books as *Death at an Early Age*; and the first strike of school children that I know of occurred in the large industrial town of Falkirk in 1889. It was a spontaneous strike which soon involved all the schools in the area, and it had erupted at the same time as a wave of trade union militancy.[112] A man, who was to become a leading figure in the Socialist Labour Party in the early 1900s, described a strike of school children in Glasgow in the early 1890s:

> Resentment at the cruelty of certain of the teachers led to their being mobbed by the boys after school hours. More than once I took part in waylaying a teacher, booing and hissing and shouting names at him on the way. . . . Finally feelings ran so highly that we organised a strike.[113]

In a study of a series of national strikes of school children which erupted throughout Britain in 1911 side-by-side with mass, trade union militancy, Dave Marson has shown that some of the striking children were "arrested" by their mothers.[114] Such strikes were not really taken seriously by Liberal and Tory newspapers, yet they did report them. *Justice* and other socialist newspapers ignored the children's strikes altogether, and concentrated on reporting on how they were capturing political control of some school boards for the first time and giving some working class children free books.

It is interesting to note that as the dominant groups of socialists succeeded in making "compulsory" school attendance more effective during the period down to 1917, social tension in schools correspondingly increased and deepened. For most working class children school was an institution they had to attend, and they, like their parents, were often antagonistic towards the teachers as a middle class group trying

109 Report on Education by John Gordon, Her Majesty's Inspector of Education, Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Vol. XLVII, p. 147.

110 *Stirling Journal*, 6 Nov. 1903.

111 Workers like A. J. Cook were, in the opinion of such Fabians as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, "low-caste," while James Ramsay MacDonald was, "owing to his middle class equipment" very "superior" to his working class competitors for the leadership of the Labour Party. See *Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1912–1924*, edited by M. Cole (London, 1952), p. 17 and Sidney Webb, *Towards Social Democracy* (London, 1919), p. 29.

112 *Falkirk Herald*, 19 Oct. 1889.

113 T. Bell, *Pioneering Days* (London, 1941), p. 17.

114 Dave Marson, *Children's Strikes in 1911* (London, 1973), pp. 1–35.

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to impose foreign social values on their social consciousness.[115] At the same time there were some ambitious working class parents (and oral evidence suggests that this was certainly true of many full-time trade union officials) who trained their children in the habits of obedience, diligence and good behaviour.

The potential cadres the SDF wanted to recruit and train to lead the workers to socialism could be accommodated into the existing social system through "the ladder system of instruction whereby boys and girls may work their way upward to the highest education and accomplishment in however lowly a position of life they have been born."[116] Of those working class children, who, though born into humble circumstances, "made it" to the university and remained dedicated revolutionaries, John MacLean[117] was an exception. And, for every potential rebel like John MacLean, there were millions of children who were trained in the habits of discipline and good behaviour; and a Liberal head-teacher of humble origins, who was trained under this system, noted that a successful career in teaching usually rested on the ability to "crush all initiative and individuality."[118]

However, the historian can only appreciate the extent to which even the children of authentic left-wing working class parents were indoctrinated into accepting authoritarian habits of social behaviour by talking and corresponding with socialist veterans. In conversations and letters Mary Docherty, who was born in 1908, has described her initial sense of discomfort and unease when, in 1918, she was transferred by her father, who was a left-wing miner, from the "well-disciplined" authoritarian ILP Socialist Sunday School into the libertarian atmosphere of Lawrence Storione's Proletarian Sunday School.[119]

There was, of course, another side to the story of underground working class rebellion and working class socialist aspirations—a story which has yet to be conceptualized and told. In this essay I have only touched the fringes of what most labour historians would ignore, dismiss as unimportant or depict as apolitical working class protest against the new middle class values being imposed on working people between 1883 and 1917. Nor would I deny the need for "vanguard" groups or a multiplicity of "vanguard" working class parties. I would support Eugene Victor Debs, who abhorred the notion of middle class elitists

[115] For comparable present-day conflicts between the social values of working class children and the contrary ones being imposed in the state schools, see Brian Jackson, Working Class Community (London, 1968), passim.

[116] *Stirling Journal*, 9 Oct. 1885.

[117] Kendall, op. cit. passim.

[118] C. W. Thomson, *Scottish School Humour* (Glasgow, 1936), p. 83. He was both an active member of the Liberal Party and a liberal with a small *l* in educational matters. I was informed by Mr Ronald Wood, a former headmaster in Fife, that Thomson was always in hot water with the authorities because of his independence and opposition to corporal punishment. Conversation, 3 January 1972.

[119] Mary Docherty in a letter to the author, 9 Sept. 1973. Her evidence is all the more convincing since she rejected anarchism (but not socialism) in the early 1920s.

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leading the workers to socialism, and argued that the role of socialists was to make working people " conscious of the power of their class." [120]

Moreover, it was the members of the Socialist Labour Party, who, working to create a climate of opinion in which workers would grow up steeped in the values of aggressive, militant and democratic socialism, had employed the most effective methods for preparing the people against the power of the capitalist controls they saw around them.[121] Long before the word " totalitarianism " was coined, they realized that militant, democratic socialism was the *only* alternative to the totalitarianism that would either culminate in 1984 or the "impossible dream" of a totally new socialist society. But labour historians need not be politically committed to recognize that most socialist criticism before 1917 acted as a safety-valve for profound working class apolitical discontent with the existing order of things.[122]

120 Ray Ginger, *The Bending Cross* (New Brunswick, 1949), p. 235.

121 For a different interpretation of the role of the Socialist Labour Party where one working class activist argued that the SLP integrated workers into the existing social order down to 1917, see J. T. Murphy, " Wanted: the Marxism of Marx," *Plebs*, April 1923.

122 In 1964 Alan Sillitoe, a sort of " new left " novelist of working class origin, could still question the *existence* of working class militancy and self-activity in the Edwardian period; but the world has changed since 1964 and contemporary events have compelled a few labour historians to ask themselves new questions. Professional historians can either give legitimacy to the existing scheme of things, ask new questions, or continue to write dry institutional history. See A. Sillitoe's Preface to the 1965 edition of Robert Tresall's *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists* (London, 1965), pp. 7–10.

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The Western Marxists

Thomas Molnar

THE book I am now writing about is a brilliant one,* and was much needed on the western intellectual scene. But precisely because it states very important things, one wishes it were more convincing. Its thesis is a veritable bomb explosion under the desk of yesterday's and today's fashionable leftist thinkers whom it may leave intellectually up in the air, or at least uprooted from the soil in which they thought they were planting; planting, that is, seeds of an endless Marxian rejuvenation.

McInnes indeed states that the real Marx and the "Western Marxists" who claim to descend from him are practically incommensurable quantities. Marx, as understood by his nineteenth-century followers, by McInnes, and by Karl Marx himself, was an anti-Hegelian materialist, a scorner of metaphysics, and a political economist who made many errors but who had done his homework. This is what even the utopians of the 1840s understood whose "robust faith in science and industry" could be smoothly integrated with Marx's ideology of a proletarian socialist movement which claimed to be scientific and promised to retain, this time in the framework of a just system of distribution, the productive capacity of capitalism. The Marxism that Soviet Russia, then later China, adopted was based on the same understanding; namely that under its sponsorship these countries, "obsessed with industrialization and scientific achievement," would be able to reach their twin goal (plus the third, catching up with the United States).

This is, according to the author's thesis, *one* Marxism, the genuine one, derived from the materialist Marx of the so-called "mature years." But McInnes's book was born out of the puzzlement that there is *another* Marxism, the Western variety, which has all but buried the real Marx and resuscitated an illusory one. The latter is the "young Marx" of the early manuscripts (that the mature alter ego wanted to confine to oblivion and refused to have published), a "re-mystified" Marx who was magically metamorphosed by his Western epigoni into the exact opposite of what he was: into a Hegelian, an "absolute idealist," and even an "anti-scientific irrationalist."

THE reviewer has now two tasks before him if he wants to pursue his métier of criticism honestly: the first is to present McInnes's arguments as to why the transformation took place, why the real Marx was made to yield to an idealized (almost spiritualized) picture of himself; the second is to show that McInnes is partly right in distinguishing the reality and the picture, but that the western Marxists are also partly right in claiming their filiation from Karl Marx.

* Neil McInnes, *The Western Marxists*, Alcove Press, London, 1972.

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It is an old story that the Western Marxists whom McInnes puts on his list: Lukacs, Gramsci, Marcuse, the Frankfurt School, and the New Leftists never really did their homework in economics. The "dismal science" became increasingly left alone with a mixture of holy awe. Thus, since the men mentioned above were nevertheless attracted to Marx (*why*?—this is the question to be discussed as my second task), they were inclined to ignore Marx's "mature period" and, even before finding the 1844 manuscripts, to guess (genially, as Lukacs did) what Marx really thought about matters that interested them more genuinely than economics ever could. Thus they began—already Lenin in 1914—to read Hegel in whose writings, like in a mirror-image, they wanted to read off the "real" (pre-economist) Marx.

Then came the second, even more decisive, reason to "re-mystify" Marx by dipping him into Hegelian (and irrationalist) holy water: the Marxist system had failed all along: it failed economically and politically in Russia, it failed to bring about the world-revolution, it failed to provide all things for all men: cultural fulfilment, a society based on workers' councils, the defeat of capitalism, the permanence of proletarian class-consciousness. (*Why* did they expect all these benefits from Marx? This is what we must answer later.)

McIness thus detects a retrogression of Western Marxists to the young Hegelians, as if the young Marx had not abandoned that position at an early phase of his maturing. He asks, astonished: If Marx de-mystified metaphysics, how can his epigoni claim that a metaphysics may arise in his name? He exclaims, indignant: One cannot just make an arbitrary selection, take only philosophy and leave out economics. "In their second coming," the author writes, "the utopian and proto socialist doctrines [which where to empty into the Marxist mainstream] have reappeared in a peculiarly perverted form . . . marked by distrust, not to say detestation, of industry and its products, of science and indeed of logic itself. A doctrine once dedicated to the 'associated producers' . . . has been transmuted into the faith of 'flower people. . . .'"

The bulk of the book scrutinizes with a sure hand the process of this transmutation at the hands of men like Lukacs, Sorel, Marcuse, Adorno, Heidegger (one must rejoice that McInnes de-mystifies Heidegger!), et al. It becomes the story, as the author sees it, of the alliance of Left thought which, one assumes, ought to have remained materialist and anti-Hegelian (but this is an incorrect assumption), with idealism and irrationality. That the story is very different in the East, in Soviet Russia, is easily understandable: under the Kremlin's shadow Marx was put to exclusive contribution to the immediate goals of the State: forced industrialization and the positivization (pardon for the barbarism) of the "Slavic soul." In the West where the intellectuals could roam freely on a largely self-made landscape, the doctrine was to bring forth the strangest fruit. Where East (the Kremlin) and West (Lukacs, Gramsci, etc.) clashed was when the latter insisted too tactlessly on the Hegelian Marx. And why did they do so? McInnes, particularly authoritative on Lukacs on whom he wrote convincingly in this magazine, explains the core of the conflict by the ultimately divergent objectives pursued by Lukacs and by Lenin/Stalin.

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The former regarded the anti-capitalist industrial liberation not as an end, but as a means towards the anti-industrial cultural restoration. As a typical bourgeois intellectual—the case neither of Lenin nor of Stalin—Lukacs hated the industrial-financial essence of his own class (his father was a banker), saw in it the enemy of culture and humanism, and, in a sense, interpreted Marxism not as a liberator *of* the productive forces but as the liberator *from* the productive forces, from economics (the par excellence bourgeois preoccupation) as such. If he had been Thomas Mann, he would have written a perhaps more bitter *Tonio Kröger*; as a young sociologist and critic, he re-mystified Marx, or, as McInnes describes it, "reconstructed the Hegelian dream that Marx had de-mystified."

Needless to say, the background and the motives were similar in the case of Marcuse who was confronted by the American consumer society, the epitome of a society based on productive forces and where culture takes a second place. While Marx attributes to the proletariat magic powers once they become conscious of their plight, Marcuse denies that the workers, or for that matter others, can become at all conscious of their wants. (One can almost feel here the immigrant Marxist's despair!) Thus there are only hidden wants, known only to Marcuse, yet they are the motor forces of history. As McInnes ironically notes, Marcuse mystified the whole history of the working-class movement by taking it "back into the mainstream of Hegelian idealism purged of such impurities as the Communist Party and the working class."

MUST we have recourse to the conspiracy theory, or simply to the labyrinthine deformations of the human mind to explain the Western Marxist's "re-mystification" of Marx? In one passage, at least, McInnes seems tempted to see in this alleged transmutation a conspiracy, namely where he writes that in the 1930s the German university professors found no other means of rehabilitating a discredited Marxism than making of Marx a respectable "idealist." Somewhat in the same way (this is now a second conspiracy), Hegel was restored to a position of high prestige in order to make of him an academic sponsor of Marxism.

These suppositions make it even more urgent for us to enquire, as proposed before, why, in the first place, minds of a Hegelian, idealistic, irrational bent should be attracted at all to Marx if it is true, as McInnes suggests, that the real (mature) Marx was anti-metaphysical, pro-science and pro-industry. Why did they trust the Marxian enquiry (and continued doing so doggedly at the risk, literally, of their safety and life) to bring about the cultural revolution, the society run by soviets and other Betriebsrats, or the paradisiacal state of all-love-no-work?

There can only be one answer to these questions: Marx was not so obviously an anti-metaphysician, a rationalist, as he appears to McInnes. The latter is, of course, right in his marshalling of passages from Marx and Engels which document and substantiate his thesis; he is correct also in pointing at the often grotesque ways in which the Western Marxists contorted and distorted Marx to fit their own purposes. Yet I still maintain that they saw in Marx, and saw it legitimately,

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one of their chief ancestors in the utopian line of thinkers. True, Marx called his socialism " scientific," but all great utopians of the nineteenth century—Saint-Simon and Comte to begin with—called their own systems scientific too. After all, confronted with the conquering advance of the scientific method, most historians and sociologists of the last century dreamed of elevating *their* disciplines to the status of a science. Referring to philosophy's similar dream in that and in our century, Berdiaeff spoke of our " black envy of science."

In other words, Marx's (and Engels's) claim that there was a utopian socialism (Proudhon, Fourrier, Weitling, etc.) and a scientific socialism does not have to be taken seriously. We are now in a position to place Marx in the category he so despised, that of utopianism—which will explain why Lukacs, Marcuse, et al. have been irresistibly attracted to him, and why the regimes of China, Russia, Cuba, model their utopias on a basically Marxian ideal. It also explains why such minor marxists like Edgar Morin admit that through the creed which was theirs (Morin is now officially an ex-communist) they could fulfil the aspiration for totality, an aspiration so strong that it reconciled them even with totalitarianism. " Le sens de la totalité se gonflait en mystique de la totalité " (*Autocritique*, p. 143). " We are all utopians now," as Irving Kristol recently remarked, characterizing not only the western intellectuals, but also the Western governments and the western mood.

BEFORE arguing that Marx was a utopian, let me remark that McInnes himself shows in a passage that he would not disagree. He quotes Marx who, criticizing Hegel, notes that, after all, it is normal that man, a social being, should have around him social objects and institutions which are not to be condemned as instances of reification. But in another quotation Marx is made to deplore that " social things like capital, markets and states do have independent and characteristic ways of behaving."

Now McInnes and I obviously agree (and I think I read him correctly on these matters) that one important symptom of irrationalism in epistemology and politics is to deplore the " congelation " of cognition and of social processes, the first in concepts, the second in institutions and " social things." We would, I think, further agree that Marx's treatment of the proletariat as lived philosophy and of philosophy as dissolved by and in the proletariat is a decisive utopian statement: for philosophy in the West (as opposed to Hindu or Gnostic thought) was always conceived as the on-going speculation of an open-ended mankind (in history), and history was similarly conceived as an indefinite succession of configurations not to be closed by a fixist ideology and its class-representatives. Granted, the economist Marx had other preoccupations; but from beginning to end *this* was the overarching meaning of his quest, which is in complete harmony with his materialist metaphysics (*pace*, McInnes: metaphysics can be materialist too, as Marx's Greek masters, Democritus and Epicurus taught). Man, for Marx, is part of nature, and the scandal of all pre-proletarian systems of production is to have separated the two, to have prevented the harmonization of nature and the naturalization of man. From full nature to full man—is the Marxian motto, and on the way to this utopian ideal there are

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enough *points d'arrêt* to accommodate Marcuse, Lukacs, and a legion of others.

All these men have indeed been conscious that Marx, better than other nineteenth-century thinkers who were not of a lesser stature but were less imbued by a victorious German idealism, pulled together for them the many threads of utopianism from the Renaissance to the Revolution. In this, as in most other things, Hegel had cleared the ground for him (and for them) by his critique of the *philosophes*, by his ingenious nonsense about masters and slaves, and by his claim that philosophy can have an end, namely *hic et nunc*, in Hegel (or in Marx). This is not the place to show (besides, McInnes does it anyway in a masterly fashion) how and why the Western Marxists have embroidered endless secondary designs on the fabric woven by Marx (and Hegel). Let me only conclude that they, the Western Marxists, did not, generally speaking, betray their master's thought, certainly not more than anxious epigoni are in the main permitted to do. It is another matter that their fidelity to Marx does not necessarily do them honour.

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The Achievement of Max Nomad, Impossibilist: 1881-1973

Lewis S. Feuer

THE achievement of Max Nomad was not born of the academies. It was the by-product of a solitary individual's effort to understand the many years he had spent in the irrational world of underground revolutionary and sectarian movements. That Max Nomad achieved so much understanding is a measure of that honesty of spirit which was his outstanding characteristic. Born in 1881, the son of a radical physician, in the small Austro-Polish town of Buczacz, Max soon fell under the spell of the aura of Nihilism, of what he called "the mystique of anarchism and its violent acts of protest." A picture of Kropotkin illuminated the wall of his room when he was a student at the University of Vienna. The call to serve the masses, however, drew him from the academic halls. He learned the printer's trade, though when he first sought an apprenticeship the workingmen regarded him as if he was out of his mind. He never became a really skilled typesetter as his speed was only two-thirds that of the able union worker. But something of that sense of guilt which pervaded Max Nomad's life was thereby partially assuaged; the taint of the exploiter, which for him affected all those not engaged in manual labour, was for him the original sin. And Max's life had a sort of penance about it. Soon Max was in Zurich, Switzerland, and following his vocation, editing underground journals, writing revolutionary pamphlets, speaking to workingmen's groups, smuggling tracts into Poland and Russia.

In 1905 Max Nomad met a strange underground sectarian thinker, Wacław Machajski, who shaped the basic cast of his thought. Machajski, with his ascetic face, lined with corresponding years in Czarist prisons, and dedicated to the irreconcilable struggle against the bourgeoisie, appealed strongly to Max. Machajski had developed a theory which proposed that a new class was emerging in the revolutionary struggle—a class of intellectuals who were seeking to acquire the hegemony over the manual workers. Education, in Machajski's view, was the decisive capital investment of the future; and the educated class would replace the capitalist bourgeoisie as the exploiters of the working class.

With typical self-abnegation, Max Nomad described himself as a follower of Machajski, yet it is clear that he developed his theory of the intellectual class in a distinctively original fashion. There were other forerunners, too, in the sociology of the intellectuals. Bakunin in a well-known passage raising the spectre of the rule of the *savants*, had feared

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the prospect of their tyranny. Robert Michels in 1911 in *Political Parties* set forth his "iron law of oligarchy," and Max Nomad, who had once met Michels at a syndicalist congress in 1907, wrote that he "read Michels' book as soon as it came out. It made me shudder, and I was only half convinced. I was barely thirty and still in need of a secular religion of salvation. It took Lenin's and Stalin's noble experiment and the 'confession' of Machajski's widow finally to convert me to the illusionless radicalism of a philosophical libertarian who believes that *every* social system, present or future, deserves and will deserve to be opposed." Michels' theory, wrote Nomad, "tormented me for years, sapping my revolutionary optimism, until I finally accepted it in the 1930s." Max had discovered as well during the thirties that even Machajski, envisaging a revolutionary dictatorship allegedly of the workers, had not been immune to the longing for power. Max Nomad's theory, however, differed from those of his predecessors in more important respects than he seemed to realize.

In the first place, Bakunin had raised the possibility of the rule of the intellectual class as a polemical weapon against Marx and the "scientific" socialists. He never applied it to his own movement, though he called on 40,000 young intellectuals to lead the Russian peasantry to revolution. Nor did he try to provide a sociological theory concerning the rise of this new intellectual class, its place in the social scheme, its potential powers and weaknesses. Michels had formulated a law of oligarchy, presumably valid for all organizations, from trade unions to churches. But Michels had dealt only incidentally with the new role of the intellectuals. Lastly, Machajski had tried to derive his theory of the mental worker from Marxian economic equations. The mental worker was regarded as the possessor of an educational capital which would make him the exploiter in the future planned society. But for Max Nomad, it was not so much their place in the system of production which was assigning the intellectuals their leading role; rather it was their power over words and images, their command of ideology, which was making them contenders for the status of philosopher-kings; the intellectuals and their ideology were the replacements for priests and religion; not men's economic requirements but their unconscious needs were the principal source of the intellectuals' rise to power. Consequently, Max's method of research took the form of what he called "psychological and sociologic case histories." Probably he was one of the few men alive who could use such a method. For he had read the literature of the revolutionary movements widely and intensively for many years. He knew not only their classics and their newspapers but the countless fugitive publications, the tattered pamphlets, the crumbling, cracking leaflets, the hectographed hand-outs—those fleeting emanations from small revolutionary circles whose lifetimes are fleeting moments, whiffs of social energy, that vanish in the historical process.

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MAX NOMAD'S political pessimism deepened with the years. Bakuninist anarchists and communists, Leninists, Trotskyists, and Luxemburgists, talked of the revolutionary instincts of the masses, but Max felt that the masses were even less attached to ideal goals of liberty and equality than their leaders. He felt that Anatole France's benevolent contempt for mankind was the "attitude closest to my temperament," and in his remarkable short essay *Comrade Anatole*, he cited the words: "Without illusions mankind would perish of despair and boredom." All that was left at the end was a philosophy of permanent protest against the master-and-servant cycle, the mandate that "every social system will always have to be fought as hostile to the underdog."

It is clear that Max Nomad had evolved into probably the most extreme impossibilist since the Cynic philosophers of Athens. No wonder Angelica Balabanoff said to him: "How can you live with such a hopeless philosophy?" Max was indeed aware that his political work had been moved by what he called a "romantic impossibilism." And despite all his criticism, his sympathies remained "nostalgically" with the "romantics, noble adventurers, knights-errant, sectarians, . . ." It is now customary to speak of politics as the art of the possible. Yet here was this immensely erudite man who took his stand with the impossible. In science the votaries of the impossible, the pursuers of perpetual motion machines are consigned to the realm of the cranks and crackpots. Max Nomad was aware of such a component in himself, and struggled to master it. He recognized that his comrades peopled an unreal world: a "usually mild form of insanity," he wrote, "temporarily or intermittently attacks every one active in the underground movement, . . ." He called himself "one of those fools, or political 'vegetarians'," with "a pathological idiosyncrasy against the idea of seizure of power." He wondered what quirks in his character had led him to found his life on an impossibilism. He concluded that it was "a compensation for the personal sense of inadequacy and insecurity of the impractical son of a radical Jewish physician." "My own revolt was probably the reaction of an impractical dreamer who, a lamb in a world of wolves, becomes what the French call a *mouton enragé*."

But it was precisely this angular perspective on social reality that enabled Max Nomad to grasp a sociological truth which other observers had overlooked or repressed. Almost every sociological theory goes through several stages. It is born in the trauma of direct social experience; Marx, Freud, Pareto, Michels, felt acutely certain social realities which they found that traditional ideas could not explain. Such too was the traumatic genesis of Max Nomad's Law of the Intellectuals. Then comes the second stage: the novel theory is expounded in fugitive publications, little magazines, left-wing journals. Then in a third stage, younger, innovative scholars and social scientists began to adapt these ideas to academic use; often, however, they refrain from indicating the stimulating source of these ideas, trying to present them in a purely

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academic fashion, and with only academic authorities cited. In the fourth stage, however, the original, non-academic source is habilitated; doctoral dissertations are written about him; young scholars apply for foundation grants to study his works and interview his surviving friends. Max Nomad is now entering this fourth stage, and I am sure that in his heaven of the disenchanted, it will lead him to add several items to *A Skeptic's Political Dictionary.*

LIKE most original theories, Max Nomad's was a blend of several which he never fully distinguished. His initial emphasis was on the antagonism between the intellectuals, as the educated class, and the workers. But in his *Aspects of Revolt* the intellectuals became identified with the *déclassés*, with those whom Marx, Engels, and Lafargue had characterized as the "lawyers without clients, doctors without patients and without knowledge, pool room students, commercial travellers and other salesmen, and particularly journalists of the small press." The person who became an ideologist then was a power-seeking individual who lacked the true discipline and dedication to a professional vocation. At other times, one wondered whether Nomad was reaching for the notion that the activist intellectuals were mediocrities in their professions, who as mediocrats sought a dictatorship which would rule not only over the masses but over the genuine creative intellectuals of whose abilities they were jealous. Sometimes Max's theory took an over-simplified form rather contrary, I think, to his basic intent. For instance, he described the American communist leaders of the mid-twenties as the products of an "overproduction of college graduates" which had made it difficult for Jewish intellectuals to find careers. However, Bertram Wolfe, Jay Lovestone and others of the college generation of 1916 actually had careers available; graduates were in demand. Then too there was the curious fact that such highly gifted leaders as Jean Jaurès, selfless, idealistic, and practical, also emerged from the ranks of the socialist intellectuals. Unlike the guilt-driven sectarians and the death-seeking rebels, such as Sophia Perovskaya, Jaurès delighted in all his activities—teaching, writing, politics, his family, friends, and his country's traditions. Max Nomad admired him greatly, though he did not fit easily into Max's categories.

Leon Trotsky once wrote that the Bolsheviks were the Jesuits of the revolutionary movement. The movement has had its counterpart of Franciscan brethren too. Max Nomad was of their number, akin in spirit to the Fraticelli, with their personal vows of renunciation of power and goods, and dedication to spiritual communism. At the end he recognized his impracticalities, for though he still professed opposition to all social systems, he preferred the welfare state, with its democracy, security, and mixed economy, and valued democratic socialists over totalitarian communists. In science, the physicist who recognizes impossibilities in nature goes on to derive from them various laws and

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generalizations; but Max hesitated to derive from his impossibilism the sociological law that every social movement, the progressive ones included, must avail itself of and transmute for its purposes the selfish and aggressive energies of men. To Max the admixture of any ingredient of evil destroyed the savour of life.

Nobody seemed to dwell more on political guilt and sin than Max Nomad. I knew him only in the last thirteen years or so of his life, yet his letters to me were preoccupied with incidents, which time had made altogether trivial, if they had not been so originally, expressing Max's feeling that he had transgressed his own standard of perfect morality. From this personal torment, however, issued the amazing series of studies in the sociology of political hypocrisy from *Rebels and Renegades* to *Political Heretics.* His wry sense of humour, nonetheless, never left him. I once told him that my parents had come as youngsters from a village near his own, and that the novelist Agnon who had won the Nobel Prize also lived in Max's village. Max Nomad replied:

"Your guess about Agnon is correct. In fact, when he was 13 (yes, 13) and I 20, he read to me his first opus (in Yiddish), a play about the Maccabees. I forgive you for atrociously misspelling the name of my birthplace (Buczacz), but I'll never forgive your calling it a village. It had at that time 12,000 inhabitants of whom 10,000 were Jews (that's about three times the population of your native Czortkow) [Max was mistaken: I was a native of Manhattan] and, considering the good opinion our people have of themselves, this is as good as a big city inhabited by 100,000 goyim." (Letter of 24 November, 1966.)

He lived simply in a small upper-West Side apartment cared for by his devoted wife Ray. The neighbourhood had declined with the years. Marauding bands stole Max's mail. Therefore his wife and he arranged for a private mail box at Grand Central. The masses at the end had failed the old impossibilist.

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Jane Degras
1905-1973

JANE DEGRAS, who died on 9 December 1973, was connected with *Survey* from the beginning, helping to edit it for many years. She was also my personal friend for over twenty years. Jane was a person of exceptional abilities and nowhere was it more obvious than in her editorial work. She used to say to me that she was born with a blue pencil in her fingers and there is really no exaggeration in that statement. She had an unerring instinct for the apt phrase, for clarity of expression and for organizing material to improve its publishable form. Many a young writer owes her a debt of gratitude, frequently not even realizing that it was she who presented his thoughts in a way that he was not yet capable of doing. She always did it with utmost faithfulness to the text, so that there were no complaints on the part of the authors who not only found her textual improvements acceptable, but positively welcomed them. In editing manuscripts she was capable of that rare thing: enhancing the form of the presentation without in any way changing the ideas of the writer.

Jane was born in London ('within the sound of Bow Bells', as she used to say), in a family of poor Jewish emigrants from Eastern Europe. Her scholarly talents soon emerged and she gained a degree with first class honours at the London School of Economics. In the early years of her career, she became attracted by the Communist movement and went to Moscow where she worked for three years at the Marx-Engels Institute. She frequently recalled this in our conversations, describing how, through personal experience, she became disillusioned with Communism in practice. When she came back to London, she gave up her Party membership and began her long scholarly career, specializing in Soviet and Communist affairs.

She joined the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in 1942, where she edited three volumes of *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917–1941*, which were followed by the three-volume collection of documents from the history of the *Communist International, 1919–1942*. Both these works remain indispensable reference books for every scholar, teacher and journalist concerned with these subjects.

During the last twenty years of her life, Jane worked first on *Survey* and then on the *Journal of Contemporary History*. Her contribution to both was invaluable. She was an excellent linguist and at the same time her attachment to the English language was nothing less than pedantic. She was not only pre-occupied with syntax, grammar and punctuation, but with clarity of style and elegance of expression. The final text had to be correct, precise, 'just right'. She could attune herself to different styles so that her 'stylistic interventions' always remained discreet and unobtrusive.

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Her personal misfortunes in life, and there were many, Jane bore with fortitude. She had more than her full share of the 'slings and arrows of outrageous fortune' and the bitterness they bring. In the last decade of her life her health deteriorated, but not the vitality of her mind. In her last letter to me which I received in Stanford, California, a few days before her death, she wrote that she had discharged herself from hospital: 'I feel much better at home: mentally, that is, though very weak as I can't get my weight above 6 stone (84 lb.). However, enough of that,' And, characteristically, she continued on matters of public interest, *viz.* the reaction in the West to the Middle East war:

> 'The world gets madder and madder. It seems inconceivable that governments and businessmen should be so short-sighted about their long-term interests. The *Economist* has been far and away the best on these matters, and absolutely withering on the suicidal trade unions here. I don't know if you saw, or heard of, the headline in the *Telegraph* the day after the EEC resolution on the Middle East—it was much the best: $9 \times 0 = 0$.'

Jane was very forthright in her political judgements, always expressing them with cutting directness.

She will be greatly missed by her many friends and by her family, to whom she was extremely devoted. We all appreciated her absolute personal honesty, her professional reliability and her intellectual integrity.

L. L.

George Lichtheim 1912-1973

George Lichtheim liked to think of himself as the last, or among the last, of the pre-war, bourgeois Central European intellectuals, and this he was, a free intellectual living by his wits and constantly keeping countless ideas in the air. Except for two brief intervals, he turned down all offers to attach himself to a university. Nor did he work in academic or public libraries: he relied for background information for his books on his own large collection of books on philosophy, history, politics and sociology. This meant the use of mostly secondary sources, but he shrewdly relied on his judgment of their value. He was a magnificent conversationalist, apt to lapse into monologues in which he could go off along tangents because ideas came to him faster than they could be expressed. To those who knew Lichtheim personally, parts of some of his later books, like *The History of Socialism*, read like such mono-

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logues, hammered out at the typewriter with at times half a dozen thoughts on issues of our time crowded into a sentence.

George Lichtheim was born in Berlin in 1912, the son of Richard Lichtheim, a leading German-Jewish Zionist, who spent some time in London in the Twenties as a member of the World Zionist Executive, then returned to Berlin. After Hitler's access to power in 1933, Richard Lichtheim emigrated to Palestine, where he settled in Jerusalem, to remain there until his death in 1963.

George Lichtheim, after his London years, was educated at a Gymnasium in Berlin, a city where he made some lifelong friends, in particular a young woman to whom he remained attached throughout his life, even though he did not see her for long intervals. He had just started on his second year in the study of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg when Hitler became German Chancellor and Lichtheim left Germany for London. This brief year was the end of his formal university study: after this he was entirely self-educated.

After a year in London, George Lichtheim also settled in Jerusalem, where from 1935 to 1948 he worked as foreign editor on the English language newspaper, the *Jerusalem Post*. This proved to be an excellent apprenticeship in English journalism for him. In Gershon Agronsky, Editor of the *Jerusalem Post*, he found an indulgent father figure, who let him write on international affairs broadly as he saw fit.

Being myself resident in Jerusalem in 1936–7, I well remember his frequent visits. I have an image of him, seen from our balcony, as he came walking down the road, with his feet slightly turned outwards—he was a handsome young man, with intense blue eyes gazing into the distance. He would drop into a chair and talk about Hitler and Beneš and Chamberlain and Stalin, and all political problems would seem to drop into place. He was already showing his talents. He had started a twice-weekly "Political Diary" in the *Jerusalem Post*, modelled on Kingsley Martin's "Critic's Diary" in the *New Statesman*, but often, I thought, rather better than the original. For a special *Jerusalem Post* issue to commemorate the end of World War Two (as he later told me), he sat down and wrote a survey of about 3,000 entries with scarcely any use of books of reference—his memory, at the time, was one of almost total recall.

In 1948 he left Israel to become, at first, a roving European correspondent for the *Jerusalem Post*. It was a hard decision—as he later often told me—all his life he would miss the warm company of his Jerusalem circle of close friends such as Samuel Zambursky and Gershon Sholem. But although he retained a soft spot for Israel, he was not a Zionist and the wider world called him. I remember his coming into my office in London (I was then a literary editor) to collect books for reviews, which he wrote under the pseudonym of "G. L. Arnold"—he wanted a pseudonym, he said, which was equally fitting in German or English, although he dropped it after two or three years.

To the question of what he intended to do, the answer was that he wanted to continue to study, especially on the subject of Marxism, and to write books. Surprisingly, the latter activity did not at the start come easily to him. A book of essays on post-war Europe was turned down in 1950 by the first London publisher and George Lichtheim, deeply wounded, would not submit it to any other firm. But in general,

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during the Fifties, he read and travelled, especially to America. For a time he was one of the editors of *Survey*, of *Commentary* and he was attached for brief spells to Stanford and Columbia, as visiting lecturer, but in fact he basically rejected academic life. Although it was shown that he could be a magnificent teacher, he preferred to be a free-lance writer—a free, Central European intellectual (and a confirmed bachelor).

The Fifties had been years of preparation. In 1960, George Lichtheim moved into a top-floor apartment in the London house of his friend Francis Carsten, the historian and expert on the Hapsburg empire. From here, surrounded by his ever-growing library and with his typewriter at the ready—he wrote his work straight on to the typewriter—he turned out a flow of essays, articles and reviews and a formidable series of books. It began in 1961 with his authoritative textbook, *Marxism: an Historical and Critical Study*. There followed *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays, Marxism in Modern France, A Short History of Socialism, The Origin of Socialism, From Marx to Hegel, Imperialism, George Lukacs* (in the "modern Masters" series in which Lichtheim cut this overrated Communist writer down to size), and concluding with his massive *Europe in the Twentieth Century*.

It is hard to define this body of work he left behind, because apart from his first book on Marxism, his books tended to be monologues in which he summed up, placed and precisely evaluated the work of others. As Martin Jay, the Berkeley historian, said about him in the October 1973 issue of *Midstream*:

"He was the master of a vast and complex body of thought, which he skilfully interwove with a profound knowledge of the history of the modern age, at least in the West. His basic talent lay in synthesizing the research of others rather than in performing the spade work himself, but in this endeavour he had few if any peers in the post-war world. Whether evaluating the historical role of a Churchill, debating the fine points of Hegelian metaphysics, or dissecting the intricacies of contemporary French politics, he combined a global perspective with a mastery of detail that was extraordinary."

And further:

"If Lichtheim was a Hegelian-Marxist in his philosophy, he was a social democrat in his politics. The only serious discontinuity he perceived in Marx's own development was between an early Jacobin phase and a later democratic one. Leninism, he argued, had revived the Jacobin Marx—admittedly for objective reasons in a Russia lacking an advanced labour movement—and was thus as much of a revisionism as the more celebrated variety associated with the name of Edward Bernstein."

These seem to me acute observations. As I said, the intellectual illumination to be drawn from the body of Lichtheim's work has yet to be judged, but as I look back at him, after his sad death, I have a picture of him, as it were, brooding constantly over the history of Socialism in the modern world: the thought of Hegel, the early humanist Marx, the later scientific Marx, the Western Socialists, labourism and Social Democracy, the Leninist secession. In his later works, he seemed fascinated with the task of seeing Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution

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and the gigantic structure which was its consequence in historical perspective. Let me here let Lichtheim speak for himself. In his *History of Socialism* (1970), for example, he argued that in the Soviet Union in the late Twenties, Bukharinist moderation would have been popular with the majority of the workers and peasants and, had he lived, might have had Lenin's support. But it was incompatible with the decision of the real Soviet controllers, the central Party bureaucracy at the head of the state apparatus, to turn the Soviet Union into a great industrial and military power able to meet the " imperialists " on equal terms:

" By adopting this course of action, which was urged upon him by the planners, the managers of heavy industry, the military leaders and the secret police, and then sticking to it at the cost of millions of lives, Stalin ensured the triumph of faction and the acceptance of his personal despotism. Stalinism, then, was the outcome of a uniquely terrible situation: a country already devastated by years of civil war, an inert peasantry and working class, a tradition of bureaucratic despotism, and the rule of a terrorist party apparatus able and willing to enforce its authority by the deliberate slaughter of millions in labour camps and man-made famines. No one will ever know the precise cost of Stalin's ' iron age ' (setting aside the military losses in 1941–5), but 20 million dead seems a reasonable estimate ... In principle the regime might have adopted Bukharin's policy of social peace and cooperation with the peasantry —and perhaps would have done so had Lenin lived a few years longer. But the mere fact that so much depended upon the accident of one man's presence points up the dangers of despotism."

In crammed paragraphs like this, one can see Lichtheim's fascination with an almost shorthand expression of ideas. He goes on:

> " In his empirical fashion—for he lacked any sort of theoretical capacity and indeed can hardly be thought to have understood what he was doing—Stalin had stumbled upon a major discovery. He had come to realize that a revolutionary party in control of the state could under modern conditions undertake a radical reorganization of the ' economic infrastructure '. Once in possession of political power, the party—provided it was animated by the necessary ruthlessness—could employ the state apparatus for the purpose of effecting social revolution from above. This was a discovery of great importance. It was also a complete innovation. The French Revolution had witnessed nothing of the sort. On the contrary, the Robespierrist experiment had failed precisely because in those days it was *not* possible for men in control of the political sphere to stand society on its head."

This never occurred to Trotsky, said Lichtheim, who like the Mensheviks was caught by notions of repeating the French Revolution. A few pages further in his *History of Socialism*, writing about foreign acceptance of the Soviet Union, Lichtheim says that Gramsci was only foremost in a generation of labour leaders who wrongly mistook the Russian Revolution for a proletarian seizure of power, and he goes on:

" In fact, it was nothing of the kind, nor could it have been. Russian Socialism was the creation of the gentry—a stratum already prominent before the belated rise of the bourgeoisie which missed its

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chance in 1917. Lenin was the last and greatest of those *déclassé* intellectuals who for a century had given form and content to the Populist doctrine that Russia could and should "skip" the capitalist stage. He was right in asserting that this doctrine had to be imported into the workers' movement, but the conclusion he drew—that "the party" must be composed of 'professional revolutionaries'—was irrelevant to the conditions under which Communist movements arose after 1919 in Central and Western Europe. A purely Russian notion, it was unacceptable even to Polish Marxists such as Rosa Luxemburg, and doubly unacceptable to labour leaders shaped in the Syndicalist tradition ...

The misunderstanding latent in this situation became apparent only after the Soviet bureaucracy had visibly cut its connection with the workers' movement. The delayed shock of this discovery accounts for the disarray of the Communist parties in all those advanced countries in which the labour movement has outgrown the primitive rebelliousness normally associated with the impact of early capitalism. Conversely, the Russian model, having been propounded in a retarded country by intellectuals stemming from the gentry, continues to have an emotional and intellectual appeal for radical intellectuals similarly situated, notably in Latin America and Southeast Asia."

One can see how ideas simply crowded into Lichtheim's sentences as he tries to show how events all "fit in" into modern history.

As the Sixties drew to their close, Lichtheim, in his flat in Professor Carsten's house, seemed to withdraw more and more from the world, becoming subject to spells of melancholia. He slowly lessened his journalist work until in spite of urgent pleas from British and American editors, he stopped journalist work altogether. He fell more and more into the role of an isolated Central European intellectual, really interested only in pre-war thinkers. History was changing: he told me at the end that what with the consumer society and the population explosion and the discovery of the finite nature of global resources, neither liberal capitalist nor Marxist ideas applied any more. In 1970 he was down-cast by the news that the young woman of his Berlin days for whom he had formed a lifelong attachment had died of cancer. Under the shock of the news, he told me, he sat down at the typewriter and more or less straightaway typed out his vast *Europe in the Twentieth Century*. But it was a last effort. In 1972–3, although commissioned for another book, he felt he had not the psychological resources left to begin work again and so in a fit of melancholia he came to his end. It was a sad loss: apart from the unique gap he left among his friends, he might have had another half a dozen books in him.

T. R. Fyvel

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THOMAS MOLNAR, Professor at the City University of New York, is Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Hillsdale College, Michigan during 1973-74. His books include: *The Decline of the Intellectual*; *Sartre, ideologue of our time*; *Utopia, the Perennial Heresy* and *God and the Knowledge of Reality.*

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SLAVIC STUDIES "BANFF '74"

A unique international conference will be held 5–7, September 1974 at Banff, Alberta, Canada. The conference is the first of its kind and is sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, the British Universities Association of Slavists, the Canadian Association of Slavists, and the National (British) Association of Soviet and East European Studies. The objective of the organizers is to bring together Western scholars specializing in this area and to enable them to exchange the results of their research on a wide variety of topics related to Soviet and East European Studies.

In addition to substantial delegations from Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, it is expected that there will be representation from the West European countries, including particularly France and Germany, and from the Pacific countries, including Australia, New Zealand and Japan. While the conference will be primarily a meeting of Western specialists, plans are also being made for the attendance of scholars from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Altogether some 700 delegates are expected.

The Canadian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, has agreed to act as the patron of the conference and to give an address on that occasion. The conference is being prepared by an international committee composed of members of the four sponsoring organizations.

Information concerning the conference may be obtained from Adam Bromke (Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6, Canada) or Don Karl Rowney (Department of History, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43402, U.S.A.), the co-chairmen of the committee. In Europe information may be obtained (including information concerning a charter flight which will be subsidized by a grant from the Ford Foundation) from Charles Drage (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, London, WC1E 7HU), or Fred Singleton (Department of Geography, University of Bradford, Bradford, England). The co-ordinator of the programme committee is Roger E. Kanet, Department of Political Science, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66044, U.S.A. Inquiries concerning specific panels should be addressed to the panel chairmen listed in the tentative programme.

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